This paper explores the Prayuth regime, which began with a military coup in May 2014. Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance as in the Prem and Surayud governments, but tries to militarise the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new constitution is designed to institutionalise the power of the military and the traditional elite vis-a-vis the electoral forces. Ironically, however, the junta's rule by military decree and discretionary power have weakened the bureaucratic polity, rather than strengthening it. Economically, the Prayuth regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish the Pracharath scheme, with an aim to differentiate its grass-roots development policy from Thaksin's populism (Prachaniyom). Nonetheless, it has become a platform through which the giant firms perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their sectors. Pracharath therefore reflects the collective endeavours of the conglomerates to replace competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to catch-up with them.

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The Prayuth Regime: Embedded Military and Hierarchical Capitalism in Thailand

After the military coup of 2014, 143 serving and retired generals of the Royal Armed Thai Forces submitted asset declarations to the National Anti-Corruption Commission on being appointed to the mi...

Thailand’s Public Secret: Military Wealth and the State

The article looks at the nature of the state and society in contemporary Thailand using a comparative historical analysis. Thailand is led by an officer corps, faithful only to the monarchy regime,...

Thailand’s new right, social cleansing and the continuing military–monarchy entente:

In September 2018 a quarrel between a Thai border guard and a tourist from the People’s Republic of China at Bangkok’s Don Mueang Airport turned violent. The argument took place after the Chinese visitor was denied entry on the grounds that he could not produce evidence that he would return to China after his trip to Thailand. The incident should be worrying for Thailand, given the country’s increasing reliance on the growing numbers of Chinese tourists since the coup of 2014. Yet this incident is also symbolic of the internal pressure generated within the Thai state as a result of having to manage China’s encroachments on Thai sovereignty. In 2018 the Thai military government struggled to maintain a balance between two opposing policy logics. On the one hand, China has become not just a critical economic partner but also a potential model of governance; on the other, Thailand’s resilient strategic culture and national identity each emphasize sovereignty and independence, requiring judicious diplomacy with the great powers as the primary tool to achieve these ends. Clearly, there is a tension here: while Thailand may find the stability of authoritarian capitalism attractive, it no more wants coercion from China than it does from the United States. In this chapter I assess the extent to which 2018 may have seen the highwater mark of Thailand’s embrace of China and its adoption of the China

Competing Logics: Between Thai Sovereignty and the China Model in 2018

Thailand in 2018: Military Dictatorship under Royal Command

INTRODUCTION Thailand's intransigent political crisis and polarization, marked by two military coups d’etat and debilitating mass demonstrations since 2006, has been recognized as the orchestrated work of the anti-democratic alliance of the old powers against the rise of electoral politics. The alliance is conceptualized as “the network monarchy” by Duncan McCargo (2005), the “parallel state” by Paul Chambers (2015), and “the deep state” by Eugenie Merieau (2016). Despite their differences in some aspects, these authors agree that the monarchy is the bedrock of the alliance while the military is its least popular component, especially after the violent crackdown of the popular uprising in May 1992 by the military government led by General Suchinda Khraprayun (7 April – 24 May 1992). The military's legitimacy comes from the claim that it is the major defender of the three pillars of Thailand — Nation, Religion and Monarchy. It lost much of its popularity following the May 1992 crackdown, however, and it had been perceived to have retreated to its barracks (Surachart 1998, p. 17). In other words, only putsches and military governments came to be considered political intervention on its part. Eugenie Merieau (2016) noted the significance of the ideological apparatus of the deep state, her works tended to focus though on the role of the Constitutional Court, the apparent tip of this deep state. A study of the Thai military's civil affairs programmes, however, holds better potential for improving our understanding of the phenomenon. Despite warnings from Suchit Bunbongkarn (1987, p. 53) and Surachart Bamrungsuk (1998, pp. 76–77) about the military's involvement in civil affairs projects at the end of the counter-insurgency period, there has been no serious study on the matter. The Thai military's civil affairs programmes, especially in the post-counter-insurgency period, have drawn little attention from scholars, and studies of the Thai armed forces tend to focus on internal factionalism; conflict between elected civilian governments and military leaders; networks of cliques and classes; and personal ties between military leaders and the palace (Chambers and Napisa 2016; Surachart 1998, 2016; Yoshifumi 2008). At the same time, it is well known that since the toppling of the absolute monarchy in 1932, the Thai military has never restricted itself to an exclusively military role.

Puangthong R. Pawakapan

Papers

The Central Role of Thailand's Internal Security Operations Command in the Post-Counter-insurgency Period