Central and East Europeans have a great deal in common, both historically and culturally, with West Europeans and North Americans, but tend to be more interdependent. Interdependence has been shown to be linked to holistic cognition. East Asians are more interdependent than Americans and are more holistic. If interdependence causes holism, we would expect Central and East Europeans to be more holistic than West Europeans and North Americans. In two studies we found evidence that Central and East Europeans are indeed more holistic than Westerners on three tasks, one of which examined categorization and two of which measured patterns of visual attention. These studies support the argument that cross-cultural differences in cognition are due to society level differences in independence/interdependence.

Holism in a European cultural context: Differences in cognitive style between Central and East Europeans and Westerners

The recent discourse on overtourism and anti-tourist attitudes has opened up the space to reimagine tourism development and planning. Employing an interdisciplinary approach we combined research by...

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Overtourism Dystopias and Socialist Utopias: Towards an Urban Armature for Dubrovnik*

Is Europe about to rise as a full political actor on the world stage? Conventional wisdom had it that European integration in foreign policy, security and defence was unlikely to amount to much very quickly. More recently, however, a diverse group of scholars has argued that pan-European political actorhood had gained considerable substance. Surveying the recent literature, pertinent related writings and relevant primary materials on the matter, this article identifies and systematizes the many different factors affecting European high-politics actorhood in the early 21st century. A fully grown international actor Europe, it finds, remains a longer-term project rather than an imminent prospect.

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Momentum and Impediments: Why Europe Won't Emerge as a Full Political Actor on the World Stage Soon*

Croatia’s versatile plant use traditions are still not sufficiently documented. The aim of this study was to record local traditions of wild food plant use on the Dubrovnik coast. We interviewed 40 inhabitants of 23 villages, mainly knowledgeable informants. On average 19 species were listed, which in total produced an inventory of 95 food plant species (including species whose leaves or inflorescences are used as recreational teas). The most commonly collected are: Sonchus oleraceus and S. asper, Asparagus acutifolius, Dioscorea communis, Cichorium intybus, Crepis zacintha, Allium ampeloprasum, Picris echioides and Foeniculum vulgare (all of them used as vegetables), the fruits of Rubus ulmifolius (mainly eaten raw), the fruits of roses (Rosa sempervirens and R. canina) and the leaves of Salvia officinalis (both roses and salvia are used for making recreational teas). A particular feature of the local gastronomy is the collection of young Ruscus aculeatus shoots.

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Wild food plants used on the Dubrovnik coast (south-eastern Croatia)

The foundations for modern contract law were laid between 1670 and 1870. Rather than advancing a purely chronological account, this examination of the development of contract law doctrine in England during that time explores key themes in order to better understand the drivers of legal change. These themes include the relationship between lawyers and merchants, the role of equity, the place of statute, and the part played by legal literature. Developments are considered in the context of the legal system of the time and through those who were involved in litigation as lawyers, judges, jurors or litigants. It concludes that the way in which contract law developed was complex. Legal change was often uneven and slow, and some of the apparent changes had deep roots in the past. Clashes between conservative and more reformist tendencies were not uncommon.

The Law of Contract 1670–1870

Margaret Thatcher is one of the most iconic politicians of the twentieth century. With the possible exception of Winston Churchill, no other Prime Minister has had such an impact on modern British history. Like it or not, her radical social and economic policies have made Britain the country it is today. Without Margaret Thatcher there could have been no New Labour, no Tony Blair and no David Cameron. Now Robin Harris, for many years Thatcher's speechwriter, trusted adviser and the draftsman of two volumes of her autobiography, has written the defining book about this indomitable woman. He tells her extraordinary life story, from humble beginnings above her father's grocer's shop in Grantham, her early days as one of the first women in Westminster who became known as 'Thatcher milk-snatcher' during her days in the Ministry for Education and then as Prime Minister. We follow her through the 'Winter of Discontent', the tribulations of the miners' strike and the Falklands War. And Harris writes a stunning account of her exit from power and tells of her life after number 10.

Not for Turning: The Life of Margaret Thatcher

Dubrovnik: A History

THE FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR to the Court of St. J James, Ray Seitz, recalls in his autobiography preparations for President Bill Clinton's first meeting with Britain's then-prime minister, John Major. Sitting in the Oval Office, the president was reminded by one of his aides to mention the magic phrase "special relationship." "Oh yes," said Clinton. "How could I forget?" And he burst out laughing. The events of September II cast a different light on this joke, as they did on the frivolity of the rest of the Clinton years. Ten days after al Qaeda's attacks on New York and Washington, President George W. Bush told Congress that America had "no truer friend than Great Britain." This was more than a gracious compliment to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who was listening in the gallery. Americans, including America's commander in chief, were moved by London's response to the attacks on the United States. Everyone (bar Saddam Hussein) had condemned the loss of civilian life. But whereas, for example, the Belgian foreign minister -- acting as president of the European Union -- was soon talking of "limits to [EU-U.S.] solidarity," Blair's anger was unmistakable and his robustness unwavering. The British prime minister spoke of "barbarism" and "shame for all eternity....Are we at war with the people who committed this terrible atrocity? Absolutely." Blair's sentiments were palpably sincere. But they also reflected his intuitive grasp of Britain's national mood: The truth is that the nation, as a whole, clearly did exhibit far stronger ties of sympathetic solidarity with America than did anyone else. According to a Daily Telegraph/Gallup poll taken in early October, 70 percent of Britons supported military action against Afghanistan: They did so even if it meant large numbers of Afghan civilian casualties and despite the risk of substantial numbers of British troops being killed or wounded. So when the following month a Newsweek poll asked Americans whether particular countries had done enough to support the U.S. during the crisis, Britain earned the highest approval ratings. Blair's own popularity in the United States soared to levels rarely if ever enjoyed by a foreign statesman. Equally significant, American conservatives previously unenamored with the British prime minister were suddenly effusive with praise. All of which was highly gratifying to enthusiasts of the Anglo-American "special relationship" -- a somewhat embattled political minority on both sides of the Atlantic in recent years. But, viewed objectively, the practical results of the revivified "special relationship" have turned out to be meager, in some ways plain disappointing. Capabilities and will OF AMERICA'S EUROPEAN allies only France and Britain possessed a significant capacity to assist in the war on terrorism, and only Britain had the will. A British task force was accordingly deployed in the Gulf; British submarines fired Tomahawks against Taliban targets on two occasions. Within Afghanistan, members of Britain's SAS regiment -- without doubt the most skilled special service forces in the world -- performed taxing and dangerous tasks with great success, notably in attacking the al Qaeda training camp outside Kandahar and in hand-to-hand fighting in the Tora Bora region. British forces are still involved in mopping-up operations against the enemy. The pity is that from first to last these exploits have mattered little in the overall outcome. This has been America's war, and the U.S. has fought it according to its own battle plan and almost entirely with its own resources. The military cooperation of the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan -- frontline but hardly first-rate powers -- probably mattered more at the crucial stages than that of Britain. Moreover, the significance of the 200 or so British soldiers sent to fight by America's side in Afghanistan is put into some perspective by the British Foreign Office's estimate that about the same number of British citizens were engaged on the side of al Qaeda. …

Robin Harris

Papers

Not for Turning: The Life of Margaret Thatcher

Dubrovnik: A History

The State of the Special Relationship

Talleyrand: Betrayer and Saviour of France