From the Publisher:
A valuable reference for the novice as well as for the expert who needs a wider scope of coverage within the area of cryptography, this book provides easy and rapid access of information and includes more than 200 algorithms and protocols; more than 200 tables and figures; more than 1,000 numbered definitions, facts, examples, notes, and remarks; and over 1,250 significant references, including brief comments on each paper.

Handbook of Applied Cryptography

https://cs.uwaterloo.ca/~brecht/courses/854-Emerging-2014/readings/iot/iot-survey.pdf

The Internet of Things: A survey

Cryptosystem designers frequently assume that secrets will be manipulated in closed, reliable computing environments. Unfortunately, actual computers and microchips leak information about the operations they process. This paper examines specific methods for analyzing power consumption measurements to find secret keys from tamper resistant devices. We also discuss approaches for building cryptosystems that can operate securely in existing hardware that leaks information.

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Differential Power Analysis

We propose a fully homomorphic encryption scheme -- i.e., a scheme that allows one to evaluate circuits over encrypted data without being able to decrypt. Our solution comes in three steps. First, we provide a general result -- that, to construct an encryption scheme that permits evaluation of arbitrary circuits, it suffices to construct an encryption scheme that can evaluate (slightly augmented versions of) its own decryption circuit; we call a scheme that can evaluate its (augmented) decryption circuit bootstrappable.Next, we describe a public key encryption scheme using ideal lattices that is almost bootstrappable.Lattice-based cryptosystems typically have decryption algorithms with low circuit complexity, often dominated by an inner product computation that is in NC1. Also, ideal lattices provide both additive and multiplicative homomorphisms (modulo a public-key ideal in a polynomial ring that is represented as a lattice), as needed to evaluate general circuits.Unfortunately, our initial scheme is not quite bootstrappable -- i.e., the depth that the scheme can correctly evaluate can be logarithmic in the lattice dimension, just like the depth of the decryption circuit, but the latter is greater than the former. In the final step, we show how to modify the scheme to reduce the depth of the decryption circuit, and thereby obtain a bootstrappable encryption scheme, without reducing the depth that the scheme can evaluate. Abstractly, we accomplish this by enabling the encrypter to start the decryption process, leaving less work for the decrypter, much like the server leaves less work for the decrypter in a server-aided cryptosystem.

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Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices

In several distributed systems a user should only be able to access data if a user posses a certain set of credentials or attributes. Currently, the only method for enforcing such policies is to employ a trusted server to store the data and mediate access control. However, if any server storing the data is compromised, then the confidentiality of the data will be compromised. In this paper we present a system for realizing complex access control on encrypted data that we call ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption. By using our techniques encrypted data can be kept confidential even if the storage server is untrusted; moreover, our methods are secure against collusion attacks. Previous attribute-based encryption systems used attributes to describe the encrypted data and built policies into user's keys; while in our system attributes are used to describe a user's credentials, and a party encrypting data determines a policy for who can decrypt. Thus, our methods are conceptually closer to traditional access control methods such as role-based access control (RBAC). In addition, we provide an implementation of our system and give performance measurements.

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Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption

We present a formalism for the analysis of key-exchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys some important analytical benefits: (i) any key-exchange protocol that satisfies the security definition can be composed with symmetric encryption and authentication functions to provide provably secure communication channels (as defined here); and (ii) the definition allows for simple modular proofs of security: one can design and prove security of key-exchange protocols in an idealized model where the communication links are perfectly authenticated, and then translate them using general tools to obtain security in the realistic setting of adversary-controlled links.

We exemplify the usability of our results by applying them to obtain the proof of two classes of key-exchange protocols, Diffie-Hellman and key-transport, authenticated via symmetric or asymmetric techniques.

Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels.

Technical Session 1.- Incrementally Verifiable Computation or Proofs of Knowledge Imply Time/Space Efficiency.- On Seed-Incompressible Functions.- Technical Session 2.- Asymptotically Efficient Lattice-Based Digital Signatures.- Basing Weak Public-Key Cryptography on Strong One-Way Functions.- Technical Session 3.- Which Languages Have 4-Round Zero-Knowledge Proofs?.- How to Achieve Perfect Simulation and A Complete Problem for Non-interactive Perfect Zero-Knowledge.- General Properties of Quantum Zero-Knowledge Proofs.- Technical Session 4.- The Layered Games Framework for Specifications and Analysis of Security Protocols.- Universally Composable Multi-party Computation with an Unreliable Common Reference String.- Efficient Protocols for Set Intersection and Pattern Matching with Security Against Malicious and Covert Adversaries.- Fast Private Norm Estimation and Heavy Hitters.- Technical Session 5.- Matroids Can Be Far from Ideal Secret Sharing.- Perfectly-Secure MPC with Linear Communication Complexity.- MPC vs. SFE: Perfect Security in a Unified Corruption Model.- Invited Talk.- Bridging Game Theory and Cryptography: Recent Results and Future Directions.- Technical Session 6.- Verifiably Secure Devices.- Lower Bounds on Implementing Robust and Resilient Mediators.- Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information.- Technical Session 7.- Equivocal Blind Signatures and Adaptive UC-Security.- P-signatures and Noninteractive Anonymous Credentials.- Technical Session 8.- Multi-property Preserving Combiners for Hash Functions.- OT-Combiners via Secure Computation.- Semi-honest to Malicious Oblivious Transfer-The Black-Box Way.- Black-Box Construction of a Non-malleable Encryption Scheme from Any Semantically Secure One.- Technical Session 9.- A Linear Lower Bound on the Communication Complexity of Single-Server Private Information Retrieval.- Randomness Extraction Via ?-Biased Masking in the Presence of a Quantum Attacker.- Technical Session 10.- An Equivalence Between Zero Knowledge and Commitments.- Interactive and Noninteractive Zero Knowledge are Equivalent in the Help Model.- Technical Session 11.- The Round-Complexity of Black-Box Zero-Knowledge: A Combinatorial Characterization.- On Constant-Round Concurrent Zero-Knowledge.- Technical Session 12.- Concurrent Non-malleable Commitments from Any One-Way Function.- Faster and Shorter Password-Authenticated Key Exchange.- Technical Session 13.- Saving Private Randomness in One-Way Functions and Pseudorandom Generators.- Degradation and Amplification of Computational Hardness.

Theory of Cryptography

The traditional approach to formalizing ideal-model based definitions of security for multi-party protocols models adversaries (both real and ideal) as centralized entities that control all parties that deviate from the protocol. While this centralized-adversary modeling suffices for capturing basic security properties such as secrecy of local inputs and correctness of outputs against coordinated attacks, it turns out to be inadequate for capturing security properties that involve restricting the sharing of information between separate adversarial entities. Indeed, to capture collusion-freeness and and game-theoretic solution concepts, Alwen et.al. [Crypto, 2012] propose a new ideal-model based definitional framework that involves a de-centralized adversary. We propose an alternative framework to that of Alwen et. al. We then observe that our framework allows capturing not only collusion-freeness and game-theoretic solution concepts, but also several other properties that involve the restriction of information flow among adversarial entities. These include some natural flavors of anonymity, deniability, timing separation, and information confinement. We also demonstrate the inability of existing formalisms to capture these properties. We then prove strong composition properties for the proposed framework, and use these properties to demonstrate the security, within the new framework, of two very different protocols for securely evaluating any function of the parties’ inputs. ? both authors are supported by the Check Point Institute for Information Security, Marie Curie grant PIRG03-GA-2008230640, and ISF grant 0603805843.

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Ran Canetti

Papers

Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels.

Theory of Cryptography

Universally Composable Security With Local Adversaries.

An Architecture for Secure Internet Multicast

The parallel C (pC) programming language