Digital Soviet Union : the Russian national segment of the Internet as a closed national network shaped by strategic cultural ideas

https://people.cs.vt.edu/~irchen/ps/Mitchell-comcom14a.pdf

Review: A survey of intrusion detection in wireless network applications

Understanding deterrence and dissuasion in cyberspace is often difficult because our minds are captured by Cold War images of massive retaliation to a nuclear attack by nuclear means. The analogy to nuclear deterrence is misleading, however, because many aspects of cyber behavior are more like other behaviors, such as crime, that states try (imperfectly) to deter. Preventing harm in cyberspace involves four complex mechanisms: threats of punishment, denial, entanglement, and norms. Even when punishment is used, deterrent threats need not be limited to cyber responses, and they may address general behavior as well as specific acts. Cyber threats are plentiful, often ambiguous, and difficult to attribute. Problems of attribution are said to limit deterrence and dissuasion in the cyber domain, but three of the major means—denial by defense, entanglement, and normative taboos—are not strongly hindered by the attribution problem. The effectiveness of different mechanisms depends on context, and the question of...

Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace

Cyberwar has been described as a revolution in military affairs, a transformation of technology and doctrine capable of overturning the prevailing world order. This characterization of the threat from cyberwar, however, reflects a common tendency to conflate means and ends; studying what could happen in cyberspace (or anywhere else) makes little sense without considering how conflict over the internet is going to realize objectives commonly addressed by terrestrial warfare. To supplant established modes of conflict, cyberwar must be capable of furthering the political ends to which force or threats of force are commonly applied, something that in major respects cyberwar fails to do. As such, conflict over the internet is much more likely to serve as an adjunct to, rather than a substitute for, existing modes of terrestrial force. Indeed, rather than threatening existing political hierarchies, cyberwar is much more likely to simply augment the advantages of status quo powers.

/pdf/the-myth-of-cyberwar-bringing-war-in-cyberspace-back-down-to-33jr2uokda.pdf

The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth

While decisionmakers warn about the cyber threat constantly, there is little systematic analysis of the issue from an international security studies perspective. Some scholars presume that the related technology's scientific complexity and methodological issues prohibit orderly investigation; only a minimum degree of technical acuity is needed, however, revealing the scope of maneuver in the cyber domain. Other skeptics argue that the cyber peril is overblown, contending that cyber weapons have no intrinsic capacity for violence and do not alter the nature or means of war. This view misses the essence of the danger and conceals its true significance: the new capability is expanding the range of possible harm and outcomes between the concepts of war and peace—with important implications for national and international security. The cyber domain, moreover, features enormous defense complications and dangers to strategic stability: offense dominance, attribution difficulties, technological volatility, poor st...

/pdf/the-meaning-of-the-cyber-revolution-perils-to-theory-and-p1ejemqfa2.pdf

The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution: Perils to Theory and Statecraft

Siber Savaş-Ulusal Güvenliğe Yönelik Yeni Tehdit (Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It)

Richard A. Clarke warned America once before about the havoc terrorism would wreak on our national security -- and he was right. Now he warns us of another threat, silent but equally dangerous. Cyber War is a powerful book about technology, government, and military strategy; about criminals, spies, soldiers, and hackers. This is the first book about the war of the future -- cyber war -- and a convincing argument that we may already be in peril of losing it. Cyber War goes behind the "geek talk" of hackers and computer scientists to explain clearly and convincingly what cyber war is, how cyber weapons work, and how vulnerable we are as a nation and as individuals to the vast and looming web of cyber criminals. From the first cyber crisis meeting in the White House a decade ago to the boardrooms of Silicon Valley and the electrical tunnels under Manhattan, Clarke and coauthor Robert K. Knake trace the rise of the cyber age and profile the unlikely characters and places at the epicenter of the battlefield. They recount the foreign cyber spies who hacked into the office of the Secretary of Defense, the control systems for U.S. electric power grids, and the plans to protect America's latest fighter aircraft. Economically and militarily, Clarke and Knake argue, what we've already lost in the new millennium's cyber battles is tantamount to the Soviet and Chinese theft of our nuclear bomb secrets in the 1940s and 1950s. The possibilities of what we stand to lose in an all-out cyber war -- our individual and national security among them -- are just as chilling. Powerful and convincing, Cyber War begins the critical debate about the next great threat to national security.

Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It

Cyberwar: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It

Adversarial Internet robots (botnets) represent a growing threat to the safe use and stability of the Internet. Botnets can play a role in launching adversary reconnaissance (scanning and phishing), influence operations (upvoting), and financing operations (ransomware, market manipulation, denial of service, spamming, and ad click fraud) while obfuscating tailored tactical operations. Reducing the presence of botnets on the Internet, with the aspirational target of zero, is a powerful vision for galvanizing policy action. Setting a global goal, encouraging international cooperation, creating incentives for improving networks, and supporting entities for botnet takedowns are among several policies that could advance this goal. These policies raise significant questions regarding proper authorities/access that cannot be answered in the abstract. Systems analysis has been widely used in other domains to achieve sufficient detail to enable these questions to be dealt with in concrete terms. Defeating botnets using an observe-pursue-counter architecture is analyzed, the technical feasibility is affirmed, and the authorities/access questions are significantly narrowed. Recommended next steps include: supporting the international botnet takedown community, expanding network observatories, enhancing the underlying network science at scale, conducting detailed systems analysis, and developing appropriate policy frameworks. Solarium Report [1] Physical World Red (Adversary) Cyberspace Blue (Frie ndly) Cyb erspace Gray (Neutral) Cyberspace Public-private partnerships based on a shared situational awareness, combined action, and full support of governments in defense of the private sector. An international community that observes and enforces norms of responsible state behavior. 30 Cyberspace Solarium Commission STRATEGIC APPROACH: LAYERED CYBER DETERRENCE Layered cyber deterrence is the bluepri t that the government and American public need to build bridges across government agencies, international partners, and most importantly the private sector in order to secure American networks in cyberspace. It is the best way for the government to implement new authorities and take appropriate proportional action that builds national resilience as well as disrupts, defeats, and deters active cyber campaigns, including those targeting critical economic and political institutions like election systems.157 To translate layered dete rence into a tion requires three lines of e!ort organized into six pillars and more than 75 supporting recommendations that enhance the ability of the U.S. government to shape adversary behavior, deny bene"ts, and impose costs. Defend forward spans all three lines of e!ort to identify, isolate, and counter threats consistent with existing authorities and legal frameworks. Layered Cyber Deterrence CURRENT STATE APPROACH PILLARS DESIRED END STATES Adversaries are conducting cyber campaigns that target U.S. networks in cyberspace and threaten American safety and security, economic interests, political institutions, and ability to project military power. The U.S. government has the authorities but lacks the optimal structure and relationships with the private sector and other partners to achieve a unity of effort at the scale required to defend forward. Shape Behavior Foundation: Reform the U.S. Government Structure and Organization for Cyberspace Strengthen Norms and Nonmilitary Tools A digital environment that is safe and stable, promot s c ntinued innovation and economic growth, protects personal privacy, ensures national security, and does so by building: • An international community that observes and enforces norms of responsible state behavior • Critical elements of national power and infrastructure that are secure, resilient, and supported by a defensible digital ecosystem • Public-private partnerships based on a shared situational awareness, combined action, and full support of the U.S. government in defense of the private sector • An agile, proactive U.S. government organized to rapidly and concurrently employ every instrument of national power in defense of cyberspace and to generate deterrent options tailored to each adversary • A cyber force equipped with the resources, capabilities, and processes to maneuver and rapidly engage adversaries in and through cyberspace Deny Benefits Promote National Resilience Reshape the Cyber Ecosystem toward Greater Security Operationalize Cybersecurity Collaboration with the Private Sector Impose Costs Preserve and Employ the Military Instrument of Power The proactive observing, pursuing, and countering of adversary operations and imposing of costs in a day-to-day competition to disrupt and defeat ongoing malicious adversary cyber campaigns, deter future campaigns, and reinforce favorable international norms of behavior.

Robert K. Knake

Papers

Siber Savaş-Ulusal Güvenliğe Yönelik Yeni Tehdit (Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It)

Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It

Cyberwar: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It

Zero Botnets: An Observe-Pursue-Counter Approach

Why Cyber Warfare is Important