In the first two volumes of this work, Paul Ricoeur examined the relations between time and narrative in historical writing, fiction, and theories of literature. This final volume, a comprehensive reexamination and synthesis of the ideas developed in volumes 1 and 2, stands as Ricoeur's most complete and satisfying presentation of his own philosophy.

Time and Narrative

To raise the question of the nature of narrative is to invite reflection on the very nature of culture and, possibly, even on the nature of humanity itself. So natural is the impulse to narrate, so inevitable is the form of narrative for any report of the way things really happened, that narrativity could appear problematical only in a culture in which it was absent-absent or, as in some domains of contemporary Western intellectual and artistic culture, programmatically refused. As a panglobal fact of culture, narrative and narration are less problems than simply data. As the late (and already profoundly missed) Roland Barthes remarked, narrative "is simply there like life itself. . international, transhistorical, transcultural."' Far from being a problem, then, narrative might well be considered a solution to a problem of general human concern, namely, the problem of how to translate knowing into telling,2 the problem of fashioning human experience into a form assimilable to structures of meaning that are generally human rather than culture-specific. We may not be able fully to comprehend specific thought patterns of another culture, but we have relatively less difficulty understanding a story coming from another culture, however exotic that

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The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality

What counts? In work, as in other areas of life, it is not always clear what standards we are being judged by or how our worth is being determined. This can be disorienting and disconcerting. Because of this, many organizations devote considerable resources to limiting and clarifying the logics used for evaluating worth. But as David Stark argues, firms would often be better off, especially in managing change, if they allowed multiple logics of worth and did not necessarily discourage uncertainty. In fact, in many cases multiple orders of worth are unavoidable, so organizations and firms should learn to harness the benefits of such "heterarchy" rather than seeking to purge it. Stark makes this argument with ethnographic case studies of three companies attempting to cope with rapid change: a machine-tool company in late and postcommunist Hungary, a new-media startup in New York during and after the collapse of the Internet bubble, and a Wall Street investment bank whose trading room was destroyed on 9/11. In each case, the friction of competing criteria of worth promoted an organizational reflexivity that made it easier for the company to change and deal with market uncertainty. Drawing on John Dewey's notion that "perplexing situations" provide opportunities for innovative inquiry, Stark argues that the dissonance of diverse principles can lead to discovery.

The Sense of Dissonance: Accounts of Worth in Economic Life

The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks

EU regional policy is an investment policy. It supports job creation, competitiveness, economic growth, improved quality of life and sustainable development. These investments support the delivery of the Europe 2020 strategy. The present paper analysis two strategically different options of EU regional policy: place-neutral versus place-based policies for economic development. Our results suggest that in many EU regions the place-neutral policies may no be the best policy response to facing new challenges posed by deeper economic integration and globalisation.

An Agenda for a Reformed Cohesion Policy A place-based approach to meeting European Union challenges and expectations

This paper explores the relationship between uncertainty and innovation. It distinguishes three kinds of uncertainty: truth uncertainty, semantic uncertainty, and ontological uncertainty, the latter of which is particularly important for innovation processes. The paper then develops some implications of ontological uncertainty for innovation processes at three levels of organization, by means of three theories: a narrative theory of action at the level of individual economic actors; the theory of generative relationships at the meso-level of agent interaction; and the theory of scaffolding structures at the macro-level of market systems. These theories are illustrated by means of examples drawn from a prospective study on the emergence of a new market system around a technology for distributed control.

Ontological uncertainty and innovation

Strategy under Complexity: Fostering Generative Relationships

What is a strategy? The answer to this question ought to depend on the foresight horizon: how far ahead, and how much, the strategist thinks he can forsee. When the very structure of the firm's world is undergoing cascades of rapid change, and interpretations about the identity of agents and artifacts are characterized by ambiguity, we say that the foresight horizon is complex. We argue that strategy in the face of complex foresight horizons should consist of an on-going set of practices that interpret and construct the relationships that comprise the world in which the firm acts. Our discussion focuses on two intertwined kinds of strategic practices. The first is cognitive: a firm "populates its world" by positing who lives there and interpreting what they do. The second structural: the firm fosters generative relationships within and across its boundries---relationships that produce new sources of value that cannot be foreseen in advance. We illustrate the ideas advanced in the paper with a story about the entry of ROLM into the PDX market in 1975.

Foresight, Complexity, and Strategy

In this essay, we argue that rational choice (RC) provides an inadequate foundation for a theory of economic action. After defining RC sufficiently broadly to encompass much of the bounded rationality literature as well as neoclassical optimization theory, we present three principal arguments against RC. The first is cognitive: economic actors are experts at what they do, and the cognitive processes that underlie experitise are not consistent with RC, descriptively, prescriptively or positively. The second argument begins with the observation that economic action takes place in and through relationships between agents, and these relationships may generate actions that connot be localized to individual agents. We argue that these generative relationships are essential to understanding such fundamental economic phenomena as innovation, and the actions that result from them are not amenable to analysis from a RC perspective. Finally, we argue that most economic agents lack the judgement and execution coherence required by RC. In a companion paper, we propose an alternative foundation for a theory of economic action that builds on the critique of RC presented in this paper.

Robert Maxfield

Papers

Ontological uncertainty and innovation

Strategy under Complexity: Fostering Generative Relationships

Foresight, Complexity, and Strategy

Choice and action

General equilibrium and the theory of directed graphs