Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison

Thank you very much for downloading applied longitudinal data analysis modeling change and event occurrence. As you may know, people have look hundreds times for their favorite novels like this applied longitudinal data analysis modeling change and event occurrence, but end up in malicious downloads. Rather than enjoying a good book with a cup of coffee in the afternoon, instead they are facing with some infectious virus inside their computer.

Applied Longitudinal Data Analysis Modeling Change And Event Occurrence

https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/99175/Hanlon_A%20review%20of%20tax%20research.pdf;sequence=1

A review of tax research

A growing body of research shows that family firms are different from other organizations in significant ways. In this paper we review this literature by examining how family firms differ from nonfamily firms along five broad categories of managerial decisions. These categories encompass a set of key organizational choices concerning management processes, firm strategies, corporate governance, stakeholder relations and business venturing. We argue that socioemotional wealth or affective endowment of family owners explain many of these choices. We also examine some contingency factors (namely family stage, firm size, firm hazard, and the presence of nonfamily shareholders) that moderate the influence of socioemotional wealth preservation as a point of reference when making managerial decisions in family firms. Lastly, we explore the firm performance consequences of family ownership.

The Bind that Ties: Socioemotional Wealth Preservation in Family Firms

We develop and describe a new measure of long-run corporate tax avoidance that is based on the ability to pay a low amount of cash taxes per dollar of pre-tax earnings over long time periods. We label this measure the long-run cash effective tax rate. We use the long-run cash effective tax rate to examine 1) the extent to which some firms are able to avoid taxes over periods as long as ten years, and 2) how predictive one-year tax rates are for long-run tax avoidance. In our sample of 2,077 firms, we find there is considerable cross-sectional variation in tax avoidance. For example, approximately one-fourth of our sample firms are able to maintain long-run cash effective tax rates below 20 percent, compared to a sample mean tax rate of approximately 30 percent. We also find that annual cash effective tax rates are not very good predictors of long-run cash effective tax rates and thus, are not accurate proxies for long-run tax avoidance. While there is some evidence of persistence in annual cash effective tax rates, the persistence is asymmetric. Low annual cash effective tax rates are more persistent than are high annual cash effective tax rates. An initial examination of characteristics of firms successful at keeping their cash effective tax rates low over long periods shows that they are well spread across industries but with some clustering.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1017610_code272789.pdf?abstractid=1017610&rulid=203683&mirid=2

Long-Run Corporate Tax Avoidance

Recent evidence suggests that corporate tax shelters have become important corporate instruments for reducing tax burden. Based on a sample of identified tax shelter participants, I develop a profile of the type of firm that likely engages in tax sheltering. The model detects tax shelter participants through the use of variables predicted to be either affected by or associated with tax sheltering. I find that firms actively engaged in tax sheltering exhibit larger ex post book‐tax differences and more aggressive financial reporting practices. Using this model of tax shelter firm characteristics, I identify a broad sample of predicted tax shelter firms from the population of firms. I then examine whether tax sheltering is associated with wealth creation for shareholders or with managerial opportunism. I find that active tax shelter firms with strong corporate governance exhibit positive abnormal returns. This finding is consistent with tax sheltering being a tool for wealth creation in well‐gover...

An Examination of Corporate Tax Shelter Participants

This study examines equity risk incentives as one determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. Prior research finds that equity risk incentives motivate managers to make risky investment and financing decisions, since risky activities increase stock return volatility and the value of stock option portfolios. Aggressive tax strategies involve significant uncertainty and can impose costs on both firms and managers. As a result, managers must be incentivized to engage in risky tax avoidance that is expected to generate net benefits for the firm and its shareholders. We predict that equity risk incentives motivate managers to undertake risky tax strategies. Consistent with this prediction we find that larger equity risk incentives are associated with greater tax risk and the magnitude of this effect is economically significant. Our results are robust across four measures of tax risk, but do not vary across several proxies for strength of corporate governance. We conclude that equity risk incentives are a significant determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness.

Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness

This study examines equity risk incentives as one determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. Prior research finds that equity risk incentives motivate managers to make risky investment and financing decisions, since risky activities increase stock return volatility and the value of stock option portfolios. Aggressive tax strategies involve significant uncertainty and can impose costs on both firms and managers. As a result, managers must be incentivized to engage in risky tax avoidance that is expected to generate net benefits for the firm and its shareholders. We predict that equity risk incentives motivate managers to undertake risky tax strategies. Consistent with this prediction, we find that larger equity risk incentives are associated with greater tax risk and the magnitude of this effect is economically significant. Our results are robust across four measures of tax risk, but do not vary across several proxies for strength of corporate governance. We conclude that equity risk incentives are a significant determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness.

This study examines an alternative approach to measuring accounting quality. Adopting a neoclassical view of the audit market, we argue that unexplained audit fees are a measure of accounting quality. We develop a comprehensive model of audit fee determinants to estimate unexplained audit fees. We use the framework developed by Cronbach and Meehl (1955) to examine the construct validity of our new measure. We find that our audit fee-based measure of quality correlates positively with other empirical measures of quality. We further show our measure is predictive of fraud, restatements, and SEC comment letters, even after controlling for other measures of accounting quality. Finally, we show that it is less associated with innate firm characteristics than measures based on realized earnings, making it a good candidate for studies examining the economic consequences of accounting quality.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1632005_code390486.pdf?abstractid=1283946&rulid=272557&mirid=5

A New Measure of Accounting Quality

This study develops a measure of accounting quality based on audit fees. Adopting a neoclassical view of the audit market, we argue that unexplained audit fees should contain information about accounting quality. We find that our measure of unexplained audit fees correlates positively with other empirical measures of quality. We further show that our measure of accounting quality is incrementally predictive of fraud, restatements, and SEC comment letters, controlling for other measures of quality. Overall, we believe that the information in audit fees can be used to provide an alternative measure of a firm’s accounting quality.

Ryan J. Wilson

Papers

An Examination of Corporate Tax Shelter Participants

Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness

Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness

A New Measure of Accounting Quality

A new measure of accounting quality