The question “what causes alignment?” remains a basic issue in international relations theory. Moreover, competing hypotheses about alliance formation underlie many recurring policy debates. Balance-of-power theory predicts states will ally to oppose the strongest state; the “bandwagoning hypothesis” predicts that alignment with the stronger side is more likely. These two hypotheses are usually framed solely in terms of the distribution of capabilities (that is, the balance of power), which neglects several other important factors and leads to faulty predictions about alliance choices. A careful examination of the alliance policies of Iran, Turkey, India, and Pakistan reveals that “balance-of-threat theory” provides a better explanation of alliance choices than these other conceptions. This theory predicts that states balance against the most threatening state, rather than the most powerful. Threats are a function of power, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and perceived intentions. Thus, balance-of-threat theory is an important refinement of structural balance- of-power theory.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0020818300032823

Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia

The Arms Trade With the Third World.

This essay presents a preliminary model of the factors that influence the value of positive and negative economic incentives in international politics. The first part of the article is a review of prior research findings on incentive value. It integrates several lines of research and organizes the findings into five categories that form the frame of a model of incentive value; target market characteristics, target political structure, characteristics of goods, world market conditions and sender state political structure. Since the studies used to create this frame focus primarily on negative incentives, the second part of the study tries to balance this bias with insights from cases of positive incentives. This analysis suggests some original points; it finds that capital goods are less useful as repeated rewards and that relational norms may affect the value of an incentive. The inductive portion of the analysis also highlights a major difference between negative and positive incentives. For while market forces work against limiting access to substitutes in negative incentives and thus decrease their value, limited alternatives were found to contribute to the value of positive incentives.

The Value of Economic Incentives in International Politics

Arms for the Third World: Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy

This article analyzes, consecutively, arms transfers from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its East European allies to the developing countries (stressing the economic motives of buyers and sellers that influence the supply of and demand for those arms), the East Europeans' role in East-South military relations (particularly their contribution to technical assistance and personnel training), and the cooperation of the USSR and the East European countries in military production. The analysis demonstrates that the international political economy and world-system approaches complement one another, and the principle for their reconciliation is established. Conclusions are drawn from the analysis concerning Eastern Europe's military relations with the Soviet Union, which are reconceptualized on the basis of the empirical work presented. The significance of changes in those relations for the future course of global military-industrial development is briefly explored.

The Political Economy of East-South Military Transfers

ARMS ON THE Indian subcontinent are required primarily for security reasons. Despite persuasive arguments to the contrary, the weapons procured by Pakistan and India have been utilized almost exclusively against each other. The situation has been exacerbated by the opposing strategic ambitions of the two superpowers and China in the region. Arms supply patterns, therefore, were established through the interaction of conflicting regional and international forces. The broad pattern of arms supplies to Pakistan and India needs brief description. The U.K., not surprisingly, was the earliest supplier of arms to the two countries and the weapons held by their armed forces at the time of independence in 1947 were of British origin. After 1954, Pakistan started obtaining military assistance from the United States under a Mutual Aid Treaty. India continued to procure military equipment from Britain and to some extent France, until the SinoIndian border conflict in 1962. Thereafter, military cooperation with the Soviet Union was established. After the Indo-Pak war in 1965 a Western arms embargo was imposed against Pakistan and India. Lacking indigenous defense production facilities, Pakistan was the more seriously affected. It turned towards France and later, more conspicuously, towards China. India was relatively better placed because of its growing defense production base. Military assistance from the Soviet Union continued, however, becoming very significant over the years. There is an important difference between governmental perceptions of external arms supplies in Pakistan and India. Pakistan has preferred arms imports, and it is only recently that the Pakistani elite has become conscious of the political liabilities attached to foreign military

P. R. Chari

Papers

Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation: A Review