Extraterritorial jurisdiction stands at the juncture of international law and animal law and promises to open a path to understanding and resolving the global problems that challenge the core of animal law. As corporations have relocated and the animal industry (agriculture, medical research, entertainment, etc.) has dispersed its production facilities across the territories of multiple states, regulatory gaps and fears of a race to the bottom have become a pressing issue of global policy. Protecting Animals Within and Across Borders provides enough background to allow readers to understand why extraterritorial jurisdiction must respond to these developments, counters objections that readers might raise, and describes how to improve animal law in tandem. The heart of the work is a fully fledged catalog of options for extraterritorial jurisdiction, which states can employ to strengthen their animal laws. The book offers top-down perspectives drawn from general international law and trade law, and complements them with a bottom-up view from the perspective of animal law. The approach connects the law of jurisdiction to substantive law and opens up deeper questions about moral directionality, state and corporate duties owed to animals, and the comparative advantages of applying constitutional, criminal, and administrative animal law across the border. To ensure that extraterritorial animal law does not become complicit in oppressing ethnic, cultural, or any other minorities, the book offers critical interdisciplinary perspectives, informed by studies on posthumanism and postcolonialism. Readers will further learn when and how extraterritorial jurisdiction violates international law, and the consequences of exercising it illegally under international law. This work answers questions about how and why extraterritorial jurisdiction can overcome the steepest hurdles for animal law and help us move toward a just global interspecies community.

Protecting Animals Within and Across Borders: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Challenges of Globalization

Introduction: filling or falling between the cracks? Law's potential Jeremy Farrall and Kim Rubenstein Part I. Setting Down the Foundations: 1. Whose public? Which law? Mapping the internal/external distinction in international law Peter G. Danchin 2. The potential for a post-Westphalian convergence of 'Public Law' and 'Public International Law' Charles Sampford Part II. Internationalising Public Law: 3. Globalisation and public law: a global administrative law? Simon Chesterman 4. The deliberative deficit: transparency, access to information and UN sanctions Devika Hovell 5. Who guards the guardian? Towards regulation of the UN security council's chapter VII powers through dialogue Hitoshi Nasu 6. Holding the United Nations security council accountable for human rights violations through domestic and regional courts: a case of 'Be Careful What You Wish For'? Erika de Wet Part III. Implementing Security Council Sanctions: 7. 'A Delicate Business': did AWB's kickbacks to Iraq under the United Nations Oil-For-Food Programme constitute a violation of Australia's international obligations? Kevin Boreham 8. Should the United Nations security council leave it to the experts? The governance and accountability of UN sanctions monitoring Jeremy Farrall Part IV. The Place of Corporations: 9. The nexus between human rights and business: defining the sphere of corporate responsibility Justine Nolan 10. At the intersection of international and municipal law: the case of Commissioner Cole and the Wheat Export Authority Linda Botterill and Anne McNaughton Part V. The Role of Lawyers: 11. International legal advisers and transnational corporations: untangling roles and responsibilities for sanctions compliance Stephen Tully 12. What is the right thing to do? Reflections on the AWB scandal and legal ethics Vivien Holmes Part VI. Public Law and Public Policy: 13. Who's responsible? Justiciability of private and political decisions Daniel Stewart 14. AWB and oil for food: some issues of accountability Richard Mulgan Part VII. Parallel Case Studies: 15. Discriminating for world peace Simon Rice 16. Removing barriers to protection at the exported border: visas, carrier sanctions, and international obligation Angus Francis Concluding remarks Thomas Pogge.

https://assets.cambridge.org/97805211/14929/frontmatter/9780521114929_frontmatter.pdf

Sanctions, Accountability and Governance in a Globalised World

Targeted sanctions—often referred to as “smart sanctions”—began in large measure as a response to the UN Security Council sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990 and 1991, after its invasion of Kuwait. By 1991 it was clear that the sanctions on Iraq, initially welcomed by antiwar activists as a peaceful alternative to military action, were different from any sanctions seen before. Combined with the destruction from the bombing campaign of the Gulf War, they were devastating to the Iraq economy and infrastructure, resulting in widespread malnutrition, epidemics of water-borne diseases, and the collapse of every system necessary to ensure human well-being in a modern society. As the sanctions seemed to have no end in sight, there was considerable “sanctions fatigue” within the United Nations, as well as a growing body of literature that questioned whether sanctions were effective at obtaining compliance by the target state, even when there was considerable impact on its economy.In the wake of these concerns, there were efforts in many venues to design sanctions that would not have the humanitarian impact of broad trade sanctions, and that would also be more effective by putting direct pressure on individual national policy-makers. These targeted sanctions included arms embargoes, financial sanctions on the assets of individuals and companies, travel restrictions on the leaders of a sanctioned state, and trade sanctions on particular goods. Many viewed targeted sanctions as an especially promising tool for foreign policy and international governance, and many still see targeted sanctions as a natural and obvious solution to a broad array of difficult situations. But there are considerable difficulties with each type of targeted sanction, with regard to implementation, humanitarian impact, and, in some cases, due process rights. Some of these difficulties may be resolved as these measures continue to be refined. Others are rooted in fundamental conflicts between competing interests or intractable logistical challenges.

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Smart Sanctions Revisited

La confiscation fait partie des strategies contre la criminalite, en particulier contre la delinquance financiere ; ces strategies sont de plus en plus centrees sur les profits. Dans la premiere partie de l'etude, nous examinons les instruments internationaux contenant des dispositions relatives a la confiscation et a l'entraide aux fins de confiscation. Dans la deuxieme partie, l'accent est mis sur les initiatives de l'UE dans le cadre du renforcement de la cooperation judiciaire penale, en particulier a des fins de confiscation. Dans la troisieme partie, nous examinons les dispositions du droit suisse de la confiscation. Il ressort de notre analyse la necessite d'une adaptation ciblee des instruments nationaux et internationaux en matiere de saisie et de confiscation. A cet egard, il faut optimiser, d'une part, l'efficacite de l'"asset tracing"; d'autre part, il faut assurer la protection des droits des personnes touchees par la saisie et la confiscation.

Confiscation internationale: instruments internationaux, droit de l’Union européenne, droit suisse

...................................................................................................... x List Of Abbreviations ........................................................................................... xi Acknowledgments ............................................................................................ xiii Chapter

Global Animal Law and International Trade Law After EC-Seal Products: An Interactional Analysis

Under recent European Union regulations promulgated with overwhelming popular support, seal products may neither be placed on the European market internally nor imported into the EU. As a result Canada, Norway, and Iceland – all states that deal in seal products – filed complaints with the World Trade Organization, contending that the EU’s actions were contrary to its commitments to free trade under international trade agreements. Many animal advocates hope this will be the first case to establish that the General Exception found in Article XX(a) of the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT), for measures that are “necessary to protect public morals,” can be used to justify animal welfare laws that otherwise adversely affect trade. Unfortunately, this hope may be misplaced, not because such measures don’t fit within Article XX(a), but rather because of the specific manner in which the EU chose to implement its regulatory ban. The regulations implementing the EU seal products ban include exclusions and exceptions that fail to distinguish between humane and inhumane practices, and which nevertheless permit some seal products to be placed on the market in the EU, or – perhaps even more significantly – to transit the EU to other markets thereby protecting the business of European brokers and forwarders. While much of the commentary to-date has focused on the regulatory exception for traditional seal hunts conducted by Inuits and other indigenous peoples, it is these other additional exceptions and exclusions that were added to the European Commission’s initial proposal during the political approval process that may well prove to be more problematic in any decision by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Ironically, the initial scheme not only better served animal welfare interests but, given the DSB’s emphasis upon a narrow textual interpretation of the WTO agreements, the tighter initial scheme would also have been more likely meet the requirements of Article XX.While animal welfare polices, in appropriate cases, certainly should fit under Article XX(a) General Exception for measures “necessary to protect public morals,” the details of this particular regulatory scheme do not comport with either the “necessity” requirement of the exception, or the requirement to avoid “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination” imposed by the chapeau. It may be that the best that can be expected is a decision similar to what occurred with the US environmental measures at issue in Shrimp-Turtle II, that is, a pronouncement that the “public morals” exception might well be useful in an animal welfare context, but that such measures must also respect the rights of exporting States under the WTO Agreements in a manner which this particular regulatory scheme fails to do. The EU will then need to decide whether to essentially ignore the WTO decision, and bear the costs of compensation or retaliation, or – in a manner similar to what ultimately occurred in Shrimp-Turtle or the Australia-Salmon cases, remedy the deficiencies in the current scheme and more fully embrace the animal welfare objective and abandon the various exceptions and gaps in coverage found in the current regulations.

'Morality' May Not Be Enough to Justify the EU Seal Products Ban: Animal Welfare Meets International Trade Law

Under recent European Union regulations that were promulgated with overwhelming popular support, 2 seal products may neither be placed on the European market internally nor imported into the EU. 3 ...

“Morality” May Not Be Enough to Justify the EU Seal Products Ban: Animal Welfare Meets International Trade Law

Economic sanctions, tools that seek to deprive terrorist organizations of the financial ability to support and conduct operations such as the attacks on Washington and New York, are among the U.S. government's most powerful weapons in the war on terrorism. Sanctions greatly expand the reach of the government's own anti-terrorism efforts, by effectively enlisting the aid of the financial and trading communities in identifying and blocking access to assets belonging to terrorist organizations and their supporters. However, there is a significant difference between simply serving political goals by announcing sanctions, and promulgating controls that are actually effective in combating terrorism. Given the new appreciation of the very real need to deprive terrorist of the ability to finance attacks like those that occurred late last year, one might ask how these controls can be made more practical and effective in the ongoing war on terrorism than they evidently proved to be in the past?The manner in which sanctions programs are actually implemented and administered has immediate and practical consequences. The importance of enlisting non-govermnental parties in the war on terrorism, for example in foreclosing the terrorists' ability to move or launder funds through unofficial channels such as the hawalu or hundi money networks, is now more clear than ever but the devil is in the details. If these programs are not properly implemented, the government's objectives may be undermined or frustrated. Similarly, the burdens imposed on those who seek to comply in good faith with the government's policies may be unnecessarily increased if the regulatory controls are not properly crafted and administered. This paper attempts to show how those burdens can be eased while simultaneously making the governmental controls more effective.

Managing Smart Sanctions Against Terrorism Wisely

The extraterritorial application of U.S. economic sanctions and trade controls is a perennial topic of discussion among international trade practitioners and a frequent cause for concern abroad. While long present in one form or another as part of several U.S. trade and export control programs, there has been a resurgence in the use of unilateral extraterritorial trade regulation by the United States following the unraveling of widespread international consensus on who should be the targets for such controls and sanctions as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the demise of the international Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls. Moreover, the pressures created by rapidly developing new means of conducting domestic and international commerce online and over the Internet now exacerbate the problems created with these types of controls,by vastly increasing both the number of international transactions and the speed with which they are conducted. The most recent focus of the discussion of unilateral extraterritorial controls in the popular and academic press has been the Helms-Burton Act, which revised the terms of the U.S. embargo of Cuba. The amendments to the Cuban embargo controls that the Helms-Bwton Act introduced have generated significant opposition from other countries, such as Canada and the United Kingdom. Additionally, the European Union has expressed its opposition through the initiation of a complaint with the World Trade Organization. Rather than the novel changes brought about by the Helms-Burton Act alone, however, it is the long-standing use of traditional "blacklisting" tools as part of the government's trade regulation and sanctions programs that most clearly highlights the difficulties inherent in unilateral extraterritorial controls. Using the Cuban embargo program as an example, this Article explores the question of the leg'timacy of these blacklisting measures under international standards, including those advocated and espoused by the United States itself in connection with the Arab League's boycott of Israel. An emerging rule of customary international law, the Article concludes, proscribes the use of blacklisting to conduct international secondary boycotts.

Pierre Goes Online: Blacklisting and Secondary Boycotts in U.S. Trade Policy

Economic sanctions have proliferated in the last half of the twentieth century, and become the "first choice" of U.S. policymakers seeking tools to address many complex international issues. A key feature of these various sanctions programs is the use of a blacklist, to bring third party agents, controlled entities, and corporate cloaks operating elsewhere within the ambit of the sanctions aimed at a particular country or destination. These blacklists have now grown to include several thousand individuals and entities. However, despite the growing importance of economic sanctions, and their accompanying blacklists, these programs are still managed by a relatively small office within the Treasury Department, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Using the example of the IPT Company, Inc., a small but long established U.S. based corporation with foreign ownership, and the economic sanctions program targeted at the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this Article examines the processes used by OFAC to establish, impose, and implement such sanctions on a particular destination, and the closely related process of blacklisting particular parties associated with the sanctioned destination. It explores the unique, adversarial, relationship with the public which characterized much of OFAC's operations until recent years, and the impact that attitude has had on the promulgation, notice, distribution, and enforcement of OFAC's regulations. After considering the important, but limited, role individual case by case challenges have played in improving these processes, the Article concludes by suggesting that new legislation is required to remedy ongoing deficiencies in OFAC's implementation of its programs. Accordingly, it concludes by urging that the pending Sanctions Reform Act be expanded to provide detailed guidance on how sanctions should be implemented, in a manner similar to the way the U.S. Congress has both directed and overseen the operation of the export control system with the Export Administration Act.

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'If Property Rights Were Treated Like Human Rights, They Could Never Get Away with this,' Blacklisting and Due Process in U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs

Peter L. Fitzgerald

Papers

'Morality' May Not Be Enough to Justify the EU Seal Products Ban: Animal Welfare Meets International Trade Law

“Morality” May Not Be Enough to Justify the EU Seal Products Ban: Animal Welfare Meets International Trade Law

Managing Smart Sanctions Against Terrorism Wisely

Pierre Goes Online: Blacklisting and Secondary Boycotts in U.S. Trade Policy

'If Property Rights Were Treated Like Human Rights, They Could Never Get Away with this,' Blacklisting and Due Process in U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs