An internal reconstruction and an immanent critique of Bourdieu's generative structuralism is presented. Rather than starting with the concept of “habitus,” as is usually done, the article tries to systematically reconstruct Bourdieu's theory by an analysis of the relational logic that permeates his whole work. Tracing the debt Bourdieu's approach owes to Bachelard's rationalism and Cassirer's relationalism, the article examines Bourdieu's epistemological writings of the 1960s and 70s. It tries to make the case that Bourdieu's sociological metascience represents a rationalist version of Bhaskar's critical realism, and enjoins Bourdieu to give heed to the realist turn in the philosophy of the natural and the social sciences. The article shows how Bourdieu's epistemological assumptions are reflected in his primary theoretical constructs of “habitus” and “field.” To concretize their discussion, it analyzes Bourdieu's reinterpretation of Weber in his theory of the field of religion and of the young Mannheim in his theory of the scientific field.

“The Real is Relational”: An Epistemological Analysis of Pierre Bourdieu's Generative Structuralism

Modern social theory offers three main models of the state: an instrumentalist, a realist and a pluralist. These models can be respectively represented by the names Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. Of those three theorists, perhaps only Marx can claim to be a key originator of ‘his’ model of the state. In Weber’s political sociology the influence of political realism stretching back at least as far as Machiavelli and Hobbes is quite transparent. Furthermore, while rejecting any form of socialism and what he took to be the economic reductionism of Marxist theory, Weber nevertheless sought to retain elements of a materialist methodology denuded of its original political aim. Finally, Weber’s conception of power as an expression of will, and his view of both politics and society as increasingly rationalised (and ‘disenchanted’) and as sites of eternal struggle owe a great deal to his reading of Nietzsche. His achievement might be described as one of synthesising elements of realism, materialism and nihilism, and of translating these into the language of the modern social sciences. In Durkheim’s political sociology the influence of both French and German political theory is no less evident. His view of the state as the deliberative organ of political societies and as the guardian of their conscience collective echoes Rousseau’s general will, French socialist thought (in particular Saint–Simon’s) and Comte’s positivist approach to the study of society. Moreover, his emphasis upon the normative role of secondary associations (as both a source of identity and as a counter-balance to the growing power of the state) has precedence not only in Montesquieu and Tocqueville, but also in those German political theorists who tried to rescue elements of the ‘ Standestaat ’ (polity of estates) for a modern pluralist society. Durkheim’s objective was to use scientific method to show how the individual and the social, the value of freedom and the requirement of solidarity, might be reconciled.

Weber, Durkheim and the sociology of the modern state

Thinking about the future in a scientific manner is often characterised by an illusion of knowledge, leading to precarious one-sidedness and false conclusions. The reasons for this are misinterpretations of core scientific concepts as well as vested interests in knowledge creation and scientific advice; these misinterpretations and interfering interests can prevail because there is no coherent set of rules on what a scientific enquiry into the future could look like. To provide a foundation for further discussion, this article takes the knowledge illusion seriously and drafts some epistemological concepts and methodological rules that could bridge this gap. Ways to think about the future in a scientific way correspond to scientific anticipation instead of knowledge creation, to a complex analytical worldview instead of determinism, to discourse and scepticism instead of critical rationalism, to illustrative thought experiments instead of explanatory prognoses, and to plausibility instead of probability. The concepts and rules for a scientific enquiry into the future developed in this article can help to clearly differentiate between multiple prognoses and scenarios, and to evaluate scenarios by scientific means.

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A scientific enquiry into the future

In recent discussions of historical materialism, the relationship of Marx’s critique of political economy to a critical social theory directed toward political action has come into question. The thesis that there is a &dquo;crisis in the theory of revolution&dquo; indicates that the analysis of capital, the centerpiece of Marx’s theoretical project, can no longer retain such a leading role in the determination of a critical social theory capable of offering a praxisoriented interpretation of the contemporary situation of late capitalism. The function of the critique of political economy in a theory of class struggle was always disputed in the history of Marxism, but it has never before been questioned to such a great extent. Although the fundamental methodological notion of the mutual translatability, if not the thematical convergence of the systematic analysis of capital and a pt~~~s-oriented theory of revolution forms the basis of the Marxian tradition, it is precisely this theoretical complementarity which is currently in doubt. The categories of a crisis theory based upon the analysis of capital are apparently no longer adequate to describe the altered crisis areas and conflict potentials of late capitalist society. This icongruity has come to dominate both the theoretical and the political sides of Marxist discussion.

Work and Instrumental Action: On the Normative Basis of Critical Theory

Diese beiden Definitionen von Feldern unterscheiden sich nicht nur im Sprachduktus. Sie divergieren ganz offensichtlich auch hinsichtlich der Frage, was als wesentliche Bezugsgrose der Feldtheorie gelten sollte. Sind es strukturelle Positionen (Bourdieu/Wacquant) oder Institutionen (DiMagio/Powell)? Auserdem herrscht Unklarheit hinsichtlich der Beziehungen dieser Elemente zueinander: Mussen sie sich wissentlich aufeinander beziehen, um zu einem feldformigen Praxiszusammenhang zu gehoren (DiMagio/Powell) oder handelt es sich um objektive Relationen, die sich zwar in Interaktionen niederschlagen konnen, aber keineswegs mussen (Bourdieu/Wacquant). Solche Dissonanzen hatten in anderen Kontexten durchaus das Potenzial, erbitterte Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Wissenschaftlern zu provozieren. Bei der Feldanalyse ist dies anders.

Feldanalyse als Forschungsprogramm

»Die gesellschaftliche Totalität führt kein Eigenleben oberhalb des von ihr Zusammengefaßten, aus dem sie selbst besteht. Sie produziert und reproduziert sich durch ihre einzelnen Momente hindurch ... So wenig jenes Ganze vom Leben, von der Kooperation und dem Antagonismus seiner Elemente abzusondern ist, so wenig kann irgendein Element auch bloß in seinem Funktionieren verstanden werden ohne Einsicht in das Ganze, das an der Bewegung des einzelnen selbst sein Wesen hat. System und Einzelheit sind reziprok und nur in ihrer Reziprozität zu erkennen[]« Adorno begreift Gesellschaft in Kategorien, die ihre Herkunft aus der Logik Hegels nicht verleugnen. Er begreift Gesellschaft als Totalität in dem streng dialektischen Sinne, der es verbietet, das Ganze organisch aufzufassen nach dem Satze: es sei mehr als die Summe ihrer Teile; ebensowenig aber ist Totalität eine Klasse, die sich umfangslogisch bestimmen ließe durch ein Zusammennehmen aller unter ihr befassten Elemente. Insofern fällt der dialektische Begriff des Ganzen nicht unter die berechtigte Kritik an den logischen Grundlagen jener Gestalttheorien[], die auf ihrem Gebiete Untersuchungen nach den formalen Regeln analytischer Kunst überhaupt perhorreszieren; und überschreitet dabei doch die Grenzen formaler Logik, in deren Schattenreich Dialektik selber nicht anders scheinen kann denn als Schimäre.

Roland Simon-Schaefer

Papers

Analytische Wissenschaftstheorie und Dialektik