We developed a theory of an antenarrative practices in relation to the interplay of dominant cultural narratives and counternarratives of resistance. Antenarrative is defined here as the field of forces Before, Between, Beneath, Bets and Becoming that occurs in the reduction of diverse living stories of Self to hegemonic narratives and counternarratives. We contribute two case studies of the ways antenarrative processes accomplish the hegemony, and the resistance occurring between dominant narrative and counternarrative. In the first case, dominant cultural narratives of homelessness are resisted by counternarrative theatrical performances by developing micropolitic antenarrative threads to bring what is Before, Beneath, Between, and Becoming to the fore, so that alternative Bets on the future become presented to audiences. We also offer an antenarrative inquiry into counternarrative and narrative cultural stereotypical representations of race, class and gender, and offer theory and methodology resources for a more meaningful understanding of homeless life and cultures. The second case explores narrative-counternarrative and antenarrative inquiry into a cross-cultural merger between two companies. Both cases contribute to how the storytelling world is an interplay of dominant narratives and their counternarratives, and the undercurrent of antenarrative processes.

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Counternarrative and antenarrative inquiry in two cross-cultural contexts

Title: A Physiology of the Imagination: Anatomical Faculties and Philosophical Designs, Author: Jody W. McNabb, Location: Mills

A Physiology of the Imagination: Anatomical Faculties and Philosophical Designs

This essay examines biological discourses alongside literary and philosophical discussions on the concept of habit from author Gertrude Stein. This was aimed at demonstrating the nonexclusivity of scientific models and using humanistic frameworks in recontextualing habit. Works of Stein were featured to highlight Charles Darwin's views on contemporary biological discourses and sociopolitical ones. The author placed emphasis on the continuum between biology and culture in Stein's writings, which oppose biological essentialism and social constructivism.

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Gertrude Stein's Lively Habits

William James: In the Maelstrom of American Modernism (review)

Much like our earlier encounter with the Opus Postumum, our treatment of Nietzsche’s notebooks on teleology left us facing the x of production, the opaque but imperious demand for an approach to individuation that would suspend or overcome the parameters of the ‘Antinomy of Teleological Judgment’ — that is, the partition between a merely regulative speculation concerned with teleological organization, on the one hand, and a determinant mechanistic causality, on the other. Simply by posing the problem of the genesis of the intellect, Nietzsche exposed the hastiness and fragility of such a partition, predicated as it is upon a stark demarcation between modalities of individuation that themselves remain insufficiently accounted for, not to mention laden with the prejudices of common sense. The theme of asymmetry, arguably the driving force behind Nietzsche’s successive reductions, casts suspicion on the legitimacy of any approach that would subordinate all accounts of individuation — and a fortiori of ‘life’ or ‘production’ — to the form of objectivity that the subject of cognition demands as its indispensable correlate. Yet for all its corrosive impetus, and despite representing a considerable achievement in its own right, Nietzsche’s bold reduction of the anomaly of the organic to the plural ontology of vital production does not go beyond a preparatory deployment of the problem of a non-representational (or non-intellectualist) ontology of individuation.

Systems of Habit: Ravaisson, James, Peirce

Amidst a wracking melancholia that revealed to him "that pit of insecurity beneath the surface of life," a young William James found rescue from his own "ontological wonder-sickness" in a definition of free will posited by the French philosopher Charles Renouvier (Varieties 135; Will 63). In James's 1870 diary entry that records this remarkable instance of mental and moral resummoning, he enlists Renouvier's concept of free will - "'the sustaining of a thought because I choose to when I might have other thoughts'" - in a grim struggle against his own morbid degree of "mere speculation and contemplative Grublei" (Letters 1: 147). Having previously determined suicide to be "the most manly form" to put his daring into, James now vows to direct his "free initiative" towards staunch belief in his "individual reality and creative power" (148). While scholars have often fixed on this passage for its nascent markers of a pragmatism James most famously lodged in his celebrated declaration that "my first act of free will shall be to believe in free will," they tend to give only a nod to what James attests will be his means to subsequent acts of free will (147). Citing the English psychologist Alexander Bain and his postulates for the acquisition of habits, James writes, "I will see to the sequel" (148). Recollect, he instructs himself, that only when habits of order are formed can we advance to really interesting fields of action - and consequently accumulate grain on grain of willful choice like a very miser; never forgetting how one link dropped undoes an indefinite number. (148) Hence James rediscovers in habit, that usually so stolid affair, not only a newly valiant source for the homecoming of his very being, but also a language with which to express his restored creative energy. From this point on James begins with quiet urgency to develop a narrative of habit, one that proves integral to his writing on the processive self and challenges our assumptions about habit's aesthetic force. Perhaps because we tend to dress habit in so prosaic a mood, readers of William James have neglected to address fully the range of its significance in his writing. More often than not habit's importance to his work is generally dealt with straightforwardly as constituting the topic of his engaging "Habit" chapter in The Principles of Psychology, or is handled as a building-block philosophical concept on the way to grander ideas - its function, for instance, in the tychistic ideas with which James worked. In his bench mark 1935 study of the philosopher, Ralph Barton Perry writes of James's "Habit," curiously, with no further analysis, that "it is not without bearing on its success that it should have sprung from an early and lifelong faith of his own in the benign effect of routine and the cumulative significance of little acts" (2: 90). Gerald Myers, who presents a more recent and deeper interpretative analysis, still only mentions the concept as a physiological layer underlying the will's "psychological habit" (199). George Cotkin, on the other hand, does recognize James's emphasis upon "the salutary role of habit formation," hearing in it an echo of the Victorian predilection to regard habit's disciplinary function as "an anodyne for doubt," yet he keeps his inquiry trained on the influences of "Scottish common-sense philosophy" and the principles of science (69-70). Even in as involved a cultural critique as Ross Posnock's, which at its core places James's work within a genealogical model of human thinking that presents the historical conditions of how we think, there is no intensive examination of habit's presence or power in that kind of human shaping; again, habit becomes subsumed by other ideas, as it does in the work of Bruce Kuklick, James Kloppenberg, and Kim Townsend. Only Joseph M. Thomas's searching exploration into how James's writerly reliance upon habit issues from his deeper and conflicted involvement with the concept stands as the welcome exception. …

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/style.33.1.67

Renee Tursi

Papers

William James's Narrative of Habit