Roland Strausz

TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a crowdfunding platform that enables consumers to contract with consumers before investment under aggregate demand uncertainty, which improves screening for valuable projects and promotes welfare and complements traditional entrepreneurial financing, which focuses on controlling moral hazard.

TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that decreasing concavity of the agent's utility function with respect to the screening variable is not sufficient to ensure that stochastic mechanisms are suboptimal.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the structure of optimal finance contracts in an agency model of outside finance, when investors possess private information, and they showed that, depending on the intensity of the entrepreneur's moral hazard problem, optimal contracts induce full, partial, or no revelation of the investor's private information.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce consumers with intrinsic privacy preferences into the monopolistic non-linear pricing model, and they show that a privacy mechanism is optimal if privacy costs are large and that it yields classical consumers a higher utility than data-sensitive consumers with the same valuation.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that ordinary shares undermine any inherent commitment of its holders to resist renegotiating away ex post inefficiencies, and they show that shareholders may use a manager in combination with a golden parachute (managerial severance payments) as a commitment device not to renegotiate ex post.