As reflected in the amount of controversy, few areas in psychology have undergone such dramatic conceptual changes in the past decade as the emerging science of heuristics. Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes, conscious or unconscious, that ignore part of the information. Because using heuristics saves effort, the classical view has been that heuristic decisions imply greater errors than do “rational” decisions as defined by logic or statistical models. However, for many decisions, the assumptions of rational models are not met, and it is an empirical rather than an a priori issue how well cognitive heuristics function in an uncertain world. To answer both the descriptive question (“Which heuristics do people use in which situations?”) and the prescriptive question (“When should people rely on a given heuristic rather than a complex strategy to make better judgments?”), formal models are indispensable. We review research that tests formal models of heuristic inference, including in business organizations, health care, and legal institutions. This research indicates that (a) individuals and organizations often rely on simple heuristics in an adaptive way, and (b) ignoring part of the information can lead to more accurate judgments than weighting and adding all information, for instance for low predictability and small samples. The big future challenge is to develop a systematic theory of the building blocks of heuristics as well as the core capacities and environmental structures these exploit.

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Heuristic Decision Making

Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes that ignore information. In contrast to the widely held view that less processing reduces accuracy, the study of heuristics shows that less information, computation, and time can in fact improve accuracy. We review the major progress made so far: (a) the discovery of less-is-more effects; (b) the study of the ecological rationality of heuristics, which examines in which environments a given strategy succeeds or fails, and why; (c) an advancement from vague labels to computational models of heuristics; (d) the development of a systematic theory of heuristics that identifies their building blocks and the evolved capacities they exploit, and views the cognitive system as relying on an ‘‘adaptive toolbox;’’ and (e) the development of an empirical methodology that accounts for individual differences, conducts competitive tests, and has provided evidence for people’s adaptive use of heuristics. Homo heuristicus has a biased mind and ignores part of the available information, yet a biased mind can handle uncertainty more efficiently and robustly than an unbiased mind relying on more resource-intensive and general-purpose processing strategies.

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Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences

The long-standing divide between research and practice in clinical psychology has received increased attention in view of the development of evidence-based interventions and practice and public interest, oversight, and management of psychological services. The gap has been reflected in concerns from those in practice about the applicability of findings from psychotherapy research as a guide to clinical work and concerns from those in research about how clinical work is conducted. Research and practice are united in their commitment to providing the best of psychological knowledge and methods to improve the quality of patient care. This article highlights issues in the research- practice debate as a backdrop for rapprochement. Suggestions are made for changes and shifts in emphases in psychotherapy research and clinical practice. The changes are designed to ensure that both research and practice contribute to our knowledge base and provide information that can be used more readily to improve patient care and, in the process, reduce the perceived and real hiatus between research and practice.

Evidence-based treatment and practice: new opportunities to bridge clinical research and practice, enhance the knowledge base, and improve patient care.

Contents: Foreword. Preface. What Are Statistical Decisions? Non-Parametric Measures of Sensitivity. Gaussian Distributions of Signal and Noise With Equal Variances. Gaussian Distributions of Signal and Noise With Unequal Variances. Conducting a Rating Scale Experiment. Choice Theory Approximations to Signal Detection Theory. Threshold Theory. The Laws of Categorical and Comparative Judgement. Appendices: Answers to Problems. Logarithms. Integration of the Expression for the Logistic Curve. Computer Programmes for Signal Detection Analysis. Tables.

A Primer of Signal Detection Theory; Table of D' and β

The adaptive toolbox is a Darwinian-inspired theory that conceives of the mind as a modular system that is composed of heuristics, their building blocks, and evolved capacities. The study of the adaptive toolbox is descriptive and analyzes the selection and structure of heuristics in social and physical environments. The study of ecological rationality is prescriptive and identifies the structure of environments in which specific heuristics either succeed or fail. Results have been used for designing heuristics and environments to improve professional decision making in the real world.

Why Heuristics Work

R.F. Pohl, Introduction: Cognitive Illusions. Part 1: Thinking Illusions. J.E. Fisk, Conjunction Fallacy. M.H. Birnbaum, Base Rates in Bayesian Inference. S. Kurzenhauser, A. Lucking, Statistical Formats in Bayesian Inferences. M.E. Oswald, S. Grosjean, Confirmation Bias. K. Fiedler, Illusory Correlation. S.C. Thompson, Illusions of Control. J. St. B.T. Evans, Biases in Deductive Reasoning. Part 2: Judgment Illusions. R. Reber, Availability. K.H. Teigen, Judgments by Representativeness. T. Mussweiler, B. Englich, F. Strack, Anchoring Effect. C. Hackett Renner, Validity Effect. R.F. Bornstein, C. Craver-Lemley, Mere Exposure Effect. U. Hoffrage, Overconfidence. M.W. Matlin, Pollyanna Principle. Part 3: Memory Illusions. Heekyeong Park, Lynne M. Reder, Moses Illusion. G.V. Jones, M. Martin, Orientation Illusions in Memory. H.L. Roediger III, D.A. Gallo, Associative Memory Illusions. R.F. Pohl, Effects of Labeling. J. Pickrell, D.M. Bernstein, E.F. Loftus, Misinformation Effect. R.F. Pohl, Hindsight Bias. A. Wilson, M. Ross, Illusions of Change or Stability. Perspectives. V.A. Gheorghiu, G. Molz, R.F. Pohl, Suggestion and Illusion.

Cognitive illusions : a handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement and memory

Empirical tests of the recognition heuristic

Since Baruch Fischhoff's (1975) groundbreaking paper opened up a whole new research field, more than 150 journal articles and book chapters, two meta–analyses (Christensen–Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway & Posavac, 2004), and one special issue (Memory, 2003, edited by Ulrich Hoffrage & Rudiger Pohl) have addressed hindsight phenomena. The current editorial aims to provide a rough roadmap to the hindsight bias research landscape. It highlights some important landmarks and developments of the last 30 years and puts the 13 articles of the present special issue into a historical and systematic perspective.

Hindsight bias: on being wise after the event

This study investigated gender-specific relationships between autobiographical memory (AM) performance and two social skills, namely empathy and assertiveness. One hundred and fourteen male and female students were tested with a questionnaire on AM and two test scales for empathy and assertiveness. The results revealed positive correlations between AM performance and both social skills, thus underscoring the social function of AM. In addition we found several gender differences. Women showed superior AM performance and also scored higher in empathy, while men scored higher in assertiveness. We propose that AM, empathy, and assertiveness develop in gender-specific mutual dependencies reflecting parental socialization. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Autobiographical memory and social skills of men and women

Hindsight bias is a robust phenomenon; it has been found with different designs, materials, and measures. However, several methodological problems may hinder an adequate analysis and interpretation of results obtained in experimental studies of the effect. This article therefore systematizes and critically discusses relevant features of designs, materials, and types of feedback, as well as different operationalizations and indices of hindsight bias. In particular, the potential confound of recollection and reconstruction, which may lead to inadequate theoretical conclusions, is addressed.

Rüdiger F. Pohl

Papers

Cognitive illusions : a handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement and memory

Empirical tests of the recognition heuristic

Hindsight bias: on being wise after the event

Autobiographical memory and social skills of men and women

Ways to assess hindsight bias