Convention: a philosophical study

1. Introducing the Puzzle 2. Contextualism and the Puzzle 3. Invariantist Treatments 4. Sensitive Moderate Invariantism Bibliography

Knowledge and lotteries

The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should Expect. Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel. New York: Crown Publishers, 2001. 205 pp. $20 hbk. Inherent in the behavior and process we call "journalism" is controversy. Journalism's inexact, less-than-scientific character almost assures it will occasionally enter a crisis, becoming awash in change, its self-identity threatened or its credibility challenged. Just as naturally, we can depend on someone to attempt to right the ship, calm the waters, and smooth the sails. Enter The Elements of Journalism, which simply lists and details what the authors consider journalism's ten guiding principles and purpose for the enlightenment of journalists and the general public. For the former, the book serves as a Journalism 101 moral refresher: Journalism's purpose is truth, produced by those loyal to that purpose and to the citizens (not to profits). Committee of Concerned journalists Chairman Bill Kovach and Project for Excellence in journalism Director Tom Rosenstiel assert, however, that truth is not enough: There is also verification, to which they devote a chapter that's as good a reporting primer as any textbook. The authors explain "the intellectual principles of a science of reporting" gleaned from numerous discussions with and surveys of editors, journalists, and members of the public. As a CCJ member, I applaud the effort: Journalists need to be reminded of their profession's high ethical objective. Any craft-journalism included-requires a howto inventory. For the public, the book provides a glimpse into why serious journalists behave as they do; journalism has a purpose over and above selling newspapers and airtime. The lay reader discovers there is a rationale for what journalists cover and that not only is journalism a map with which to navigate society, but that good journalism strives to be accurate and comprehensive. But it is not enough to index-as the text does-all the proper characteristics. To be sure, the authors credibly explain each item. For example, they say journalists have an obligation to monitor the powerful because-as investigative reporting gets trivialized (thanks to consumer-oriented topics such as the honesty of auto brake mechanics) and challenged-journalism's function as a public forum becomes weakened, giving way to "a new wave of journalism as assertion." But as if it were Moses coming down from the Big Newsroom In The Sky, the book comes off as so many pronouncements. This is no text for a skeptic; while each element gets its due in terms of description and analysis, there is no Burning Bush-no original explanation exists for the list as a whole. By its structure, the text expects the reader to accept the idea that journalism is a recipe. The book makes a weak attempt at synthesis in the last chapter, in which the authors claim that journalists' responsibility to conscience ties all the other elements together. On its face, this makes sense: For example, what journalist would not say his or her conscience is the reason for his or her search (via journalism) for truth? But the final chapter does not engage in such analytical application of the elements, choosing instead to elaborate on the role of conscience in newsrooms and the threat certain newsroom cultures pose against individual conscience. …

The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should Expect

The logic of questions and answers

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A Transformative Experience

These are examples of generic sentences (or simply generics). Generics come in a variety of forms. Moreover, they communicate generalisations without any pronounced element which is responsible for expressing the content of the generalisation itself. What characterises the class of generic sentences, then, is that each member of the class communicates some sort of generalisation without any obvious component that is responsible for expressing this generalisation. For example, (1a) is a generic since it communicates a generalisation about candy — let’s say a generalisation akin to in general, candy is bad for your teeth, but does not contain an explicit expression, like in general, which is responsible for expressing the content of the generalisation. Similarly for (1b)–(1f). Specifying the truth-conditions of generics has proved especially challenging.1 The primary challenge is that the intuitive truth-conditions of generics seem to vary quite radically from generic to generic: while nearly all ravens are black and tigers have stripes, (1d) is intuitively true despite the fact that only very few ticks (around 1%) carry Lyme disease. Still further, (1e) is false even though the vast majority of books have paper covers, while (1f) is true despite the fact that it is only adult, male lions that have manes.

Generics in Context

What words we use, and what meanings they have, is important. We shouldn’t use slurs; we should use ‘rape’ to include spousal rape (for centuries we didn’t); we should have a word which picks out the sexual harassment suffered by people in the workplace and elsewhere (for centuries we didn’t). Sometimes we need to change the word-meaning pairs in circulation, either by getting rid of the pair completely (slurs), changing the meaning (as we did with ‘rape’), or adding brand new word-meaning pairs (as with ‘sexual harassment’). A problem, though, is how to do this. One might worry that any attempt to change language in this way will lead to widespread miscommunication and confusion. I argue that this is indeed so, but that’s a feature, not a bug, of attempting to change word-meaning pairs. The miscommunications and confusion such changes cause can lead us, via a process I call transformative communicative disruption, to reflect on our language and its use, and this can further, rather than hinder, our goal of improving language.

Linguistic Intervention and Transformative Communicative Disruptions

The term "fake news" ascended rapidly to prominence in 2016 and has become a fixture in academic and public discussions, as well as in political mud-slinging. In the flurry of discussion, the term has been applied so broadly as to threaten to render it meaningless. In an effort to rescue our ability to discuss—and combat—the underlying phenomenon that triggered the present use of the term, some philosophers have tried to characterize it more precisely. A common theme in this nascent philosophical discussion is that contemporary fake news is not a new kind of phenomenon, but just the latest iteration of a broader kind of phenomenon that has played out in different ways across the history of human information-dissemination technologies. While we agree with this, we argue that newer sorts of fake news reveal substantial flaws in earlier understandings of this notion. In particular, we argue that no deceptive intentions are necessary for fake news to arise; rather, fake news arises when stories which were not produced via standard journalistic practice are treated as though they had been. Importantly, this revisionary understanding of fake news allows us to accommodate and understand the way that fake news is plausibly generated and spread in a contemporary setting, as much by non-human actors as by ordinary human beings.

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What's New About Fake News?

This paper offers three objections to Leslie’s recent and already influential theory of generics (Leslie in Philos Perspect 21(1):375–403, 2007a, Philos Rev 117(1):1–47, 2008): (i) her proposed metaphysical truth-conditions are subject to systematic counter-examples, (ii) the proposed disquotational semantics fails, and (iii) there is evidence that generics do not express cognitively primitive generalisations.

Leslie on generics

This article discusses recent theories of the meaning of generics. The discussion is centred on how the theories differ in their approach to addressing the primary difficulty in providing a theory of generic meaning: The notoriously complex ways in which the truth conditions of generics seem to vary. In addition, the article summarizes considerations for and against each theory.

Rachel Katharine Sterken

Papers

Generics in Context

Linguistic Intervention and Transformative Communicative Disruptions

What's New About Fake News?

Leslie on generics

The Meaning of Generics