Individualism and collectivism

Democratic states are in general about as conflict- and war-prone as nondemocracies, but democracies have rarely clashed with one another in violent conflict. We first show that democracy, as well as other factors, accounts for the relative lack of conflict. Then we examine two explanatory models. The normative model suggests that democracies do not fight each other because norms of compromise and cooperation prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes. The structural model asserts that complex political mobilization processes impose institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies confronting each other to make violent conflict unfeasible. Using different data sets of international conflict and a multiplicity of indicators, we find that (1) democracy, in and of itself, has a consistent and robust negative effect on the likelihood of conflict or escalation in a dyad; (2) both the normative and structural models are supported by the data; and (3) support for the normative model is more robust and consistent.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0003055400271414

Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946-1986

The Silent Language

Social scientists have sketched four distinct theories to explain a phenomenon that appears to have ramped up in recent years, the diffusion of policies across countries. Constructivists trace policy norms to expert epistemic communities and international organizations, who define economic progress and human rights. Coercion theorists point to powerful nation-states, and international financial institutions, that threaten sanctions or promise aid in return for fiscal conservatism, free trade, etc. Competition theorists argue that countries compete to attract investment and to sell exports by lowering the cost of doing business, reducing constraints on investment, or reducing tariff barriers in the hope of reciprocity. Learning theorists suggest that countries learn from their own experiences and, as well, from the policy experiments of their peers. We review the large body of research from sociologists and political scientists, as well as the growing body of work from economists and psychologists, pointing to the diverse mechanisms that are theorized and to promising avenues for distinguishing among causal mechanisms.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2281983_code2071501.pdf?abstractid=2281983&type=2

The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition or Learning?

Political scientists, sociologists, and economists have all sought to ana- lyze the spread of economic and political liberalism across countries in recent decades+ This article documents this diffusion of liberal policies and politics and proposes four distinct theories to explain how the prior choices of some countries and inter- national actors affect the subsequent behavior of others: coercion, competition, learn- ing, and emulation+ These theories are explored empirically in the symposium articles that follow+ The goal of the symposium is to bring quite different and often isolated schools of thought into contact and communication with one another, and to define common metrics by which we can judge the utility of the contending approaches to diffusion across different policy domains+

/pdf/introduction-the-international-diffusion-of-liberalism-j0407lw02p.pdf

Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism

A set of hypotheses derived from experiential learning and a realpolitik orientation to crisis bargaining are employed to investigate the bargaining behavior of pairs of states embroiled in recurring crises. It is proposed that in crisis bargaining, experiential learning focuses on the outcome of the preceding crisis, and the lessons drawn from that experience are interpreted in accordance with a realpolitik orientation that stresses the importance of a credible demonstration of power and resolve. The hypotheses predict that in crises between states of relatively equal military capabilities, successful outcomes encourage policymakers to repeat the bargaining strategy employed in the previous crisis, while failures lead to more coercive bargaining in the next crisis. Employing events data from a sample of 18 disputes among 6 pairs of states, each pair having been engaged in three successive crises, a significant pattern of shifts to more coercive bargaining following crises with unsuccessful outcomes was f...

When Will They Ever Learn?: Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises

This article studies the effectiveness of influence strategies in serious dyadic disputes. Influence strategies are classified according to four types: bullying, reciprocating, appeasing, and trial-and-error. The study employs events data from twenty serious disputes occurring in the twentieth century. The findings support the central hypothesis that a reciprocating strategy is the most effective means of avoiding a diplomatic defeat without going to war, especially when it is employed against a bullying opponent. A closer look at the individual cases suggests that this is related to the face-saving properties of this approach, as well as the universal norm of reciprocity in international affairs.

Influence Strategies, Success, and War

The findings of a quantitative analysis of the effectiveness of reciprocating influence strategies in militarized interstate crises (MICs) suggest that the success of reciprocating strategies in MICs is related to (1) withholding cooperative initiatives until after the reciprocating party has demonstrated its resolve, (2) the use of carrot-and-stick influence attempts and responses combining firmness with flexibility, and (3) overcoming ambiguity through overt communication of intentions. Reciprocating influence strategies are most likely to be employed by democratic states either defending the status quo or following a change in the status quo in their favor through a fait accompli. When reciprocating strategies are employed against different types of influence strategies, the outcomes are consistent with the intersection of the decision rules of the influence strategies employed by the two sides.

Reciprocating Influence Strategies in Interstate Crisis Bargaining

The authors address the question of why some militarized interstate disputes evolve into wars, while others do not. They note from previous investigations that the probability of such disputes ending in war is associated with the types of bargaining behavior adopted by disputants. Particularly important are the degrees of escalation and reciprocity that characterize that behavior. This leads them to ask two questions: first, why do statesmen involved in militarized interstate disputes adopt the bargaining behavior they do?; second, what accounts for variations in outcomes for those disputes in which similar patterns of bargaining behavior are observed? Based upon an analysis of 30 militarized interstate disputes, the authors conclude that (1) escalation in interstate bargaining is strongly associated with the nature of the issues in contention and the types of threat of force initially employed in dispute bargaining, that (2) there exists an association between the relative capabilities of disputants and the degree of reciprocity in bargaining exchanges, and that (3) variations in the outcomes of disputes largely can be accounted for in terms of the interests at stake and the diplomacy of the great powers. These findings prove to be consistent with the basic tenets of political realism, and suggest that the behavior of decision makers engaged in militarized interstate disputes is generally rational in that they respond to cost-benefit considerations. This study combines quantitative methods with a traditional realpolitik perspective in order to investigate the factors that lead to war-or its avoidance-in militarized interstate disputes. In undertaking this investigation we work from two basic assumptions.

Realpolitik and the Road to War: An Analysis of Attributes and Behavior

Reagan's view of how to deal with the Soviet Union is compared to the U. S. performance record in three Soviet-American crises: Berlin, 1948-1949, Berlin, 1961, andCuba, 1962. Reagan's public statements indicate that he views the Soviets as incorrigibly hostile, so that conflict bargaining with the Soviets is a zero-sum game requiring a coercive U.S. bargaining strategy. This is characterized as a “bullying” strategy and contrasted with a “reciprocating” approach. The two approaches provide competing hypotheses for an examination of Soviet responses to U.S. influence attempts. The study tests the association between types of U.S. influence attempts and initial Soviet reactions and then proceeds to an interrupted time series analysis of the longer effects of U. S. threats of force on the mix of coercion-accommodation in Soviet crisis bargaining. The author finds a positive association between specific U.S. threats of force and initial Soviet responses in kind, and between carrot-and-stick inducements that use less specific threats and more accommodative Soviet responses. With the exception of the Cuban crisis, U.S. threats of force have not been associated with significant extended shifts in the level of Soviet hostility. The article concludes that, on balance, the performance record of the United States is more supportive of the efficacy of a reciprocating strategy than the coercive bargaining strategy implied by Reagan's beliefs.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1963368.pdf

Russell J. Leng

Papers

When Will They Ever Learn?: Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises

Influence Strategies, Success, and War

Reciprocating Influence Strategies in Interstate Crisis Bargaining

Realpolitik and the Road to War: An Analysis of Attributes and Behavior

Reagan and the Russians: Crisis Bargaining Beliefs and the Historical Record