다중혈관 관상동맥 환자에서 y-문합을 이용하여 양쪽 내흉동맥만을 사용한 우회술의 조기 성적

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/14221/1/FullText.pdf

A survey of deep neural network architectures and their applications

In the Hamadryas baboon, males are substantially larger than females. A troop of baboons is subdivided into a number of ‘one-male groups’, consisting of one adult male and one or more females with their young. The male prevents any of ‘his’ females from moving too far from him. Kummer (1971) performed the following experiment. Two males, A and B, previously unknown to each other, were placed in a large enclosure. Male A was free to move about the enclosure, but male B was shut in a small cage, from which he could observe A but not interfere. A female, unknown to both males, was then placed in the enclosure. Within 20 minutes male A had persuaded the female to accept his ownership. Male B was then released into the open enclosure. Instead of challenging male A , B avoided any contact, accepting A’s ownership.

Evolution and the Theory of Games

Convention: a philosophical study

Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are stealthy attacks which make use of social engineering and deception to give adversaries insider access to networked systems. Against APTs, active defense technologies aim to create and exploit information asymmetry for defenders. In this paper, we study a scenario in which a powerful defender uses honeynets for active defense in order to observe an attacker who has penetrated the network. Rather than immediately eject the attacker, the defender may elect to gather information. We introduce an undiscounted, infinite-horizon Markov decision process on a continuous state space in order to model the defender's problem. We find a threshold of information that the defender should gather about the attacker before ejecting him. Then we study the robustness of this policy using a Stackelberg game. Finally, we simulate the policy for a conceptual network. Our results provide a quantitative foundation for studying optimal timing for attacker engagement in network defense.

Optimal Timing in Dynamic and Robust Attacker Engagement During Advanced Persistent Threats

Rolling horizon games of resilient networks with non-uniform horizons

In this paper, we introduce a class of linear non- cooperative games with linearly coupled constraints. It bears striking connections with classical linear systems theory and finds itself pervasively used in network engineering applications. In the second part of the paper, we will illustrate this type of games by an application from OSNR-based power control in optical networks, where we can view the slack variables as fictitious players. This powerful interpretation allows us to bridge over the theory and the issue of implementation in engineering.

Theory of Linear Games with Constraints and Its Application to Power Control of Optical Networks

Mixed integer optimal compensation deals with optimization problems with integer- and real-valued control variables to compensate disturbances in dynamic systems. The mixed integer nature of controls could lead to intractability in problems of large dimensions. To address this challenge, we introduce a decomposition method which turns the original n-dimensional optimization problem into n independent scalar problems of lot sizing form. Each of these problems can be viewed as a two-player zero-sum game, which introduces some element of conservatism. Each scalar problem is then reformulated as a shortest path one and solved through linear programming over a receding horizon, a step that mirrors a standard procedure in mixed integer programming. We apply the decomposition method to a mean-field coupled multi-agent system problem, where each agent seeks to compensate a combination of an exogenous signal and the local state average. We discuss a large population mean-field type of approximation and extend our study to opinion dynamics in social networks as a special case of interest.

/pdf/decomposition-and-mean-field-approach-to-mixed-integer-1i2n1i8obw.pdf

Decomposition and Mean-Field Approach to Mixed Integer Optimal Compensation Problems

Enabling the Internet of things in remote areas without traditional communication infrastructure requires a multi-layer network architecture. The devices in the overlay network are required to provide coverage to the underlay devices as well as to remain connected to other overlay devices. The coordination, planning, and design of such two-layer heterogeneous networks is an important problem to address. Moreover, the mobility of the nodes and their vulnerability to adversaries pose new challenges to the connectivity. For instance, the connectivity of devices can be affected by changes in the network, e.g., the mobility of the underlay devices or the unavailability of overlay devices due to failure or adversarial attacks. To this end, this work proposes a feedback based adaptive, self-configurable, and resilient framework for the overlay network that cognitively adapts to the changes in the network to provide reliable connectivity between spatially dispersed smart devices. Our results show that if sufficient overlay devices are available, the framework leads to a connected configuration that ensures a high coverage of the mobile underlay network. Moreover, the framework can actively reconfigure itself in the event of varying levels of device failure.

Quanyan Zhu

Papers

Optimal Timing in Dynamic and Robust Attacker Engagement During Advanced Persistent Threats

Rolling horizon games of resilient networks with non-uniform horizons

Theory of Linear Games with Constraints and Its Application to Power Control of Optical Networks

Decomposition and Mean-Field Approach to Mixed Integer Optimal Compensation Problems

Cognitive Connectivity Resilience in Multi-Layer Remotely Deployed Mobile Internet of Things