This article explores the growing perception, prompted by the eurozone crisis, of Germany as a hegemonic power in the European Union. The article explores the realignments in the power balance within the European Union (EU) by making an original application of the insights from the literature on hegemony. It reviews the evidence for Germany playing a hegemonic role, but then emphasizes three sets of constraints. First, German pre-eminence is largely confined to the economic sphere. Even in this area Germany has not acted fully in line with the role ascribed by hegemonic stability theory. Second, its pre-eminence in the EU encounters problems of international legitimacy. Third, growing constraints arising from German domestic politics further hamper playing the role of hegemon. In consequence, Germany is intrinsically a reluctant hegemon: one whose economic leadership is recognized but politically contested. The conclusion considers the significance of these findings on the EU's most important member state. © 2013 Taylor & Francis.

Germany as the EU's reluctant hegemon? Of economic strength and political constraints

This paper explores Germany’s centrality to the outcome of the eurozone crisis. It argues that the eurozone crisis has led Germany’s ordo-liberal principles to trump its other longstanding commitment – i.e. to European integration. These two principles are explored in order then to shed light on how they have played out during the crisis. German centrality has created high expectations for it to provide leadership. Exploring hegemony conceptually and in practice, it is argued that international legitimacy and increasing domestic constraints have limited a leadership role. Indeed, it is argued that it is the domestic political situation that explains why ordo-liberalism has trumped pro-Europeanism. Ordo-liberal emphasis on stability culture has provided a valuable strategic resource for securing German objectives within the eurozone while satisfying the requirements of domestic politics.

Germany and the Eurozone Crisis: Between Hegemony and Domestic Politics

Ideas are at their most powerful as an explanatory variable when they lead agents to go against any broadly reasonable interpretation of their material self-interests. They become even more intriguing when they are instrumental in actually causing a crisis, in which actors undercut their own stated goals and then continue to make matters worse by sticking to those same ideas, even in the light of clear evidence that the policies they inspire are not working. This contribution shows two dynamics between power and ideas to explain Germany's behavior during the euro crisis. The first dynamic examines the changing macroeconomic consensus on how to conduct monetary and fiscal policy that governed the euro from 1999 to 2012. The second dynamic shows how a strict adherence to Germany's ordoliberal ideas of budgetary rules and structural reform turned a containable Greek fiscal problem into a full-blown systemic sovereign debt crisis.

Powerful rules governing the euro: the perverse logic of German ideas

Europe’s response to the sovereign debt crisis in Southern Europe has been premised on the idea that these states can return to growth through internal devaluation and fiscal consolidation. This article explores the distributive consequences of that strategy in Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain. We argue that standard measures of poverty do not capture the deterioration in living standards as fully as anchored poverty. Moreover, we show that inequality trends conceal considerable re-ranking within the income distribution: those who were rich in 2012 had got richer in 2009–12, but those who were rich in 2009 lost ground in 2009–12. We find that in all four countries the new poor include significantly fewer pensioners and more unemployed workers, and are considerably poorer than the old poor had been. We demonstrate that there was significant variation in the magnitude and design of austerity, with Italy imposing a far smaller adjustment than Spain, and Portugal achieving less inequality in spite o...

The political economy of austerity in Southern Europe

Germany has a long history of institutionalized ordoliberalism. While these ideas may be implemented almost unreflexively within Germany, its status of ‘reluctant hegemon’ within the European Union has led to purposive uploading of many of these ideas to other Member States. In this article, we first define what these ordoliberal actions consist of, before tracing their evolution within Germany and the EU. Our intention is to detail how acting within ordoliberal tenets has led to some rather messy and unpredictable results for Germany and other EU Member States alike – a state particularly emphasized by the crisis. In so doing, we (re)invoke Robert Merton's treatment of unintended consequences. In particular, we are concerned with Germany's increased role in enforcing fiscal order in the EU, counter to our interviewees’ (drawn from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) express intentions to retain Germany's political distance.

‘As I Drifted on a River I Could Not Control’: The Unintended Ordoliberal Consequences of the Eurozone Crisis†

At the end of January, European leaders agreed the wording of the new treaty aimed primarily at tightening fiscal policy in the euro area that was agreed in principle by 26 EU heads of government at last December’s European summit. The treaty reflects German positions rather than collective compromise. In particular, the treaty centres on a “fiscal compact” that compels all eurozone countries to incorporate into their constitutions a deficit limit modelled on the German Schuldenbremse, or “debt brake”. In addition, European leaders once again ruled out the possibility of using European Central Bank (ECB) funds to “leverage” the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) or European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and there was no mention of ECB bond purchases to help stabilise bond markets.

Sebastian Dullien

Papers

(049) the long shadow of ordoliberalism: germany’s approach to the euro crisis