1. Introduction 2. Fear, interest and honor 3. The spirit and its expression 4. The ancient world 5. Medieval Europe 6. From Sun King to Revolution 7. Imperialism and World War I 8. World War II 9. Hitler to Bush and beyond 10. General findings and conclusions.

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A Cultural Theory of International Relations

In this article I assess the violence that took place in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda in the 1990s and argue that the whole concept of “ethnic warfare” may be severely misguided. Speciacally, insofar as it is taken to imply a war of all against all and neighbor against neighbor—a condition in which pretty much everyone in one ethnic group becomes the ardent, dedicated, and murderous enemy of everyone in another group—ethnic war essentially does not exist. I argue instead that ethnic warfare more closely resembles nonethnic warfare, because it is waged by small groups of combatants, groups that purport to aght and kill in the name of some larger entity. Often, in fact, “ethnic war” is substantially a condition in which a mass of essentially mild, ordinary people can unwillingly and in considerable bewilderment come under the vicious and arbitrary control of small groups of armed thugs. I consider arst the violent conoicts in Croatia and Bosnia. These were spawned not so much by the convulsive surging of ancient hatreds or by frenzies whipped up by demagogic politicians and the media as by the ministrations of small—sometimes very small—bands of opportunistic marauders recruited by political leaders and operating under their general guidance. Many of these participants were drawn from street gangs or from bands of soccer hooligans. Others were criminals speciacally released from prison for the purpose. Their participation was required because the Yugoslav army, despite years of supposedly inouential nationalist propaganda and centuries

The Banality of "Ethnic War"

Introduction Jonathan Riley-Smith and David Luscombe 1. The rural economy and demographic growth Robert Fossier 2. Towns and the growth of trade Derek Keene 3. Government and community, 1024-1204 Susan Reynolds 4. The development of law Peter Landau 5. Knightly society Jean Flori 6. War, peace and the Christian order, 1024-1204 Ernst-Dieter Hehl 7. The structure of the church, 1024-1073 H. E. J. Cowdrey 8. Reform and the church, 1073-1122 I. S. Robinson 9. Religious communities, 1024-1215 Giles Constable 10. The institutions of the church, 1073-1216 I. S. Robinson 11. Thought and learning D. E. Luscombe 12. Religion and laity (including popular devotions and heresy) Bernard Hamilton 13. The crusades, 1095-1198 Jonathan Riley-Smith 14. The eastern churches Jean Richard 15. Muslim Spain and Portugal: al-Andalus and its neighbours, 1025-1198 Hugh Kennedy 16. The Jews in Europe and the Mediterranean basin in the eleventh and twelfth centuries Robert Chazan 17. Literature (Latin and vernacular) Jan Ziolkowski 18. Romanesque and gothic: architecture and the arts Patrick Kidson List of primary sources Bibliography of secondary sources arranged by chapter Index of manuscripts.

The New Cambridge Medieval History

The point 1. Why are people violent? 2. Violence is morally motivated to regulate social relationships 3. Defense, punishment, and vengeance 4. The right and obligation of parents, police, kings, and gods to violently enforce their authority 5. Contests of violence: fighting for respect and solidarity 6. Honor and shame 7. War 8. Violence to obey, honor, and connect with the gods 9. On relational morality: what are its boundaries, what guides it, and how is it computed? 10. The prevailing wisdom 11. Intimate partner violence 12. Rape 13. Making them one with us: initiation, clitoridectomy, infibulation, circumcision, and castration 14. Torture 15. Homicide: he had it coming 16. Ethnic violence and genocide 17. Self-harm and suicide 18. Violent bereavement 19. Non-bodily violence: robbery 20. The specific form of violence for constituting each relational model 21. Why do people use violence to constitute their social relationships, rather than using some other medium? 22. Metarelational models that inhibit or provide alternatives to violence 23. How do we end violence? 24. Evolutionary, philosophical, legal, psychological, and research implications The denouement.

Virtuous Violence: Hurting and Killing to Create, Sustain, End, and Honor Social Relationships

Why do rich countries receive the lion's share of international investment flows? Although this wealth bias is strong today, it was even stronger during the first global capital market boom before 1913. Very little of British capital exports went to poor countries, whether colonies or not. This paper constructs panel data for 34 countries that as a group received 92% of British capital. It concludes that international capital market failure had only second-order effects on the geographical distribution of British capital. The three local fundamentals that mattered most were schooling, natural resources and demography.

Wealth bias in the first global capital market boom, 1870¿1913

Medieval Europe was a rapidly developing society with a problem of violent disorder. Professor Kaeuper's original and authoritative study reveals that chivalry was not simply part of the solution. Chivalry praised heroic violence by knights, and fused such displays of prowess with honour, piety, high status, and attractiveness to women. Though the vast body of chivalric literature, here examined, praises chivalry as necessary to civilization, most texts also worry over knightly violence, criticize all ideals and practices of chivalry, and often propose reforms. The knights themselves joined the debate, absorbing some reforms, ignoring others, sometimes proposing their own. Complexity likewise characterized the interaction of chivalry with major governing institutions ("church" and "state") emerging at the same time: kings and clerics both needed and feared the force of knighthood. This fascinating book lays bare the conflicts and paradoxes surrounding the concept of chivalry in medieval Europe.

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Chivalry and violence in medieval Europe

This is a study of two topics of central importance in late medieval history: the impact of war, and the control of disorder. Making war and making law were the twin goals of the state, and the author examines the effect of the evolution of royal government in England and France. Ranging broadly between 1000 and 1400, he focuses principally on the period c.1290 to c.1360, and compares developments in the two countries in four related areas: the economic and political costs of war; the development of royal justice; the crown's attempt to control private violence; and the relationship between public opinion and government action. He argues that as France suffered near breakdown under repeated English invasions, the authority of the crown became more acceptable to the internal warring factions; whereas the English monarchy, unable to meet the expectations for internal order which arose partly from its own ambitious claims to be `keeper of the peace', had to devolve much of its judicial powers. In these linked problems of war, justice, and public order may lie the origins of English `constitutionalism' and French `absolutism'.

War, Justice, and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages

This is a study of two topics of central importance in late medieval history: the impact of war, and the control of disorder. Making war and making law were the twin goals of the state, and the author examines the effect of the evolution of royal government in England and France. Ranging broadly between 1000 and 1400, he focuses principally on the period c.1290 to c.1360, and compares developments in the two countries in four related areas: the economic and political costs of war; the development of royal justice; the crown's attempt to control private violence; and the relationship between public opinion and government action. He argues that as France suffered near breakdown under repeated English invasions, the authority of the crown became more acceptable to the internal warring factions; whereas the English monarchy, unable to meet the expectations for internal order which arose partly from its own ambitious claims to be 'keeper of the peace', had to devolve much of its judicial powers. In these linked problems of war, justice, and public order may lie the origins of English 'constitutionalism' and French 'absolutism'.

War, Justice and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages

On the Friday before last midlent here came to Hackney Richard Catel, kinsman of Master Richard de Baldock, in a monk's habit, calling himself Brother Muf, and John de Sabrychtheswith [i.e. Sawbridgeworth, Herts.], calling himself Brother Cuf, who entered the parsonage and told John, farmer of the benefice, that their abbot, Brother Puf, and his convent wanted to visit John within a week and put the parsonage to the torch, and that the money of the farm of the parsonage would be taken against their coming, if he wished to avoid damage and save his life. And then the next day they returned with Henry He...iz of Asschwall, Roger de Stevenhath of Lovel, William le Chaumberlain, Master Richard de Baldock, and others unknown to do what they had threatened, and John, fearing for his life, ran for the constables of the peace, raised the hue and cry, made signal for aid, and gathered the whole community of the town so that they were disturbed in their purpose. They returned Thursday in Easter week to John's house, broke in, bound John, his wife and all his household, beat and ill-treated them, took ?40 cash and valuables worth ?20 to John's damage of ?40. And because he would make a complaint concerning these damages, they were alarmed and greatly fearful of what they had done, and they wished to justify their deed by other devices, and by conspiracy and maintenance of Master Robert de Baldock, Master Richard de Baldock and Sir Roger de Waltham and John Fot, esquire of the said Sir Roger, and John Cullyng, they falsely informed our lord the king who then was [i.e. Edward II] that the said John de Bannebury and the people of Hackney had robbed them of gold, silver, and other valuables to a sum of 1,000m. The king granted a commission of oyer and terminer to Master Robert and Master Richard aforesaid, who procured justices who wore their robes and took their fees, namely John de Canterbrigg, John Bever, and Geoffrey Atte Legh. And the aforesaid Masters Robert and Richard de Baldock sent their letters to all the people in the county warning that none should be so foolish as to be against them and they ordered and sent armed men to kill John de Bannebury so that he could not remain in his own home nor come before the justices so that he has to pay ?40 to Master Richard de Baldock aforesaid and the vicar of Hackney has had to pay

Richard W. Kaeuper

Papers

Chivalry and violence in medieval Europe

War, Justice, and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages

War, Justice and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages

Law and Order in Fourteenth-Century England: The Evidence of Special Commissions of Oyer and Terminer

Bankers to the Crown: The Riccardi of Lucca and Edward I