Smart object technology, sometimes called the Internet of Things, is having a profound impact on our day-to-day lives. Interconnecting Smart Objects with IP is the first book that takes a holistic approach to the revolutionary area of IP-based smart objects. Smart objects are the intersection of networked embedded systems, wireless sensor networks, ubiquitous and pervasive computing, mobile telephony and telemetry, and mobile computer networking. This book consists of three parts, Part I focuses on the architecture of smart objects networking, Part II covers the hardware, software, and protocols for smart objects, and Part III provides case studies on how and where smart objects are being used today and in the future. The book covers the fundamentals of IP communication for smart objects, IPv6, and web services, as well as several newly specified low-power IP standards such as the IETF 6LoWPAN adaptation layer and the RPL routing protocol. This book contains essential information not only for the technical reader but also for policy makers and decision makers in the area of smart objects both for private IP networks and the Internet.



Shows in detail how connecting smart objects impacts our lives with practical implementation examples and case studies 
Provides an in depth understanding of the technological and architectural aspects underlying smart objects technology 
Offers an in-depth examination of relevant IP protocols to build large scale smart object networks in support of a myriad of new services 

Table of Contents

Part I: The Architecture Chapter 1: What are Smart objects? Chapter 2: The IP protocol architecture Chapter 3: Why IP for smart objects? Chapter 4: IPv6 for Smart Object Networks and The Internet of Things Chapter 5: Routing Chapter 6: Transport Protocols Chapter 7: Service Discovery Chapter 8: Security for Smart Objects Chapter 9: Web services For Smart Objects Chapter 10: Connectivity models for smart object networks 
Part II: The Technology Chapter 11: What is a Smart Object? Chapter 12: Low power link layer for smart objects networks Chapter 13: uIP A Lightweight IP Stack Chapter 14: Standardization Chapter 15: IPv6 for Smart Object Networks - A Technology Refresher Chapter 16: The 6LoWPAN Adaptation Layer Chapter 17: RPL Routing in Smart Object Networks Chapter 18: The IPSO Alliance Chapter 19: Non IP Technology

Part III: The Applications Chapter 20: Smart Grid Chapter 21: Industrial Automation Chapter 22: Smart Cities and Urban Networks Chapter 23: Home Automation Chapter 24: Building Automation Chapter 25: Structural Health Monitoring Chapter 26: Container Tracking

Interconnecting Smart Objects with IP: The Next Internet

This document specifies a point-to-point route discovery mechanism,
complementary to the Routing Protocol for Low-power and Lossy Networks
(RPL) core functionality. This mechanism allows an IPv6 router to
discover "on demand" routes to one or more IPv6 routers in a Low-power
and Lossy Network (LLN) such that the discovered routes meet specified
metrics constraints.

Reactive Discovery of Point-to-Point Routes in Low-Power and Lossy Networks

This specification defines REsource LOcation And Discovery (RELOAD), a
peer-to-peer (P2P) signaling protocol for use on the Internet. A P2P
signaling protocol provides its clients with an abstract storage and
messaging service between a set of cooperating peers that form the
overlay network. RELOAD is designed to support a P2P Session
Initiation Protocol (P2PSIP) network, but can be utilized by other
applications with similar requirements by defining new usages that
specify the Kinds of data that need to be stored for a particular
application. RELOAD defines a security model based on a certificate
enrollment service that provides unique identities. NAT traversal is a
fundamental service of the protocol. RELOAD also allows access from
"client" nodes that do not need to route traffic or store data for
others.

REsource LOcation And Discovery (RELOAD) Base Protocol

In Low-Power and Lossy Networks (LLNs), memory constraints on routers
may limit them to maintaining, at most, a few routes. In some
configurations, it is necessary to use these memory-constrained
routers to deliver datagrams to nodes within the LLN. The Routing
Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) can be used in some
deployments to store most, if not all, routes on one (e.g., the
Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) root) or a few routers and forward the
IPv6 datagram using a source routing technique to avoid large routing
tables on memory-constrained routers. This document specifies a new
IPv6 Routing header type for delivering datagrams within a RPL routing
domain. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

An IPv6 Routing Header for Source Routes with the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)

There is growing operational awareness of the challenges in securely operating IPv6 networks. Through a measurement study of 520,000 dual-stack servers and 25,000 dual-stack routers, we examine the extent to which security policy codified in IPv4 has also been deployed in IPv6. We find several high-value target applications with a comparatively open security policy in IPv6 including: (i) SSH, Telnet, SNMP, are more than twice as open on routers in IPv6 as they are in IPv4; (ii) nearly half of routers with BGP open were only open in IPv6; and (iii) in the server dataset, SNMP was twice as open in IPv6 as in IPv4. We conduct a detailed study of where port blocking policy is being applied and find that protocol openness discrepancies are consistent within network boundaries, suggesting a systemic failure in organizations to deploy consistent security policy. We successfully communicate our findings with twelve network operators and all twelve confirm that the relative openness was unintentional. Ten of the twelve immediately moved to deploy a congruent IPv6 security policy, reflecting real operational concern. Finally, we revisit the belief that the security impact of this comparative openness in IPv6 is mitigated by the infeasibility of IPv6 network-wide scanning—we find that, for both of our datasets, host addressing practices make discovering these high-value hosts feasible by scanning alone. To help operators accurately measure their own IPv6 security posture, we make our probing system publicly available.

Don't Forget to Lock the Back Door! A Characterization of IPv6 Network Security Policy

The functionality provided by IPv6's Type 0 Routing Header can be
exploited in order to achieve traffic amplification over a remote path
for the purposes of generating denial-of-service traffic. This
document updates the IPv6 specification to deprecate the use of IPv6
Type 0 Routing Headers, in light of this security concern. [STANDARDS-
TRACK]

Pekka Savola

Papers

Deprecation of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6