Philip L. Williams

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine infrastructure investment incentives under a system of "regulation by negotiation" and demonstrate that an appropriately specified access pricing rule can induce private firms to choose to invest in infrastructure at a socially optimal time.

TL;DR: In this paper, the optimal regulatory regime allocates investment costs to the access provider and seeker based on their relative use-values of the facility, and when the time that access is sought is flexible both replacement-and historical-cost asset valuation methodologies can lead to optimal investment incentives.

TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that increased uncertainty over the definition of necessary costs can increase or decrease the expenditure of risk neutral litigants, rather than liability, and that the amount of damages rather than the liability has no effect on expenditure.

TL;DR: The monopolisation sections of Australia's and New Zealand's antitrust statutes are unusual for the test by which they distinguish acceptable from unacceptable conduct: conduct is only proscribed if it is unlikely to be observed in a competitive market as discussed by the authors.