Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world's top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers - often implicitly - assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these "standard subjects" are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species - frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior - hence, there are no obvious a priori grounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions of human nature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges.

/pdf/the-weirdest-people-in-the-world-480wr4m3kb.pdf

The WEIRDest People in the World

Summary and Future Directions On the basis of the aforementioned studies, the hopelessnesstheory appears promising However, further research is neededFor example, although powerful tests of the attributional diath-esis-stress component have been conducted, no one has exam-ined the cognitive diatheses of inferring negative consequencesor characteristics about the self or whether the cognitive stylediathesis-stress interaction predicts clinically significant de-pression Moreover, it is crucial to determine if this interactionpredicts the development of the hypothesized symptoms ofhopelessness depression More generally, an important short-coming of the prior work is that it has not focused on the symp-toms of hopelessness depression in particular and, instead, sim-ply has examined the symptoms of depression in general Fu-ture investigators need to test more fine-grained predictionsabout the hypothesized symptoms of hopelessness depressionThe issue of the stability of the cognitive diatheses has not beenresolved satisfactorily We have only begun, in a preliminaryway, to investigate the issues of specific vulnerability and media-tional processes Finally, further tests of the predictions aboutcourse, cure, and prevention are needed We eagerly await thisresearchDifficult methodological issues may arise in the search forhopelessness depression, however For example, the hopeless-ness theory is silent about the time lag between formation ofhopelessness and onset of the symptoms of hopelessness depres-sion If it is very short, then a major challenge will be to developmethods with sufficient temporal resolving power to determineif hopelessness indeed precedes the occurrence of the hypothe-sized symptoms of hopelessness depression (see Alloy, Hartlage,et al, 1988, for proposed methods for testing the hopelessnesstheory) The results of work to test the hopelessness theory willdetermine if the concept of hopelessness depression needs tobe revised For example, perhaps the statement of the causalpathway is correc t bu culminate n a differen se f symp-toms than those currently hypothesized to compose hopeless-ness depression In this case, the symptom—but not thecause—component of the hopelessness theory would need to bemodifiedIn discussing how to search for hopelessness depression, wenote the possibility that future work may not corroborate theexistence of hopelessness depression as a bona fide subtype withcharacteristic cause, symptoms, course, treatment, and preven-tion Instead, the etiological chain featured in the hopelessnesstheory may be one of many pathways to a final common out-come of depression In this case, it would be more compellingto speak of a hopelessness cause, as opposed to a hopelessnesssubtype, of depression

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/rev/96/2/358.pdf

Hopelessness depression: A theory-based subtype of depression.

I propose that the ways people respond to their own symptoms of depression influence the duration of these symptoms. People who engage in ruminative responses to depression, focusing on their symptoms and the possible causes and consequences of their symptoms, will show longer depressions than people who take action to distract themselves from their symptoms. Ruminative responses prolong depression because they allow the depressed mood to negatively bias thinking and interfere with instrumental behavior and problem-solving. Laboratory and field studies directly testing this theory have supported its predictions. I discuss how response styles can explain the greater likelihood of depression in women than men. Then I intergrate this response styles theory with studies of coping with discrete events. The response styles theory is compared to other theories of the duration of depression. Finally, I suggest what may help a depressed person to stop engaging in ruminative responses and how response styles for depression may develop.

Responses to depression and their effects on the duration of depressive episodes.

There is extensive evidence that people strongly value and are reluctant to relinquish the perception of control. Yet, both helplessness and locus of control theorists interpret various "inward" behaviors (passivity, withdrawal, and submissiveness) as signs of relinquished perceived control. As evidence, they note that inward behavior frequently is accompanied by causal attributions to limited ability, chance, and powerful others—all attributions that suggest uncontrollability. In contrast, we claim,that these attributions and the behaviors to which they relate may often reflect a type of perceived control that is generally overlooked. People attempt to gain control not only by bringing the environment into line with their wishes (primary control) but also by bringing themselves into line with environmental forces (secondary control). Four manifestations of secondary control are considered: (a) Attributions to severely, limited ability can serve to enhance predictive control and to protect against disappointment. Passive and withdrawn behaviors reflect the attempt to inhibit unfulfillable expectations, (b) Attributions to chance can reflect illusory control, since people often construe chance as a personal characteristic akin to an ability ("luck"). Individuals who make attributions to chance may exhibit passivity and withdrawal in skill situations, reserving energy and emotional investment for situations that allow them to capitalize on their perceived strength—that is, being lucky, (c) Attributions to powerful others permit vicarious control when the individual identifies with these others. Submission to a powerful leader, a group, or a deity sometimes enables the individual to join in their power, (d) All of the preceding attributions may foster interpretive control, in which the individual seeks to understand and derive meaning from otherwise uncontrollable events in order to accept them. When perceived control is recognized in both its primary and secondary forms, a broad range of inward behaviors can be seen as efforts to sustain rather than relinquish the perception of control.

/pdf/changing-the-world-and-changing-the-self-a-two-process-model-jo5n2dpgej.pdf

Changing the world and changing the self: A two-process model of perceived control.

Literature on temperament, personality, and mood and anxiety disorders is reviewed. The review is organized primarily around L. A. Clark and D. Watson's (1991b) tripartite model for these disorders, but other influential approaches are also examined. Negative affectivity (or neuroticism) appears to be a vulnerability factor for the development of anxiety and depression, indicates poor prognosis, and is itself affected by the experience of disorder. Positive affectivity (or extraversion) is related more specifically to depression, may be a risk factor for its development, suggests poor prognosis, and also may be affected by the experience of disorder. Other personality dimensions (e.g., anxiety sensitivity, attributional style, sociotropy or dependence, autonomy or self-criticism, and constraint) may constitute specific vulnerability factors for particular disorders. More longitudinal and measurement-based research that jointly examines anxiety and depression is needed.

Temperament, personality, and the mood and anxiety disorders.

In this article we report meta-analyses of the relation of attributional styles to depression. In 104 studies involving nearly 15,000 subjects, several attributional patterns had reliable associations with depression scores. For negative events, attributions to internal, stable, and global causes had a reliable and significant association with depression. Studies in which the attribution factors of ability and luck were measured also showed a reliable association with depression. For positive events, attributions to external, unstable, and specific causes were associated with depression. Ability and luck attribution factors for positive events were also associated with depression. The relations for positive events, however, were weaker than the corresponding ones for negative events. In general, these patterns of relations were independent of a number of potential mediators suggested by authors in this literature, including the type of subject studied (psychiatric vs. college student), the type of event about which the attribution is made (real vs. simulated), the depression measure used, or the publication status of the research report. These conclusions are compared with those of other reviews. Implications for attributional models of depression are discussed.

Attributional style in depression: A meta-analytic review.

Selective exposure: Voter information preferences and the Watergate affair.

Mind over matter: Perceived success at psychokinesis.

https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED259244.pdf

Paul D. Sweeney

Papers

Attributional style in depression: A meta-analytic review.

Selective exposure: Voter information preferences and the Watergate affair.

Mind over matter: Perceived success at psychokinesis.

Another look at the relation between private self-consciousness and self-attribution