In the period 1946-2001, there were 225 armed conflicts and 34 of them were active in all of or part of 2001. Armed conflict remains a serious problem in the post-Cold War period. For three decades, the Correlates of War project has served as the main supplier of reliable data used in longitudinal studies of external and internal armed conflict. The COW datasets on war use the relatively high threshold of 1,000 battle-deaths. The Uppsala dataset on armed conflict has a lower threshold, 25 annual battle-deaths, but has so far been available for only the post-Cold War period. This dataset has now been backdated to the end of World War II. This article presents a report on armed conflict based on this backdate as well as another annual update. It presents the procedures for the backdating, as well as trends over time and breakdowns for the type of conflict. It assesses the criteria for measuring armed conflict and discusses some directions for future data collection in this area.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1555346.pdf

Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset

This article presents ACLED, an Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset. ACLED codes the actions of rebels, governments, and militias within unstable states, specifying the exact location and date of battle events, transfers of military control, headquarter establishment, civilian violence, and rioting. In the current version, the dataset covers 50 unstable countries from 1997 through 2010. ACLED’s disaggregation of civil war and transnational violent events allow for research on local level factors and the dynamics of civil and communal conflict. Findings from subnational conflict research challenges conclusions from larger national-level studies. In a brief descriptive analysis, the authors find that, on average, conflict covers 15% of a state’s territory, but almost half of a state can be directly affected by internal wars.

Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset

1. The world of dictatorial institutions 2. Three illustrative cases 3. The use of institutions to co-opt 4. Institutions and policies under dictatorship 5. Institutions and outcomes under dictatorship 6. Institutions and the survival of dictators.

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Political Institutions under Dictatorship

Although researchers have documented that many financial crises are associated with severe recessions (Graciela Kaminsky and Carmen Reinhart 1999), very little attention has been paid to whether countries recover from such large negative shocks in the sense that output losses are reversed. A few recent papers show persistent output loss from financial crises in a small set of countries. For instance, Cerra and Saxena (2005a) demonstrate that six Asian countries suffered permanent output loss from the Asian crisis, and Cerra and Saxena (2005b) show that only a tiny fraction of the output loss from Sweden's banking crisis in the early 1990s was recuperated. The graphs in Figure 1 illustrate persistent output loss for selected countries following the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis and the debt crisis of the early 1980s. In addition to financial crises, many countries experience large negative political shocks, which could include violent conflicts such as civil wars, as well as a deterioration in the country's governance. Such political shocks have the potential for significant disruption to economic activ? ity, as illustrated for a few episodes of civil war (Figure 2). This paper systematically documents the behavior of output following financial and political crises in a large set of 190 countries. While the graphs in Figures 1 and 2 are suggestive, our aim is to formally analyze the impact of financial and political shocks on output in a broad set of countries, particularly whether output losses are recovered. Financial shocks comprise currency, banking, and twin financial crises. For political shocks, we examine civil wars, a deterioration in the quality of political governance, and twin political crises comprising both shocks. We choose civil wars rather than interstate conflicts to ensure that the war occurs on the country's own soil. The military theater for some interstate conflicts may not directly encompass all parties to the conflict. In addition, the increase in wartime spending for an international conflict may boost economic activity in some countries. We also examine the economic impact of a deterioration in a country's political governance or institutional quality. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (2001) and Acemoglu et al. (2003) use constraints on the power of the political executive as a measure of institutional quality, and find that it is linked to growth and volatility. Thus, we use this measure to study the shock to political governance. Potential endogeneity of the financial or political crisis is an important issue in estimating the output impact of the crisis. That is, the crisis itself may be a function of a slowdown of economic growth or changes in expectations of future growth. We attempt to address this issue using a few methods that are far from definite, but nonetheless uncover some interesting facts. In particular, we find that the forecasts of growth from an autoregressive model and from consensus surveys are optimistic relative to actual growth occurring during and after a crisis.

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Growth Dynamics: The Myth of Economic Recovery

What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule - the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule - the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008.

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The Politics of Authoritarian Rule

The shifting nature of international conflict has prompted a rethinking of the Correlates of War Project's classification of wars. This research note describes the new expanded war typology and the resultant three war data sets. Lists of the qualifying wars in the inter-state, extra-state, and intra-state categories during the 1816-1997 period are appended.

Phil Schafer

Papers

The Correlates of War Data On War: an Update To 1997