https://www.sfu.ca/~wainwrig/Econ400/jensen-meckling.pdf

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

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The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields

In this paper, the concept of social capital is introduced and illustrated, its forms are described, the social structural conditions under which it arises are examined, and it is used in an analys...

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Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital

In this paper, we argue that the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends is critical to its innovative capabilities. We label this capability a firm's absorptive capacity and suggest that it is largely a function of the firm's level of prior related knowledge. The discussion focuses first on the cognitive basis for an individual's absorptive capacity including, in particular, prior related knowledge and diversity of background. We then characterize the factors that influence absorptive capacity at the organizational level, how an organization's absorptive capacity differs from that of its individual members, and the role of diversity of expertise within an organization. We argue that the development of absorptive capacity, and, in turn, innovative performance are history- or path-dependent and argue how lack of investment in an area of expertise early on may foreclose the future development of a technical capability in that area. We formulate a model of firm investment in research and development (R&D), in which R&D contributes to a firm's absorptive capacity, and test predictions relating a firm's investment in R&D to the knowledge underlying technical change within an industry. Discussion focuses on the implications of absorptive capacity for the analysis of other related innovative activities, including basic research, the adoption and diffusion of innovations, and decisions to participate in cooperative R&D ventures. **

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Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and innovation

This paperback reader for students and scholars presents, in a convenient and accessible form, the articles which together form the foundations of research in transaction cost economics The volume is divided into three parts: the first part presents the background to the field and includes those path-breaking papers from Coase (1937 and 1972), Williamson (1971) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972) The second part addresses the apparatus of transaction cost economics and includes papers on the structure and limits of firms The third part presents the applications of transaction cost economics to firm behavior, investment decision-making, contract bidding, regulation and legislation

The Economics of Transaction Costs (Elgar Critical Writings Reader)

L'economie des couts de transaction traite l'analyse de l'organisation economique principalement comme un probleme de gouvernance des relations contractuelles. Cette approche a combine les apports des recherches juridiques, economiques et en organisation, pour identifier les modes alternatifs de gouvernance, pour en definir les attributs pertinents et pour en expliquer les performances relatives. Depuis sa creation, l'economie des couts de transaction a evolue, partant de methodes d'analyse non-formalisees et aboutissant a des methodes formalisees, bien que la formalisation de la rationalite limitee demeure insatisfaisante.

Contract and economic organization

Although the recent literature on externalities has done much to clarify the issues2, important problems in the analysis of externalities remain. This article attempts to deal with some of them. As Coase has observed, "Satisfactory views on policy can only come from a patient study of how, in practice, the market, firms, and governments handle the problem of harmful effects" [5, p. 18]. We would agree and extend this to include a statement that a patient study of practice can lead not only to policy improvements but also to theoretical refinements. Whereas the previous literature on externalities is almost entirely concerned with problems of non-human wealth, we are concerned here principally with aspects of human wealth which involve disability conditions. Similarly, whereas the previous literature deals with deterministic conditions for which damages are objectively specified, we treat the case where damages occur stochastically and the extent of damage is imperfectly specified. Moreover, whereas insurance is irrelevant when damages are deterministic, this is an important aspect of the analysis when probabilistic conditions prevail. Finally, while the previous literature on externalities has focused mainly on the objective of allocative efficiency and subordinates or dismisses equity objectives, and while the literature on disability neglects allocative effects, we attempt a combined analysis. Extending the analysis in these several ways in no sense requires that we begin anew. Quite the contrary: the existing externalities theory provides us with a solid foundation. We review the salient aspects of this theory in Section 1. The disability and insurance problems are studied in Section II. Applications of the theory to automobile and radiation damage and workmen's compensation generally are given in Section III. The findings are summarized in Section IV.

Externalities, Insurance, and Disability Analysis

Contents: Acknowledgements Introduction Oliver Williamson PART I THEORY AND CONCEPTS 1. O.E. Williamson (2001), 'Hierarchies and Markets' 2. Oliver E. Williamson (1971), 'The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations' 3. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations' 4. Oliver E. Williamson (1983), 'Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange' 5. Oliver E. Williamson (1991), 'Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives' 6. Oliver E. Williamson (1985), 'The Limits of Firms: Incentive and Bureaucratic Features' 7. Oliver E. Williamson (1991), 'Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization' PART II PUBLIC POLICY 8. Oliver E. Williamson (1976), 'Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - in General and with Respect to CATV' 9. Oliver E. Williamson (2009), 'Opening the Black Box of Firm and Market Organization: Antitrust' 10. Oliver E. Williamson (1988), 'Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance' 11. Oliver E. Williamson (2008), 'Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice' PART III INTERDISCIPINARY SOCIAL SCIENCE 12. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), 'Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory' 13. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), 'Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization' 14. Oliver E. Williamson (2005), 'Why Law, Economics, and Organization?' PART IV PERSPECTIVES 15. Oliver E. Williamson (2009), 'Pragmatic Methodology: A Sketch, with Applications to Transaction Cost Economics' 16. Oliver E. Williamson (2010), 'Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression'

The Transaction Cost Economics Project: The Theory and Practice of the Governance of Contractual Relations

This important two volume set contains a selection of key articles on transaction cost economics by distinguished scholars including Ronald Coase, Herbert Simon, Kenneth Arrow and Richard A. Posner. As well as addressing key areas such as private ordering and credibility, contracts and organization, internal organization, vertical integration and contracting, the editors have each compiled a new introduction to accompany the set.

Oliver E. Williamson

Papers

The Economics of Transaction Costs (Elgar Critical Writings Reader)

Contract and economic organization

Externalities, Insurance, and Disability Analysis

The Transaction Cost Economics Project: The Theory and Practice of the Governance of Contractual Relations

Transaction cost economics