Domestic politics and international relations are often inextricably entangled, but existing theories (particularly “state-centric” theories) do not adequately account for these linkages. When national leaders must win ratification (formal or informal) from their constituents for an international agreement, their negotiating behavior reflects the simultaneous imperatives of both a domestic political game and an international game. Using illustrations from Western economic summitry, the Panama Canal and Versailles Treaty negotiations, IMF stabilization programs, the European Community, and many other diplomatic contexts, this article offers a theory of ratification. It addresses the role of domestic preferences and coalitions, domestic political institutions and practices, the strategies and tactics of negotiators, uncertainty, the domestic reverberation of international pressures, and the interests of the chief negotiator. This theory of “two-level games” may also be applicable to many other political phenomena, such as dependency, legislative committees, and multiparty coalitions.

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Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games

A conceptual challenge in exploring the role of trust in interorganizational exchange is translating an inherently individual-level concept-trust-to the organizational-level outcome of performance. We define interpersonal and interorganizational trust as distinct constructs and draw on theories of interorganizational relations to derive a model of exchange performance. Specifically, we investigate the role of trust in interfirm exchange at two levels of analysis and assess its effects on negotiation costs, conflict, and ultimately performance. Propositions were tested with data from a sample of 107 buyer-supplier interfirm relationships in the electrical equipment manufacturing industry using a structural equation model. The results indicate that interpersonal and interorganizational trust are related but distinct constructs, and play different roles in affecting negotiation processes and exchange performance. Further, the hypotheses linking trust to performance receive some support, although the precise nature of the link is somewhat different than initially proposed. Overall, the results show that trust in interorganizational exchange relations clearly matters.

Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effectsof Interorganizational and Interpersonaltrust on Performance

Using an empirical taxonomy identifying two types of human resource systems, “control” and “commitment,” this study tested the strategic human resource proposition that specific combinations of policies and practices are useful in predicting differences in performance and turnover across steel “minimills.” The mills with commitment systems had higher productivity, lower scrap rates, and lower employee turnover than those with control systems. In addition, human resource system moderated the relationship between turnover and manufacturing performance.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/256705.pdf

Effects of human resource systems on manufacturing performance and turnover

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

Within academia there has been similar growing awareness of this need. Although this awareness is being articulated in several ways, one of the most frequent involves the conceptualization and investigation of the relationship between business strategy and the personal characteristics of top managers.2 Here, particular manager characteristics such as personality, skills, abilities, values, and perspectives are matched with particular types of business strategies. For example, a recently released study conducted by Hay Group Incorporated, in conjunction with the University of Michigan and the Strategic Planning Institute, reports that when a business is pursuing a growth strategy it needs top managers who are likely to abandon the status quo and adapt their strategies and goals to the marketplace. According to the study, insiders are slow to recognize the onset of decline and tend to persevere in strategies that are no longer effective; so, top managers need to be recruited from the outside.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4164753.pdf

Linking Competitive Strategies with Human Resource Management Practices

The Transformation of American Industrial Relations

A behavioral theory of labor negotiations

since the days of journeyman Brooklyn Dodger outfielder Gene Hermanski, who reportedly stormed into Branch Rickey's office after a particularly good season fully expecting a raise. When, upon emerging, he was asked if he got the deserved salary increase, he replied, "No, but at least I didn't take a pay cut!" Miller continually stresses the crucial importance of unionization to the players in transforming their once monopsonistic labor market into one in which competition became much more prevalent. He succeeds ably in demonstrating this point. The reader will enjoy his discussions of maligned Angel Alex Johnson, the Curt Flood case, baseball's various strikes and lockouts, and above all, the fascinating characters Miller had to deal with over the years. Consider, for example, Miller's depiction of former baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn. One sentence epitomizes Miller's characterization of Kuhn: "Kuhn must be singled out as the most important contributor to the successes of the Players Association" (p. 91). As an aside and for an eye-opening exercise, read Bowie Kuhn's own account of these same labor relations issues in his book Hardball: The Education of a Baseball Commissioner (Times Books, 1987). These two accounts of many of the same situations are so vastly different as to make one wonder whether these two men ever agreed on anything! I found two distracting elements in this otherwise engrossing book. First, Miller is constantly patting himself on the back for a job well done and criticizing others for not living up to his own standards of excellence. For example, Miller has this to say about his replacement as head of the players' union, Ken Moffett: "Ken Moffett started on the job on January 2, 1983. Let me correct that: He started on the payroll on that day. He never really started on the job" (p. 324). And then there is Miller's statement about the 1985 compromise the players made on salary arbitration and pension contributions by the owners. Don Fehr had by this time taken over as head of the union. Miller comments: "By 1985 the players had lost touch with their own history. This was the union's fault-Don Fehr's fault" (p. 338). Second, Miller has an extremely negative view of player agents, and his repeated criticism of players for not understanding their situations and for not realizing how much he and the union had done for them becomes tiresome. That Miller and the union helped these players tremendously is so obvious that the point does not need to be reiterated. Despite the enormous gains he had won for players, Miller apparently felt unappreciated, and, I believe, he considered himself underpaid for all his efforts. In the end, I wound up feeling a bit sorry for Marvin Miller. Having noted these irritating flaws, I nevertheless strongly urge anyone interested in baseball's labor relations to read and reread Miller's book. It has a great message for all of us who practice, study, and teach industrial relations. That message is a simple one. Hard work can pay off, and the process of collective bargaining can effectively restore the balance of bargaining power between labor and management.

A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: an Analysis of a Social Interaction System

A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations.

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Robert B. McKersie

Papers

The Transformation of American Industrial Relations

A behavioral theory of labor negotiations

A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: an Analysis of a Social Interaction System

A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations.

Strategic Choice and Industrial Relations Theory