Preface Dominique Strauss-Kahn 1. Introduction Philip Daniel, Michael Keen Charles McPherson (IMF) Part 1: Conceptual Overview 2. Theoretical perspectives on resource tax design Robin Boadway (Queens University, Canada) and Michael Keen (IMF) 3. Principles of resource taxation for low-income countries Paul Collier (University of Oxford) Part 2: Sectoral Experiences and Issues 4. Petroleum fiscal regimes: Evolution and challenges Carole Nakhle (University of Surrey, UK) 5. International mineral taxation: Experience and issues Lindsay Hogan (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics) and Brenton Goldsworthy (IMF) 6.' Natural gas: Experience and issues Graham Kellas (Wood Mackenzie) Part 3: Special Topics 7. Evaluating fiscal regimes for resource projects: An example from oil development Philip Daniel, Brenton Goldsworthy, Wojciech Maliszewski, Diego Mesa Puyo (all IMF) and Alistair Watson 8. Resource rent taxes: A re-appraisal Bryan Land (World Bank) 9. State participation in the natural resources sectors: Evolution, issues and outlook Charles McPherson (IMF) 10. How best to auction natural resources Peter Cramton (University of Maryland) Part 4: Implementation 11. Resource tax administration: The implications of alternative policy choices 12 Resource tax administration: Functions, procedures and institutions Jack Calder 13. International tax issues for the resources sector Peter Mullins (Australian Tax Office) Part 5: Stability and Credibility 14. Contractual assurances of fiscal stability Philip Daniel (IMF) and Emil Sunley 15. Time consistency in petroleum taxation: Lessons from Norway Petter Osmundsen (University of Stavanger, Norway)

The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals : Principles, Problems and Practice

Petroleum taxation under uncertainty: contingent claims analysis with an application to Norway

/pdf/7-evaluating-fiscal-regimes-for-resource-projects-an-example-8s09k2w9vn.pdf

7 Evaluating fiscal regimes for resource projects: an example from oil development

Host Governments have always been anxious to procure a share of the fruits of petroleum exploitation In most countries of the world petroleum rights are vested in the state, and the Government has thus traditionally been entitled to the landlord's share Economic rents from mineral exploitation have generally been thought to be a suitable subject for taxation because their collection should not introduce distortions to decision-making In the 1970s, following the large oil price rises, Governments all over the world were quick to introduce fiscal arrangements designed to ensure that their revenues also benefited from any expected economic rents Since the oil price collapse in 1986 many Governments have reduced their taxation somewhat, but high effective rates are still common

Øyvind Bøhren

Papers

North Sea oil taxes and the sharing of risk — a comparative case study