This article discusses the conduct and evaluatoin of interpretive research in information systems. While the conventions for evaluating information systems case studies conducted according to the natural science model of social science are now widely accepted, this is not the case for interpretive field studies. A set of principles for the conduct and evaluation of interpretive field research in information systems is proposed, along with their philosophical rationale. The usefulness of the principles is illustrated by evaluating three published interpretive field studies drawn from the IS research literature. The intention of the paper is to further reflect and debate on the important subject of grounding interpretive research methodology.

A set of principles for conducting and evaluating interpretive field studies in information systems

The aim of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) is to explore in detail how participants are making sense of their personal and social world, and the main currency for an IPA study is the meanings particular experiences, events, states hold for participants. The approach is phenomenological (see Chapter 3) in that it involves detailed examination of the participant’s lifeworld; it attempts to explore personal experience and is concerned with an individual’s personal perception or account of an object or event, as opposed to an attempt to produce an objective statement of the object or event itself. At the same time, IPA also emphasizes that the research exercise is a dynamic process with an active role for the researcher in that process. One is trying to get close to the participant’s personal world, to take, in Conrad’s (1987) words, an ‘insider’s perspective’, but one cannot do this directly or completely. Access depends on, and is complicated by, the researcher’s own conceptions; indeed, these are required in order to make sense of that other personal world through a process of interpretative activity. Thus, a two-stage interpretation process, or a double hermeneutic, is involved. The participants are trying to make sense of their world; the researcher is trying to make sense of the participants trying to make sense of their world. IPA is therefore intellectually connected to hermeneutics and theories of interpretation (Packer and Addison, 1989; Palmer, 1969; Smith, in press; see also Chapter 2 this volume). Different interpretative stances are possible, and IPA combines an empathic hermeneutics with a questioning hermeneutics. Thus, consistent with its phenomenological origins, IPA is concerned with trying to understand what it is like, from the point of view of the participants, to take their side. At the same time, a detailed IPA analysis can also involve asking critical questions of the texts from participants, such as the following: What is the person trying to achieve here? Is something leaking out here that wasn’t intended? Do I have a sense of something going on here that maybe the participants themselves are less aware of?

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Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis

An introduction to discourse analysis: Theory and method (2nd ed.

Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Part 1 The departing ground: a fundamental circularity - in the mind of the reflective scientist - an already-given condition, what is cognitive science?, cognitive science within the circle, the theme of this book what do we mean "Human Experience"? - science and the phenomenological tradition, the breakdown of phenomenology, a non-western philosophical tradition, examining experience with a method - mindfulness/awareness, the role of reflection in the analysis of experience, experimentation and experiential analysis. Part 2 Varieties of cognitivism: symbols - the cognitivist hypothesis - the foundational cloud, defining the cognitivist hypothesis, manifestations of cognitivism, cognitivism and human experience, experience and the computational mind the I of the storm - what do we mean by "Self"?, looking for a self in the aggregates, momentariness and the brain, the aggregates without a self. Part 3 Varieties of emergence: emergent properties and connectionism - self-organization - the roots of an alternative, the connectionist strategy, emergence and self-organization, connectionism today, neuronal emergences, exeunt the symbols, linking symbols and emergence selfless minds - societies of mind, the society of object relations, co-dependent arising, basic element analysis, mindfulness and freedom, selfless minds, divided agents, minding the world. Part 4 Steps to a middle way: the Cartesian anxiety - a sense of dissatisfaction, representation revisited, the Cartesian anxiety, steps to a middle way, enaction - embodied cognition - recovering common sense, self-organization revisited, colour as a study case, cognition as embodied action, the retreat into natural selection evolutionary path making and natural drift - adaptationism - an idea in transition, a horizon of multiple mechanisms, beyond the best in evolution and cognition, evolution - ecology and development in congruence, lessons from evolution as natural drift, defining the enactive approach, enactive cognitive science. Part 5 Worlds without ground: the middle way - evocations of groundlessness, Nagarjuna and the Madhyamika tradition, the two truths, groundlessness in contemporary thought laying down a path in walking - science and experience in circulation, nihilism and the need for planetary thinking, Nishitani Keiji, ethics and human transformation. Appendices: meditation terminology categories of experiential events used in mindfulness/awareness works on Buddhism and mindfulness/awareness.

The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience

Translators' Preface. Author's Preface to the Seventh German Edition. Introduction. Exposition of the Question of the Meaning of Being. 1. The Necessity, Structure, and Priority of the Question of Being. 2. The Twofold Task of Working out the Question of Being. Method and Design of our Investigation. Part I:. The Interpretation of Dasein in Terms of Temporality, and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon for the Question of Being. 3. Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein. Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Dasein. Being-in-the-World in General as the Basic State of Dasein. The Worldhood of the World. Being-in-the-World as Being-with and Being-One's-Self. The 'they'. Being-in as Such. Care as the Being of Dasein. 4. Dasein and Temporality. Dasein's Possibility of Being-a-Whole, and Being-Towards-Death. Dasein's Attestation of an Authentic Potentiality-for-Being, and Resoluteness. Dasein's Authentic Potentiality-for-Being-a-Whole, and Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care. Temporality and Everydayness. Temporality and Historicality. Temporality and Within-Time-Ness as the Source of the Ordinary Conception of Time. Author's Notes. Glossary of German Terms. Index.

Ronald W. Hepburn

Papers

Being and Time