This article examines a range of potential causal variables of state legitimacy using a globally representative set of 72 countries accounting for 83 percent of the world’s population. Major theories of legitimacy determinants are advanced and tested using survey and expert data. Three variables (which measure good governance, democratic rights, and welfare gains) are then chosen from among all strongly correlated variables as being the most plausible basis for a causal theory. The theory is then further tested using 31 pairs of countries with similar income levels and in similar regions, which shows a significant positive correlation between performance and legitimacy. The article concludes with suggestions for further research.

The Determinants of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries:

FR) Le Règlement 258/2012 vise à réduire le risque de trafic illicite d’armes à feu à usage civil en établissant des règles communes pour l’exportation, l’importation et le transit extra-UE d’armes à feu, de leurs pièces, éléments et munitions. L’étude analyse dans quelle mesure le Règlement 258/2012 a été efficace, efficient, pertinent vis-à-vis des besoins de l’UE, cohérent et complémentaire avec les instruments de l’UE et internationaux dans le domaine du contrôle d’armes, et a apporté une valeur ajoutée de l’UE. L’étude confirme que le Règlement 258/2012 est globalement une initiative pertinente pour répondre aux risques de trafic illicite, et notamment de détournement, d’armes à feu civiles. Les pratiques nationales de mise en œuvre du Règlement ont abouti à la création d’un système préventif et à l’adoption de règles minimales communes sur l’exportation, l’importation et le transit qui limitent les risques liés à la sécurité des échanges internationaux. Cependant, l’étude met en évidence qu’il serait possible d’harmoniser davantage les pratiques nationales et d’améliorer l’échange d’information, d’augmenter la pertinence globale de l’initiative de l’UE en répondant aux risques que représentent les objets convertibles, et d’améliorer la cohérence en clarifiant les « zones grises » avec la Position commune 2008/944/PESC et les incohérences avec la Directive révisée sur les armes à feu. En s’appuyant sur l’évaluation, l’étude identifie des recommandations, avec différents niveaux de priorité, et des actions spécifiques de mise en œuvre.

Final Report on

The expectation of political authorities that people will comply with their demands is typically based not only on such considerations as the latter’s fear of punishment, hope of reward, habit or apathy, but also on the notion that they have the right to make such demands. This notion both inheres, explicitly or implicitly, in the claims of the authorities, and is reciprocated, to a greater or lesser extent, in the minds of those of whom compliance is demanded. This is what we mean by the ‘legitimacy’ of political power and authority, a concept of ancient pedigree whose modern usage we owe largely to Max Weber. Both the term and the phenomenon have given rise to much argument, and some of the matters at issue will be touched on in what follows, but this account will suffice to launch our discussion.1

Introduction: Political Legitimacy, Weber and Communist Mono-organisational Systems

State development in Africa is risky, even life-threatening. Heads of state must weigh the advantage of promoting political and economic development against the risk of fortifying dangerous political rivals. This book takes a novel approach to the study of neopatrimonial rule by placing security concerns at the center of state-building. Using quantitative evidence from 44 African countries and in-depth case studies of Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, Rabinowitz demonstrates that the insecurities of the African state make strategically aligning with rural leaders critical to political success. Leaders who cultivate the goodwill of the countryside are better able to endure sporadic urban unrest, subdue political challengers, minimize ethnic and regional discord, and prevent a military uprising. Such regimes are more likely to build infrastructure needed for economic and political development. In so doing, Rabinowitz upends the long-held assumption that African leaders must cater to urban constituents to secure their rule.

Coups, Rivals, and the Modern State: Why Rural Coalitions Matter in Sub-Saharan Africa

Military interventions continue to be pervasive in Africa. Thirty out of forty-eight sub-Saharan states have experienced at least one successful coup. Nor have these numbers abated. In the 21st century alone, thirteen coups have been successfully staged in Africa, thus far. At the same time, several African countries - such as Ghana, Uganda, Burkina Faso and Benin - have managed to escape from seemingly insurmountable coup-traps. Yet, we understand little about what drives countries into a coup-trap and even less about how countries can extricate themselves from one. What explains this divergence? To address these contradictory trends, I focus initially on Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, neighboring states, with comparable populations, topographies, and economies that have experienced contrasting trajectories. While Ghana suffered five consecutive coups from the 1966 to 1981, Cote d'Ivoire was an oasis of stability and prosperity. However, by the end of the 20th century, Ghana had emerged as one of the few stable two-party democracies on the continent, as Cote d'Ivoire slid into civil war. Why was Cote d'Ivoire so much more stable and prosperous than Ghana in the `60s and `70s? And what explains their dramatic reversal of fortunes?I answer these puzzles by examining the political strategies of regimes in both countries, with a particular focus on rural alliances. I find that the leaders who followed a rural political strategy were better able to preserve stability, while those who followed an urban political strategy were more likely to suffer coups. In contrast to the prevalent urban-bias thesis, I contend that traditional elites and producers in rural areas - not the organized urban sectors - are most critical to political stability. To show the wider applicability of my thesis, I extend my argument beyond these two countries. In a systematic review of fifty-eight regimes over eighteen sub-Saharan countries, I demonstrate that the rural/urban dichotomy is pervasive and predictive of the success/failure of regimes. Using formal modeling, I show a strong and robust correlation between supporting rural areas and the likelihood of being ousted in a coup as well as longevity in power

https://escholarship.org/content/qt3q6104zr/qt3q6104zr.pdf?t=ny5vzh

Paul R. Dettman

Papers

Leaders and Structures in 'Third World' Politics: Contrasting Approaches to Legitimacy