For decades, Russia has used political, military, economic, informational, and clandestine tools to advance its goals of establishing a privileged sphere of influence in the Black Sea region and enhancing its capabilities for national defense and wider power projection. In this report, the authors review those tactics and identify elements of a Western strategy to protect mutual interests and counter Russian malign influence and aggression.

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Russia, NATO, and Black Sea Security

One of the most notable consequences of the end of the Cold War was the diminished role of nuclear weapons in international relations. The world’s primary nuclear weapon powers, the United States and the Russian Federation, made considerable reductions in their nuclear forces. The climax of the process was the New START Treaty signed in 2010. Now, the optimism that characterized the first decades of the post-Cold War era is rapidly evaporating. Geopolitical competition again dominates global and regional security dynamics. Nuclear powers are modernizing their forces and introducing novel systems that may affect strategic stability. At the same time, existing arms control regimes are crumbling. This report takes stock of recent developments in deterrence in general, and nuclear deterrence in particular. Its main ambition is to understand how deterrence has changed in light of certain post-Cold War trends, particularly in Europe. To this end, the report introduces the basic principles of deterrence. It also explores the nuclear-related policies and capabilities of the four nuclear weapon states most directly involved in European security affairs – Russia, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. Importantly, the report also analyses the implications of the recent trends in strategic deterrence for Northern Europe. This publication is part of the implementation of the Government Plan for Analysis, Assessment and Research. (tietokayttoon.fi) The content is the responsibility of the producers of the information and does not necessarily represent the view of the Government. Publisher Prime Minister’s Office Distributed by/ Publication sales Online version: julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi Publication sales: julkaisutilaukset.valtioneuvosto.fi

Strategic deterrence redux Nuclear weapons and European security

As a member of NATO, Norway supports efforts to enhance deterrence, crisis management and regional security in the North Atlantic and High North — including Scandinavia and northern Russia, as well as the waters of the Arctic Ocean, Barents Sea and North Sea. To inform ongoing strategy and policy development, Norway commissioned RAND to gather insights into other NATO Allies' perspectives on strategic opportunities and challenges in the region.

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Enhancing deterrence and defence on NATO's northern flank: Allied perspectives on strategic options for Norway

The article describes the problems of polish military forces in the context of a relatively new type of threat, commonly described as “hybrid warfare” . The first step of the analysis is a description of such threat, based on data gathered by polish and foreign analytical centers . The next step is a presentation of the current state of polish military forces – in terms of doctrine, organization, training and materiel (e .g . equipment) . This kind of data analysis offers relevant information about defense capabilities that the polish armed forces have and those which they lack . These capabilities are then compared to the challenges posed by hybrid warfare, thus providing insights on potential new capabilities which should be acquired as well as those which are unnecessary in the context of hybrid war .

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Polish Armed Forces and hybrid war: current and required capabilities

What have been the consequences of NATO enlargement for European security? To the vindication of its critics, the consequences appear disastrous. Insecurity pervades Europe while NATO is in crisis with a Russia justifiably aggrieved by broken promises and the overreach of liberal hegemony. This insecurity is especially troubling because NATO’s newer commitments are indefensible. In this essay, I evaluate these criticisms of NATO enlargement and advance three claims. First, intentionally or not, NATO enlargement has fulfilled a reasonable need to hedge against Russian resurgence. Critics of NATO enlargement themselves conceded that Russia could become revisionist once it reconstitutes itself. Second, NATO enlargement still allows for mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia. It has not been responsible for Russia’s internal political development and aggressive foreign policy choices. Finally, NATO enlargement does not necessitate expensive deterrence measures to secure its most vulnerable members. NATO enlargement thus has hugely benefited European security.

Thank goodness for NATO enlargement

Abstract Russian armed forces’ lacklustre performance in Ukraine has surprised military analysts. Shortcomings have included breakdowns in logistics, poor equipment and morale, abysmal communications, and muddled command and control, as well as a weak showing by the Russian Aerospace Forces, air defence, and cruise and ballistic missiles. Chief among the contributing factors are wishful political thinking, overreliance on esoteric doctrine and endemic corruption. War, however, brutally exposes peacetime cheating. Consequently, estimates of Russian military capabilities – in particular, for large-formation combined-arms operations, logistics, air defence and intangibles such as morale – need to be carefully reassessed. Earlier analyses of a Russia–NATO conflict appear to have overstated the challenge of defending Europe. Looking ahead, the conventional threat from Russia seems less daunting than previously thought, and the country faces a formidable task in repairing depleted capabilities. That said, President Vladimir Putin’s appetite for risk is greater than anticipated.

A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War

Stater som har formagan att anvanda en kombination av sensorer och langdistansrobotar for att hindra antagonister fran att operera inom en exkluderingszon, eller "bubbla", i anslutning till sitt territorium sags besitta avreglingsformaga (eng. antiaccess/area denial, A2/AD). Denna studie analyserar Rysslands avreglingsformaga och dess implikationer for Ostersjoregionen. Rysslands forbattrade formagor, samt dess paverkan pa Natos mojligheter att forstarka och forsvara de sarbara baltiska staterna i handelse av kris eller krig, har vackt mycket uppmarksamhet pa senare ar. Denna studie visar dock att denna formaga inte ar tillnarmelsevis lika ooverstiglig som den ibland framstalls, i synnerhet nar mojliga motatgarder inkluderas i analysen. Sarskilt markbaserade luftvarnssystem skapar i nulaget en mer begransad exkluderingszon an vad som ofta antas och flera motatgarder ar mojliga. Erfarenheter fran Syrien vacker ocksa fragor om systemens faktiska formaga i falt, jamfort med dess nominella formagor. Sjomals- och markmalsrobotar utgor ett storre hot, men aven har finns flera mojliga motatgarder. Dynamiken i detta sakerhetskomplex paverkar aven Sverige direkt och indirekt och ar en av de huvudsakliga orsakerna till varfor Sveriges sakerhet i okande grad ar sammanvavd med vara grannlanders, och med den transatlantiska alliansen Nato.

Bursting the Bubble? Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region : Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications

Moscow’s missile capabilities in the Baltic Sea region are not nearly as dangerous as they seem.

Robert Dalsjö

Papers

A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War

Bursting the Bubble? Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region : Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications

Don’t Believe the Russian Hype