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Showing papers by "Peter Hays Gries published in 2022"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article , an integrated model of mediators and moderators of the impact of ideology on foreign policy was developed, which hypothesizes that ideologically motivated perceptions of threat and national power sequentially mediate the influence of individual-level ideologies on policy preferences and that in/outgroup social categorization processes moderate the relationship.
Abstract: A growing literature demonstrates that ideology shapes international relations. But just how does ideology have its effect? This article develops an integrated model of mediators and moderators of the impact of ideology on foreign policy. Specifically, it hypothesizes that ideologically motivated perceptions of threat and national power sequentially mediate the impact of individual-level ideologies on foreign policy preferences, and that in/out-group social categorization processes moderate the relationship. We interrogate these propositions with three plausibility probe case studies. The conclusion discusses which aspects of the model were best supported by the plausibility probes—and suggests hypotheses for future causal testing.

2 citations


Peer ReviewDOI
TL;DR: This paper explored the individual-level psychological micro-foundations of history wars and found that exposure to China's claim to the Gogouli/Goguryeo Kingdom undermined Korean pride, increasing dislike of China, and lessening desire to cooperate with it.
Abstract: Abstract Do history wars shape international affairs? If so, how and for whom? Taking the historical dispute between China and South Korea over the ancient Gaogouli/Goguryeo Kingdom as a case study, this article explores the individual-level psychological micro-foundations of history wars. A 2020 survey experiment in South Korea pit “ours” vs “theirs” Goguryeo imitation Wikipedia entries to explore their downstream consequences. It revealed direct, indirect, and conditional effects. Exposure to China's claim to the Kingdom undermined Korean pride, increasing dislike of China, and lessening desires to cooperate with it. Pre-existing levels of nationalism divided South Koreans in how angry they became after exposure the Wikipedia primes. That anger, however, only shaped the China policy preferences of those South Koreans who viewed the balance of military power with China favorably. Implications for ownership disputes over kimchi and other national possessions are also discussed, as are the implications of history wars for war and peace in twenty-first-century East Asia.

1 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper explored what public opinion data from a fall 2020 survey of six CEE countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Serbia, and Slovakia) can teach us about the drivers of CEE attitudes toward China.
Abstract: During the past decade, China has rapidly emerged as a major player in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Will it divide Europe? Might these formerly communist countries align themselves again with a communist superpower to their east? Or does their past experience of Russia and communism generate suspicions of China? This article explores what public opinion data from a fall 2020 survey of six CEE countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Serbia, and Slovakia) can teach us about the drivers of CEE attitudes toward China. It suggests that China has become a “second Eastern power” beyond Russia against which many people in the CEE have come to define themselves. Although there are large differences between CEE publics in their views of China, individual-level self-identifications with the East or West, and attitudes toward the communist past and communism today consistently shape views of both Russia and China. Russia looms large for all in the CEE, but especially for Latvia and Poland, whose views of China appear to be almost completely mediated through attitudes toward their giant Russian neighbor. We conclude with thoughts on the implications of these findings about the structure of CEE public opinion toward China for the future of the “16+1” mechanism and CEE-China relations more broadly.