This paper looks at representativeness in terms of policy dimensions As previous studies also have demonstrated, the analysis provides evidence that the level of policy agreement varies across policy domains The policy linkage is weak on questions of taxation and government administration Only on contemporary liberalism does the level of policy agreement begin to meet the standards of representational theory The occurrence of elections is found to be a particularly important determinant of legislative voting vis-a-vis constituency preferences California senators, elected for four-year terms, are undeniably unrepresentative to direct opinion during the first three years of their terms; representativeness increases dramatically during the final year Senators facing the possibility of having their reelection fortunes adversely affected by a presidential campaign are particularly attuned to district opinion during the final year of their terms Assemblymen, who are elected for two-year terms, are attuned to the wishes of their constituencies throughout their terms As the Founding Fathers believed, the frequency of elections conditions representatives' loyalty to the preferences of the represented

Representativeness and Elections: A Policy Analysis*

The delegate theory of representation posits that legislators ought to reflect purposively the preferences of their constituents. We show that this form of representation does take place on salient issues when the theory's two fundamental conditions are fulfilled simultaneously. First, legislators must think of themselves as delegates. Second, constituencies must provide consistent cues regarding district preferences to their representatives. The absence of either or both conditions seriously disrupts delegated representation.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2111003.pdf

The Delegate Theory of Representation

Legislative staff link Members of Congress and their constituents, theoretically facilitating democratic representation. Yet, little research has examined whether Congressional staff actually recognize the preferences of their Members’ constituents. Using an original survey of senior US Congressional staffers, we show that staff systematically mis-estimate constituent opinions. We then evaluate the sources of these misperceptions, using observational analyses and two survey experiments. Staffers who rely more heavily on conservative and business interest groups for policy information have more skewed perceptions of constituent opinion. Egocentric biases also shape staff perceptions. Our findings complicate assumptions that Congress represents constituent opinion, and help to explain why Congress often appears so unresponsive to ordinary citizens. We conclude that scholars should focus more closely on legislative aides as key actors in the policymaking process, both in the United States and across other advanced democracies.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0003055418000606

Legislative Staff and Representation in Congress

This article argues that political ambitions combined with the resources offered by professional legislatures can enhance the prospects for representation of citizen interests because ambitious legislators have strong incentives to closely monitor constituent opinions while they wait for a strategic opportunity to run for higher office. The effect of ambition for higher office should be especially pronounced in professional legislatures that provide members with high salaries, staff, and office budgets to aid their efforts. The relationship between ambition, legislative professionalism, and behavior are tested using data drawn from a survey of upper and lower chamber members in eight state legislatures. The results show that legislators who are progressively ambitious spend more time monitoring public opinion than legislators who are non-ambitious or statically ambitious and that legislative resources augment this effect.

The Incentive to Listen: Progressive Ambition, Resources, and Opinion Monitoring among State Legislators

Public policy in communist states usually is regarded as detached from ‘public opinion’.1 This inference can be drawn from both the general neglect of public opinion in studies of communist systems and an occasional explicit reference to the futility of such an explanation for policy in such states: 
As for such nondemocratic countries as the Soviet Union and East Germany, we can offer little empirical evidence to support the contention that public opinion acts as an important constraint on policy makers.2

In an authoritarian political system, where citizens’ participation activities are limited primarily to voting for a single party’s candidate, it is unlikely that many citizens will develop much confidence in themselves as able to influence national affairs. At the most, they will become ‘subject-participants,’ taking advantage of opportunities to contact bureaucrats, or informal ‘fixers,’ in order to shape governmental action as it affects their lives. Their citizenship roles are confined to the political output process.3
Where authors focus on the opinion-policy connection in the US, knowledge about public preferences in totalitarian systems is thought to provide an ‘excellent method’ for ‘monitoring and controlling popular dissatisfaction’.4

Public Opinion and Public Policy

This study assesses the ability of legislators to predict constituency opinion by comparing the predictions made by members of Florida's lower house with actual constituency opinion as reflected in subsequent referendum results. On the whole, predictions prove reasonably accurate. An attempt is also made to identify what influences legislators' predictions. On some issues, previous constituency voting behavior seems to guide the legislators' estimates of constituency opinion. Legislators' selfdescribed role orientations are not consistently related to prediction prowess.

Norman R. Luttbeg

Papers

Knowing One's District: How Legislators Predict Referendum Voting