Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Edited by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave. Pp. viii, 282. £3·50, paperback £1. 1970. (Cambridge University Press.)

(1975). The Limits of Organization. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 543-544.

The Limits of Organization

The authors present an overview of the academic literature on charitable giving based on a literature review of more than 500 articles. They structure their review around the central question of why people donate money to charitable organizations. They identify eight mechanisms as the most important forces that drive charitable giving: (a) awareness of need; (b) solicitation; (c) costs and benefits; (d) altruism; (e) reputation; (f) psychological benefits; (g) values; (h) efficacy. These mechanisms can provide a basic theoretical framework for future research explaining charitable giving.

/pdf/a-literature-review-of-empirical-studies-of-philanthropy-4iz4zg70of.pdf

A Literature Review of Empirical Studies of Philanthropy: Eight Mechanisms That Drive Charitable Giving

‘Legitimacy’ has both a normative and a sociological meaning. To say that an institution is legitimate in the normative sense is to assert that it has the right to rule — where ruling is promulgating rules and attempting to secure compliance with them by attaching costs to noncompliance and/or benefits to compliance. Ruling in this broad sense does not require that the rules be backed by coercion, much less that the rulemaker claims a rightful monopoly on coercion within a jurisdiction, so it does not presuppose the state. Later we will see that the notion of the right to rule is subject to stronger and weaker interpretations, but for now it will suffice to say that an institution is legitimate in the sociological sense when it is widely believed to have the right to rule.1 When people disagree over whether the WTO is legitimate, they are not disagreeing about whether they or others believe that institution has the right to rule; they are disagreeing about whether it has the right to rule.

The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions

is published by Princeton University Press and copyrighted, © 2007, by Princeton University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher, except for reading and browsing via the World Wide Web. Users are not permitted to mount this file on any network servers.

Methods for Applied Macroeconomic Research

This article explains how consensus decision making has operated in practice in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO). When GATT/WTO bargaining is law-based, consensus outcomes are Pareto-improving and roughly symmetrical. When bargaining is power-based, states bring to bear instruments of power that are extrinsic to rules, invisibly weighting the process and generating consensus outcomes that are asymmetrical and may not be Pareto-improving. Empirical analysis shows that although trade rounds have been launched through law-based bargaining, hard law is generated when a round is closed, and rounds have been closed through power-based bargaining. Agenda setting has taken place in the shadow of that power and has been dominated by the European Community and the United States. The decision making rules have been maintained because they help generate information used by powerful states in the agenda-setting process. Consensus decision making at the GATT/WTO is organized hypocrisy, allowing adherence to the instrumental reality of asymmetrical power and the sovereign equality principle upon which consensus decision making is purportedly based.

http://disciplinas.stoa.usp.br/pluginfile.php/161149/mod_resource/content/1/Steinberg%202002.pdf

In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO

Judicial lawmaking in the WTO is marked by elastic interpretive discourse and constitutional rules that do not serve as a meaningful restraint. Politics, however, constrains both discursive and constitutional latitude, which should alleviate concerns that WTO judicial lawmaking is so expansive as to undermine the sovereignty of powerful states, create a serious democratic deficit for their citizens, or catalyze withdrawal of their support for the organization.

Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints

Since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), commentators have debated the wisdom of replacing the model of political-diplomatic dispute settlement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with a model of legalized dispute settlement. Under the GATT model, a dispute settlement panel report could be given full legal force only if adopted by a consensus of GATT Contracting Parties, including the party that lost the case. Under the WTO model, a report of the panel or the Appellate Body is adopted automatically unless WTO members, including the prevailing member, decide by consensus to block it, which is sometimes referred to as “negative consensus.” Many analysts whose work has focused on the politics of dispute settlement have emphasized the success, political flexibility, and apparent sustainability of the older model and cautioned that the legalized approach might be too cumbersome in various political contexts. Those favoring the legalized approach have emphasized its legitimizing capacity and potential to constrain more powerful WTO members from engaging in unilateral or rule-breaking behavior.

Judicial lawmaking at the wto: discursive, constitutional, and political constraints

In the last decade, many political scientists, economists and lawyers have suggested that national economic and regulatory systems may be converging globally. Economic, ideological and sociological factors, as well as action by the world’s great powers, may be facilitating cross-national convergence of economic systems and the globalization of some sectors. Globalization of the telecommunications industry and cross-national convergence of related national laws may serve as one of the stronger examples of this phenomenon.

Richard H. Steinberg

Papers

In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO

Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints

Judicial lawmaking at the wto: discursive, constitutional, and political constraints

Trade-Environment Negotiations in the Eu, Nafta, and Wto: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development

United states¿subsidies on upland cotton