Certain data-communication protocols hog the spotlight, but all of them have a lot in common. Computer Networking: A Top-Down Approach Featuring the Internet explains the engineering problems that are inherent in communicating digital information from point to point. The top-down approach mentioned in the subtitle means that the book starts at the top of the protocol stack--at the application layer--and works its way down through the other layers, until it reaches bare wire. The authors, for the most part, shun the well-known seven-layer Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) protocol stack in favor of their own five-layer (application, transport, network, link, and physical) model. It's an effective approach that helps clear away some of the hand waving traditionally associated with the more obtuse layers in the OSI model. The approach is definitely theoretical--don't look here for instructions on configuring Windows 2000 or a Cisco router--but it's relevant to reality, and should help anyone who needs to understand networking as a programmer, system architect, or even administration guru.The treatment of the network layer, at which routing takes place, is typical of the overall style. In discussing routing, authors James Kurose and Keith Ross explain (by way of lots of clear, definition-packed text) what routing protocols need to do: find the best route to a destination. Then they present the mathematics that determine the best path, show some code that implements those algorithms, and illustrate the logic by using excellent conceptual diagrams. Real-life implementations of the algorithms--including Internet Protocol (both IPv4 and IPv6) and several popular IP routing protocols--help you to make the transition from pure theory to networking technologies. --David WallTopics covered: The theory behind data networks, with thorough discussion of the problems that are posed at each level (the application layer gets plenty of attention). For each layer, there's academic coverage of networking problems and solutions, followed by discussion of real technologies. Special sections deal with network security and transmission of digital multimedia.

Computer Networking: A Top-Down Approach

The Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack is one of the most well known attacks in computer security, representing one of the biggest concerns for security professionals. MITM targets the actual data that flows between endpoints, and the confidentiality and integrity of the data itself. In this paper, we extensively review the literature on MITM to analyse and categorize the scope of MITM attacks, considering both a reference model, such as the open systems interconnection (OSI) model, as well as two specific widely used network technologies, i.e., GSM and UMTS. In particular, we classify MITM attacks based on several parameters, like location of an attacker in the network, nature of a communication channel, and impersonation techniques. Based on an impersonation techniques classification, we then provide execution steps for each MITM class. We survey existing countermeasures and discuss the comparison among them. Finally, based on our analysis, we propose a categorisation of MITM prevention mechanisms, and we identify some possible directions for future research.

A Survey of Man In The Middle Attacks

As the Internet's de facto interdomain routing protocol, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the glue that holds the disparate parts of the Internet together. A major limitation of BGP is its failure to adequately address security. Recent high-profile outages and security analyses clearly indicate that the Internet routing infrastructure is highly vulnerable. Moreover, the design of BGP and the ubiquity of its deployment have frustrated past efforts at securing interdomain routing. This paper considers the current vulnerabilities of the interdomain routing system and surveys both research and standardization efforts relating to BGP security. We explore the limitations and advantages of proposed security extensions to BGP, and explain why no solution has yet struck an adequate balance between comprehensive security and deployment cost.

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A Survey of BGP Security Issues and Solutions

As the Internet's de facto interdomain routing protocol, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the glue that holds the disparate parts of the Internet together. A major limitation of BGP is its failure to adequately address security. Recent high-profile outages and security analyses clearly indicate that the Internet routing infrastructure is highly vulnerable. Moreover, the design of BGP and the ubiquity of its deployment have frustrated past efforts at securing inter- domainrouting.Thispaperconsidersthecurrentvulnerabilities of the interdomain routing system and surveys both research and standardization efforts relating to BGP security. We explore the limitations and advantages of proposed security extensions to BGP, and explain why no solution has yet struck an adequate balance betweencomprehensive security anddeployment cost.

A Survey of BGP Security Issues and Solutions The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) controls much of Internet traffic, but is vulnerable to communications interruptions and failures; finding suitable improved security measures with acceptable costs is difficult.

Many network middleboxes perform deep packet inspection (DPI), a set of useful tasks which examine packet payloads. These tasks include intrusion detection (IDS), exfiltration detection, and parental filtering. However, a long-standing issue is that once packets are sent over HTTPS, middleboxes can no longer accomplish their tasks because the payloads are encrypted. Hence, one is faced with the choice of only one of two desirable properties: the functionality of middleboxes and the privacy of encryption. We propose BlindBox, the first system that simultaneously provides {\em both} of these properties. The approach of BlindBox is to perform the deep-packet inspection {\em directly on the encrypted traffic. BlindBox realizes this approach through a new protocol and new encryption schemes. We demonstrate that BlindBox enables applications such as IDS, exfiltration detection and parental filtering, and supports real rulesets from both open-source and industrial DPI systems. We implemented BlindBox and showed that it is practical for settings with long-lived HTTPS connections. Moreover, its core encryption scheme is 3-6 orders of magnitude faster than existing relevant cryptographic schemes.

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BlindBox: Deep Packet Inspection over Encrypted Traffic

Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4), along with a host of other
infrastructure protocols designed before the Internet environment
became perilous, was originally designed with little consideration for
protection of the information it carries. There are no mechanisms
internal to BGP that protect against attacks that modify, delete,
forge, or replay data, any of which has the potential to disrupt
overall network routing behavior. This document discusses some of the
security issues with BGP routing data dissemination. This document
does not discuss security issues with forwarding of packets. This memo
provides information for the Internet community.

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Sandra L. Murphy

Papers

BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis