Lesson-drawing addresses the question: Under what circumstances and to what extent can a programme that is effective in one place transfer to another. Searching for fresh knowledge is not normal; the second section describes the stimulus to search as dissatisfaction with the status quo. Lessons can be sought by searching across time and/or across space; the choice depends upon a subjective definition of proximity, epistemic communities linking experts together, functional interdependence between governments, and the authority of intergovernmental institutions. The process of lesson-drawing starts with scanning programmes in effect elsewhere, and ends with the prospective evaluation of what would happen if a programme already in effect elsewhere were transferred here in future. Lesson-drwaing is part of a contested political process; there is no assurance that a lesson drawn will be both desirable and practical. The conclusion considers the uncertainty and instability of judgements about the practicality and desirability of transferring programmes.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0143814X00004918

What is Lesson-Drawing?

The importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries. This paper tries to explain this regularity by studying a political model of tax reform. The model implies that countries with a more unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient tax structures and, thus, will rely more heavily on seigniorage. This prediction of the model is tested on cross-sectional data for 79 countries. We find that, after controlling for other variables, political instability is positively associated with seigniorage. (JEL E52, E62, F41)

https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w3199/w3199.pdf

Seigniorage and Political Instability

We present a model of electoral accountability to compare the public finance outcomes under a presidential-congressional and a parliamentary system. In a presidential-congressional system, contrary to a parliamentary system, there are no endogenous incentives for legislative cohesion, but this allows for a clearer separation of powers. These features lead to clear differences in the public finance performance of the two systems. A Parliamentary system has redistribution towards a majority, less underprovision of public goods, more waste and a higher burden of taxation, whereas a presidential-congressional system has redistribution towards a minority, more underprovision of public goods, but less waste and a smaller size of government.

/pdf/comparative-politics-and-public-finance-19751gebp4.pdf

Comparative Politics and Public Finance

This paper presents a simple model to evaluate alternative payment schemes for tax inspectors in the presence of corruption. We consider problems of both moral hazard, which arises because taking bribes cannot be observed without costly monitoring, and adverse selection, since not all potential tax inspectors can be identified as being honest or dishonest. We identify three wage regimes. First, one could pay the same wage that a tax inspector could earn elsewhere - his reservation wage. Second, one could pay a wage which solves the moral hazard problem, i.e. deters bribery. This we call an efficiency wage, by analogy with recent models examined i n macro economics. Third, the government could pay a wage below the reservation wage, at which only the dishonest become tax inspectors - the capitulation wage. We make precise the conditions under which each yields the greatest amount o f tax revenues, net o f administrative costs. Many countries in the developing world are undergoing structural adjustment programmes which require fundamental fiscal changes. Outside agencies advise restoration of budget balance, a task which involves expenditure cuts and tax increases. The treatment of public employee pay scales often poses a particular dilemma i n this process. Wages and salaries are a significant component of government expenditures and one important question concerns the extent to which wages rather than employment cuts should be used to save money. There is sometimes a reluctance to advocate wage cuts, stemming in part from a feeling that this might impair the performance of the public sector. Hence, Tanzi (1990) argues that a policy of wage cutting ' is likely to increase the inefficiency of public sector employees, especially at a time when the public sector is expected to play a larger role in restructuring the economy' (p. 16). In the context of tax collection the issue is particularly pressing, given the need to raise more tax revenues. A reduction in efficiency in this branch of the government i s likely t o mean that fewer returns are processed and when individuals' living standards are squeezed, their incentive to accept bribes in lieu o f collecting taxes i s increased.^ O n this count, i t i s even sometimes suggested that wages of tax inspectors should be increased to aid the effort to * The comments of Henry Bienen, John Hey and two anonymous referees have been helpful in revising this paper. The authors are also grateful t o the John M . Olin Program for the Study o f Economic Organization and Public Policy at Princeton University and the Pew Charitable Trusts for financial support. McLaren also acknowledges support from the International Finance Section of Princeton University. None of the above should be implicated in any way. ' See, for example, Goode (1984) chapter 1 3 and Gould and Amaro-Reyes (1983).

https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/gov2126/files/besleymclaren_1993.pdf

Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives

We propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes. Compared to a parliamentary regime, the institutions of a presidential‐congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers. These differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending. A parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority, less underprovision of public goods, and more rents to politicians; a presidential‐congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities, more underprovision of public goods, but less rents to politicians. The size of government is smaller under a presidential regime. This last prediction is consistent with cross‐country data.

/pdf/comparative-politics-and-public-finance-54hq85lb48.pdf

Fiscal systems throughout the world have been severely strained in recent years, as governments have assumed more responsibility for economic management. The developing counties, where needs are greatest and resources scarcest, have found their finances especially hard pressed. This book examines a range of issues in government finance that confront developing countries: the formulation and execution of national budget; the objectives, size, and effects of expenditures; the purposes and results of various ways of taxing income, wealth, consumption, exports, or natural resources; the role of foreign and domestic borrowings; and the consequences of financing by money creation. The book also relates fiscal operations to goals such as growth and development, economic stabilization, equitable distribution, and national self-reliance. The author stresses the need to take account of economic and political conditions and particularly administrative capacity when evaluating the suitability of fiscal measures in developing countries.

Government finance in developing countries

Government Finance in Developing Countries

In 1948, the National Tax Journal replaced the Bulletin of the National Tax Association This paper describes and comments on the contents of the new journal in its first three years and in a recen

http://www.ntanet.org/NTJ/50/4/ntj-v50n04p707-18-national-tax-journal-1948.pdf

The national tax journal in 1948-50 and 1994-96

Comparative tax studies : essays in honor of Richard Goode

Tax reforms affecting existing investments and other commitments often are opposed as retroactive but in most cases more correctly may be held to impair vested interests in preferential tax treatme...

Richard B. Goode

Papers

Government finance in developing countries

Government Finance in Developing Countries

The national tax journal in 1948-50 and 1994-96

Comparative tax studies : essays in honor of Richard Goode

Disappointed expectations and tax reform