Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF00683953.pdf

Privatizing Russia: Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press 1995. 165 + ix pp

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide an extension of the Corporate Governance Reporting Initiative (CGI) 2004, which reports on Malaysia's first corporate governance ratings. Characteristics of firms with high and low scores in the corporate governance ratings are analysed by comparing companies based on their corporate governance ranking as reported in the CGI.Design/methodology/approach – Firms are classified into those at the top 50 percent and the bottom 50 percent of the corporate governance ratings list to examine whether there are any differences in the characteristics of firms in both classified samples. The characteristics of firms that are being examined are firms' profitability, leverage, growth, market valuation, size, age, ownership structure and countries of operation based on the Logit analysis.Findings – The result shows that firm size has a strong influence with corporate governance ratings, but not so for other variables tested.Research limitations/implications – This study ...

Determinants of firm level governance: malaysian evidence

This paper aims to undertake an empirical investigation on firm characteristics determining corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure and its subcategories such as environmental, social and governance disclosures.,The sample consisted of listed companies in BSE 500 index for a period of 10 years from 2007 to 2016. Panel data regression method is used for the analysis. Seven variables are analyzed, namely, firm age, financial leverage, firm size, foreign ownership, promoter ownership, export performance, innovation and firm popularity.,The result shows that firm age and financial leverage are positively influencing CSR, environmental and social disclosure score but both are negatively influencing governance score. Firm size is positively associated with all four disclosure scores. Among ownership variables, foreign ownership shows a positive influence and promoters ownership shows a negative influence towards CSR, environment and social disclosures. No association is found between both ownership variables and governance disclosure score. Further analysis also finds that there is a difference in this relationship during crisis period.,The study focuses only on listed companies in Indian capital market. In terms of implication, theoretical bases discussed in the literature review and hypotheses development are mostly validated.,The findings are important for the firm, stakeholders and policymakers. A firm may think about appointing experts in CSR to spend the amount wisely and improve CSR disclosure to compete in the international market; stakeholders have to pressure the firm to provide more CSR disclosure and for policymakers this study study provides useful inputs to design legal framework on CSR.,The measurement of CSR disclosure using environmental, social and governance (ESG) score is novel in Indian context, even though the methodology is often used in literature.

Determinants of CSR disclosure: an evidence from India

......................................................................................................................... I TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................... V LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ XII LIST OF DIAGRAMS AND FIGURES ........................................................................... XV CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCING THE STUDY ....................................................................... 1 1.0 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1 1.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT IN NEW ZEALAND ........ 3 1.2 CONTEXT AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES ........................................... 5 1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY ............................................................................ 7 1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY ..................................................................... 7 1.5 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS ................................................................. 13 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................. 14 2.0 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 14 2.1 AGENCY THEORY .......................................................................................... 17 2.1.1 INSIDER OWNERSHIP ................................................................................... 19 2.1.2 CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP ................................................................... 21 2.1.3 BOARD OF DIRECTORS ................................................................................ 23 2.1.3.1 BOARD COMPOSITION ........................................................................... 23 2.1.3.2 BOARD SIZE .............................................................................................. 27 2.1.3.3 BOARD DIVERSITY ................................................................................. 28 2.1.3.4 BOARD COMMITTEES ............................................................................ 28 2.1.4 CEO COMPENSATION, AGE, TENURE AND EDUCATION ..................... 29 2.1.5 DEBT ................................................................................................................. 30 2.1.6 DIVIDENDS ...................................................................................................... 31 2.1.7 MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL, LABOUR MARKET COMPETITION AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION ..................... 32 2.1.7.1 MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL ............................................... 32 2.1.7.2 LABOUR MARKET COMPETITION ....................................................... 32

The relationship between corporate governance practices and financial performance in new zealand: an empirical investigation

The paper studies corporate governance in non-listed firms. We analyze the effect of ownership concentration on the controlling owner’s incentives to share with outside investors in the presence of a threat of takeover. A simple model predicts that up to a certain level, an increase in ownership concentration improves corporate governance (defined as the costs of diverting profits). Using a dataset on ownership and corporate governance in Russian non-listed industrial firms we find that this model is consistent with the data. ∗This paper is based on a report on MPSF SETT project Guriev et al. (2003). We thank Erik Berflof, Mike Burkart, Boris Kuznetsov, Pavel Kuznetsov, and seminar and conference participants at CEFIR, Federation Council, Higher School of Economics, MPSF, Carnegie Moscow Center. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from USAID and Moscow Public Science Foundation through the Strengthening Economic Think Tanks Program, and from Ford Foundation through NES Research Center’s 2002-03 “Demand for economic institutions” project. †Department of Economics, Princeton University, and New Economic School, Moscow. E-mail: sguriev@princeton.edu ‡CEFIR. E-mail: olazareva@cefir.ru §CEFIR. E-mail: arachinsky@cefir.ru ¶Institute for the Economy in Transition, Moscow. E-mail: tsouhlo@iet.ru

Rachinsky Andrei

Papers

Concentrated ownership, market for corporate control, and corporate governance