?The stakeholder theory has been advanced and justified in the management literature on the basis of its descriptive accuracy, instrumental power, and normative validity. These three aspects of the theory, although interrelated, are quite distinct; they involve different types of evidence and argument and have different implications. In this article, we examine these three aspects of the theory and critique and integrate important contributions to the literature related to each. We conclude that the three aspects of stakeholder theory are mutually supportive and that the normative base of the theory-which includes the modern theory of property rights-is fundamental. If the unity of the corporate body is real, then there is reality and not simply legal fiction in the proposition that the managers of the unit are fiduciaries for it and not merely for its individual members, that they are . . . trustees for an institution [with multiple constituents] rather than attorneys for the stockholders.

http://www.faculty.wwu.edu/dunnc3/rprnts.stakeholdertheoryofcorporation.pdf

The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications

Survival of the Fittest? Entrepreneurial Human Capital and the Persistence of Underperforming Firms

Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis

Discussions of the link between firm size and innovation are outmoded because the boundaries of the firm have become fuzzy in recent decades. Strategic alliances — constellations of bilateral agreements among firms — are increasingly necessary to support innovative activities. Such alliances can facilitate complex coordination beyond what the price system can accomplish, while avoiding the dysfunctional properties sometimes associated with hierarchy. Antitrust law and competition policy need to recognize that these new organizational forms are often the functional antithesis of cartels, though they may have certain structural similarities. A more complete understanding of bilateral contracts and agreements ought to reveal when and how cooperation can support rather than impede innovation and competition.

Competition, cooperation, and innovation: Organizational arrangements for regimes of rapid technological progress

The northern California town of Mendocino, which was the shooting background for the film “East of Eden” starring James Dean, retains some of the air of its late nineteenth century role as a harbor to ship out lumber cut from the mountainsides. Ex-hippies-turned-farmers and artists live in the surrounding area. In the latter half of the 1990s, we rented a house facing the Pacific Ocean from an artist every summer. My wife and daughters went back and forth to Stanford for their activities, but I burrowed myself there for the summer with our dog Robin, brought back with us from Japan, and focused on writing my survey on comparative institutional analysis: Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis (MIT Press, 2001). Mornings and evenings I took Robin for a walk on the cape where there was a greater than 180 ° view. In the morning, the horizon was veiled in fog, while in the evening the ocean was tinted red by the setting sun. It was the perfect place for rethinking problems and reorganizing chapters. Robin was a small mixed breed with some Shikoku-ken, but she was stubborn and at times got into fights with a large Coast Guard officer’s watch dog. My family enjoyed meals made from the organic produce we bought at the farmers’ market (so many varieties of tomatoes); we also went to the harbor to buy albacore tuna and fresh sea urchin still in its thorny shell.

Norman J. Ireland

Papers

The co-operative game theory of the firm