On Frank Criticism

The Epigrams of Philodemos

True Greatness of Soul in Seneca’s De constantia sapientis

Abstract This paper discusses the presentation of the Epicurean virtues offered in the Letter to Menoeceus and in Cicero’s On Ends. It evaluates the proposals advanced by Phillip Mitsis and Pierre-Marie Morel. Against Morel, it is argued that Torquatus’ presentation of the virtues in On Ends is not part of an elaborate dialectical strategy. Instead, the paper sides with Mitsis’ more modest proposal: while Torquatus, like any good speaker, with high likelihood adapts his presentation to his audience, his ideas also have a strong foundation in Epicureanism. Given the extant state of textual evidence, it is difficult to determine precisely, however, to what degree his presentation of the virtues (1) directly draws on ideas already present in the founder of the Garden himself, (2) reflects a later development in the Epicurean school, or (3) falsifies Epicurean ideas to make them more palatable for a Roman audience.

The Presentation of the Epicurean Virtues

Ulrich Knoche. Magnitudo Animi. Untersuchungen zur Entstehung und Entwicklung eines Römischen Wertgedankens

i n the nicomachean ethics Aristotle provides a detailed account of the μεγαλόψυχος, the “great-souled man” who is virtuous to an exceptional degree and justly superior, rising above ordinary people and mundane concerns (4.3, 1123a34 –1125a35; cf. Eth. Eud. 3.5, 1232a18–1233a30). This man is distinguished by μεγαλοψυχία, or “greatness of soul,” which Aristotle declares to be the crowning virtue—a virtue in its own right that elevates all the others to a higher level and that is not to be found apart from them (4.3, 1123b28–1124a5). Aristotle argues, notoriously, that only an elite, high-status male can realize μεγαλοψυχία: possessing the other virtues is not sufficient, but one must also be fortunate enough to have noble birth, extensive wealth, and power, since such things are goods that make a person superior and worthy of greater honor (4.3, 1124a20–6)—μεγαλοψυχία concerns “great things” (4.3, 1123a34 –b8; 4.4, 1125b1–8) and involves “honor on a grand scale” (4.3, 1125a34 –5; cf. 4.2, 1122a18–25). from a moral point of view it is more admirable to be great-souled than not, despite the fact that only a select few people are in a position to develop the virtue of μεγαλοψυχία in the first place. 1

Sean McConnell

Papers

The Epicurean Virtue of ΜΕΓΑΛΟΨΥΧΙΑ