Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison

This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a managerial power approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself. Boards of publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, we argue, cannot be expected to bargain at arm's length with managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We show that the managerial power approach can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that many researchers have long viewed as puzzling. Among other things, we discuss option plan design, stealth compensation, executive loans, payments to departing executives, retirement benefits, the use of compensation consultants, and the observed relationship between CEO power and pay. We also explain how managerial influence might lead to substantially inefficient arrangements that produce weak or even perverse incentives.

/pdf/executive-compensation-as-an-agency-problem-nn4xarpjrz.pdf

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Financial systems are crucial to the allocation of resources in a modern economy. They channel household savings to the corporate sector and allocate investment funds among firms; they allow intertemporal smoothing of consumption by households and expenditures by firms; and they enable households and firms to share risks. These functions are common to the financial systems of most developed economies. Yet the form of these financial systems varies widely. In the United States and the United Kingdom competitive markets dominate the financial landscape, whereas in France, Germany, and Japan banks have traditionally played the most important role. Why do different countries have such different financial systems? Is one system better than all the others? Do different systems merely represent alternative ways of satisfying similar needs? Is the current trend toward market-based systems desirable? Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale argue that the view that market-based systems are best is simplistic. A more nuanced approach is necessary. For example, financial markets may be bad for risk sharing; competition in banking may be inefficient; financial crises can be good as well as bad; and separation of ownership and control can be optimal. Financial institutions are not simply veils, disguising the allocation mechanism without affecting it, but are crucial to overcoming market imperfections. An optimal financial system relies on both financial markets and financial intermediaries.

比较金融系统 = Comparing financial systems

A Very Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix

This paper investigates the effects of largest-shareholder ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and audit quality on the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into share prices, as measured by stock price synchronicity, of Chinese-listed firms over the 1996-2003 period. We show that synchronicity is a concave function of ownership by the largest shareholder with its maximum at an approximately 50% level. Further, we find that synchronicity is higher when the largest shareholder is government related. We also find that foreign ownership and auditor quality are inversely associated with synchronicity. Finally, we show that the amount of earnings information reflected in stock returns is lower for firms with high synchronicity.

Ownership Concentration, Foreign Shareholding, Audit Quality, and Stock Price Synchronicity: Evidence from China

This report discusses the economic impact of the Coronavirus/COVID-19 crisis across industries, and countries. It also provides estimates of the potential global economic costs of COVID-19, and the GDP growth of different countries. 

The current draft includes estimates for 30 countries, under different scenarios.

The report shows the economic effects of outbreak are currently being underestimated, due to over-reliance on historical comparisons with SARS, or the 2008/2009 financial crisis. 

At the date of this report, the duration of the lockdown, as well as how the recovery will take place is still unknown. That is why several scenarios are used. In a mild scenario, GDP growth would take a hit, ranging from 3-6% depending on the country. As a result, in the sample of 30 countries covered, we would see a median decline in GDP in 2020 of -2.8%. In other scenarios, GDP can fall more than 10%, and in some countries, more than 15%.

Service-oriented economies will be particularly negatively affected, and have more jobs at risk. Countries like Greece, Portugal, and Spain that are more reliant on tourism (more than 15% of GDP) will be more affected by this crisis. This current crisis is generating spillover effects throughout supply chains. Therefore, countries highly dependent on foreign trade are more negatively affected. The results suggest that on average, each additional month of crisis costs 2.5-3% of global GDP.

/pdf/economic-effects-of-coronavirus-outbreak-covid-19-on-the-1scjzshr58.pdf

Economic Effects of Coronavirus Outbreak (COVID-19) on the World Economy

We investigate whether cross-listing in the U.S. affects the information environment for non-U.S. stocks. Our findings suggest cross-listing has an asymmetric impact on stock price informativeness around the world, as measured by firm-specific stock return variation. Cross-listing improves price informativeness for developed market firms. For firms in emerging markets, however, cross-listing decreases price informativeness. We also find that price informativeness increases the most for firms in countries with the greatest investor protection. The added analyst coverage associated with cross-listing likely explains the findings in emerging markets, rather than changes in liquidity, ownership, or accounting quality. Our results indicate that the added analyst coverage fosters the production of marketwide information, rather than firm-specific information.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1002531_code213659.pdf?abstractid=676653&rulid=5456062&mirid=3

Does International Cross-Listing Improve the Information Environment?

We investigate the relation between a country's first-time enforcement of insider trading laws and stock price informativeness using data from 48 countries over 1980-2003. Enforcement of insider trading laws improves price informativeness, as measured by firm-specific stock return variation, but this increase is concentrated in developed markets. In emerging market countries, price informativeness changes insignificantly after the enforcement, as the important contribution of insiders in impounding information into stock prices largely disappears. The enforcement does not achieve the goal of improving price informativeness in countries with poor legal institutions. It does turn some private information into public information, thereby reducing the cost of equity in emerging markets.

/pdf/insider-trading-laws-and-stock-price-informativeness-1475rm5hsv.pdf

Insider Trading Laws and Stock Price Informativeness

Does international cross-listing improve the information environment.

We investigate the relation between a country's first-time enforcement of insider trading laws and stock price informativeness using data from 48 countries over 1980--2003. Enforcement of insider trading laws improves price informativeness, as measured by firm-specific stock return variation, but this increase is concentrated in developed markets. In emerging market countries, price informativeness changes insignificantly after the enforcement, as the important contribution of insiders in impounding information into stock prices largely disappears. The enforcement does not achieve the goal of improving price informativeness in countries with poor legal institutions. It does turn some private information into public information, thereby reducing the cost of equity in emerging markets. The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.

/pdf/insider-trading-laws-and-stock-price-informativeness-feqsq0ux2o.pdf

Nuno Fernandes

Papers

Economic Effects of Coronavirus Outbreak (COVID-19) on the World Economy

Does International Cross-Listing Improve the Information Environment?

Insider Trading Laws and Stock Price Informativeness

Does international cross-listing improve the information environment.

Insider Trading Laws and Stock Price Informativeness