Problem Given the number of times in which an unknown event has happened and failed: Required the chance that the probability of its happening in a single trial lies somewhere between any two degrees of probability that can be named. SECTION 1 Definition 1. Several events are inconsistent, when if one of them happens, none of the rest can. 2. Two events are contrary when one, or other of them must; and both together cannot happen. 3. An event is said to fail, when it cannot happen; or, which comes to the same thing, when its contrary has happened. 4. An event is said to be determined when it has either happened or failed. 5. The probability of any event is the ratio between the value at which an expectation depending on the happening of the event ought to be computed, and the value of the thing expected upon it’s 2 happening.

An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances. [Facsimil]

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The History of Statistics. The Measurement of Uncertainty before 1900.

The Scholastic Analysis of Usury

The Vortex Theory of Planetary Motions

This thesis investigates Heidegger’s concept of freedom between 1927 and 1930. In it, I argue that Heidegger advocates a radical reinvention of the positive concept of freedom in confrontation with Immanuel Kant and Henri Bergson. I also argue, against the grain of recent literature, that this conception remains the same as it is found in Being and Time and in the key texts concerning freedom from the period immediately after its publication: ‘The Essence of Ground’ [WG], Metaphysical Foundations of Logic [GA26], The Essence of Human Freedom [GA31], and ‘On the Essence of Truth’ [WW].
In Chapter 1, I interpret the argument of the lecture course The Essence of Human Freedom as Heidegger’s attempt to dismiss the question of the freedom of the will. In doing so, I argue, he critically repeats the arguments that Bergson provides in Time and Free Will. In Chapter 2, I turn to Being and Time to follow the thread of Heidegger’s argument, leading to the claim that Dasein is fundamentally free but, as inauthentic, also typically unfree. In Chapter 3 I investigate this apparent paradox further, showing that Heidegger, without using the term, is advocating a positive, rather than a negative, conception of unfreedom in evaluating inauthentic Dasein as unfree. In Chapter 4, I show how this positive conception also arrives as a critical confrontation with Kant and Bergson, where authenticity is conceived as Dasein’s being-its-self in an ontological sense.
In Chapter 5, I build on the above to demonstrate that the arguments in Being and Time concerning guilt, the arguments in WG and GA26 concerning transcendence, and the arguments in WW concerning truth all complement each other in a single concept of freedom: Dasein’s being its self by choosing to be the ground of its world, rather than fleeing from this existential responsibility.

Heidegger’s conception of freedom 1927-1930: guilt, transcendence, truth

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND Determinism, broadly speaking, is the doctrine that whatever happens in the world is brought about by causes other than itself. In this sense, all the major philosophers of the seventeenth century – with the possible exception of Male-branche – were determinists. But these same philosophers also believed in human freedom. It follows that each of them (again, perhaps excepting Malebranche) was a compatibilist with respect to freedom and determination: each held that being free is logically compatible with being causally determined. Yet their specific teachings on this subject are very different from one another. For they had very different views on the nature and scope of human freedom, and different conceptions of causation. This chapter concentrates on the teachings of these major figures: Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Locke, and Leibniz. There were, of course, other seventeenth-century thinkers who concerned themselves with freedom and determinism – this was one of the most frequently debated issues of the age. And some of these others, in opposition to the philosophers, were incompatibilists. They held that an action logically cannot both be causally determined and be free, in any proper sense of ‘free’. An incompatibilist has two options: adhere to determination and deny that anything or anyone is free (this is hard determinism) or admit free actions and claim that these are undetermined, and thereby reject the doctrine of determinism (this is libertarianism). We know of no seventeenth-century thinker who took the hard determinist position, but quite a few were libertarians.

Robert Sleigh

Papers

Determinism and human freedom