Prologue to the Third Edition \ Preface \ 1. A Disquieting Suggestion \ 2. The Nature of Moral Agreement Today and the Claims of Emotivism \ 3. Emotivism: Social Content and Social Context \ 4. The Predecessor Culture and the Enlightenment Project of Justifying Morality \ 5. Why the Enlightenment Project of Justifying Morality Had to Fail \ 6. Some Consequences of the Failure of the Enlightenment Project \ 7. 'Fact', Explanation and Expertise \ 8. The Character of Generalizations in Social Science and their Lack of Predictive Power \ 9. Nietzsche or Aristotle? \ 10. The Virtues in Heroic Societies \ 11. The Virtues at Athens \ 12. Aristotle's Account of the Virtues \ 13. Medieval Aspects and Occasions \ 14. The Nature of the Virtues \ 15. The Virtues, The Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of a Tradition \ 16. From the Virtues to Virtue and After Virtue \ 17. Justice as a Virtue: Changing Conceptions \ 18. After Virtue: Nietzsche or Aristotle, Trotsky and St Benedict \ 19. Postscript \ Bibliography \ Index.

After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory

Organizational Justice: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow

Selection of efficient institutions or policies in politics requires constituents to estimate the net benefits of political reforms. Political competition fails to inform constituents of the costs of forgone political alternatives. Ignorance of ‘political opportunity costs’ prevents the adoption of welfare enhancing reforms of public institutions and policies. The empirical record supports this contention.

The use of knowledge about society

Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X00003435

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

The aiithlor is deeply grateful to Mario Rizzo, Peter Boettke, andc1 Yat Nyarko, for exte.tsive and helpful comm7ents o an earlier draft Firther helpful coniiiiienit.s were provided by Joseph T Salernio, and by othier iaiemiibers of the Aiustriani Economizics Colloquiumi71 at New York UniverOity. Several anioniymtouis referee.s provided m1anzy additionial valiuable suggestions. The auithlor is gr-atefiul to the Sarah Scaife Foundation for researchi support. I THE AUSTRIAN TRADITION is represented in modern economics by a "very vocal, feisty and dedicated subset of the economics profession" (Karen Vaughn 1994, p. xi). Much of the work of this group of scholars is devoted to the most fundamental problems of microeconomics.1 This Austrian work, therefore, differs in character and content from a good deal of neoclassical theory which, despite widespread and growing awareness of its limitations, continues to serve as the analytical core of main

http://sobelrs.people.cofc.edu/Readings/1B-3.%20Kirzner%20-%20Entrepreneurial%20Discovery%20and%20the%20Competitive%20Market%20Process%20An%20Austrian%20Approach.pdf

Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: An Austrian Approach

Robert Nozicka s Anarchy, State, and Utopia is a powerful, philosophical challenge to the most widely held political and social positions of our age ---- liberal, socialist and conservative. "Individuals have rights," Nozick writes in his opening sentence, "and there are things no person or group may do to them without violating their rights." The work that follows is a sophisticated and passionate defence of the rights of the individual as opposed to the state. The author argues that the state is justified only when it is severely limited to the narrow function of protection against force, theft and fraud and to the enforcement of contracts. Any more extensive activities by the state, he demonstrates, will inevitably violate individual rights. Among the many achievements of the work are an important new theory of distributive justice, a model of utopia, and an integration of ethics, legal philosophy and economic theory into a profound position in political philosophy which will be discussed for years to come.

Anarchy, State, and Utopia

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Documents about the work Anarchy, State and utopia (1974) / Robert Nozick (1938-2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Pages in data.bnf.fr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Related authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 This page in data.bnf.fr lab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Sources and references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Link to the main catalogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Variant of the title

Repeatedly and successfully, the celebrated Harvard philosopher Robert Nozick has reached out to a broad audience beyond the confines of his discipline, addressing ethical and social problems that matter to every thoughtful person Here Nozick continues his search for the connections between philosophy and "ordinary" experience In the lively and accessible style that his readers have come to expect, he offers a bold theory of rationality, the one characteristic deemed to fix humanity's "specialness" What are principles for? asks Nozick We could act simply on whim, or maximize our self-interest and recommend that others do the same As Nozick explores rationality of decision and rationality of belief, he shows how principles actually function in our day-to-day thinking and in our efforts to live peacefully and productively with one another In Nozick's view, misconceptions of rationality have resulted in many intractable philosophical problems For example, the Kantian attempt to make principled behavior the sole ultimate standard of conduct extends rationality beyond its bounds In this provocative volume, Nozick reformulates current decision theory to include the symbolic meaning of actions in areas from controlling impulses to fighting society's war against drugs The author proposes a new rule of rational decision, "maximizing decision-value, " which is a weighted sum of causal, evidential, and symbolic utility In a particularly fascinating section of the book he traces the implications of this rule for the famous Prisoner's Dilemma and for Newcomb's Problem Rationality of belief, according to Nozick, involves two aspects: support by reasons that make the belief credible, andgeneration by a process that reliably produces true beliefs A new evolutionary account explains how some factual connections are instilled in us as seemingly self-evident, thus reversing the direction of Kant's "Copernican Revolution" Proposing a theory of rational belief that inc

http://www.gbv.de/dms/mpib-toc/186868073.pdf

The Nature of Rationality

Suppose a being in whose power to predict your choices you have enormous confidence. (One might tell a science-fiction story about a being from another planet, with an advanced technology and science, who you know to be friendly, etc.) You know that this being has often correctly predicted your choices in the past (and has never, so far as you know, made an incorrect prediction about your choices), and furthermore you know that this being has often correctly predicted the choices of other people, many of whom are similar to you, in the particular situation to be described below. One might tell a longer story, but all this leads you to believe that almost certainly this being’s prediction about your choice in the situation to be discussed will be correct.

Robert Nozick

Papers

Anarchy, State, and Utopia

Anarchy, State, and Utopia

Anarchy, State, and Utopia

The Nature of Rationality

Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice