The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society

In this innovative approach to the practice of social science, Charles Ragin explores the use of fuzzy sets to bridge the divide between quantitative and qualitative methods. Paradoxically, the fuzzy set is a powerful tool because it replaces an unwieldy, "fuzzy" instrument—the variable, which establishes only the positions of cases relative to each other, with a precise one—degree of membership in a well-defined set. Ragin argues that fuzzy sets allow a far richer dialogue between ideas and evidence in social research than previously possible. They let quantitative researchers abandon "homogenizing assumptions" about cases and causes, they extend diversity-oriented research strategies, and they provide a powerful connection between theory and data analysis. Most important, fuzzy sets can be carefully tailored to fit evolving theoretical concepts, sharpening quantitative tools with in-depth knowledge gained through qualitative, case-oriented inquiry. This book will revolutionize research methods not only in sociology, political science, and anthropology but in any field of inquiry dealing with complex patterns of causation.

Fuzzy-Set Social Science

Redesigning Social Inquiry Fuzzy Sets And Beyond

Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives.

The unified global efforts to mitigate the high burden of vitamin and mineral deficiency, known as hidden hunger, in populations around the world are crucial to the achievement of most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). We developed indices and maps of global hidden hunger to help prioritize program assistance, and to serve as an evidence-based global advocacy tool. Two types of hidden hunger indices and maps were created based on i) national prevalence data on stunting, anemia due to iron deficiency, and low serum retinol levels among preschool-aged children in 149 countries; and ii) estimates of Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) attributed to micronutrient deficiencies in 136 countries. A number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as India and Afghanistan, had an alarmingly high level of hidden hunger, with stunting, iron deficiency anemia, and vitamin A deficiency all being highly prevalent. The total DALY rates per 100,000 population, attributed to micronutrient deficiencies, were generally the highest in sub-Saharan African countries. In 36 countries, home to 90% of the world’s stunted children, deficiencies of micronutrients were responsible for 1.5-12% of the total DALYs. The pattern and magnitude of iodine deficiency did not conform to that of other micronutrients. The greatest proportions of children with iodine deficiency were in the Eastern Mediterranean (46.6%), European (44.2%), and African (40.4%) regions. The current indices and maps provide crucial data to optimize the prioritization of program assistance addressing global multiple micronutrient deficiencies. Moreover, the indices and maps serve as a useful advocacy tool in the call for increased commitments to scale up effective nutrition interventions.

/pdf/the-global-hidden-hunger-indices-and-maps-an-advocacy-tool-1szz3r4h0t.pdf

The global hidden hunger indices and maps: an advocacy tool for action.

What Does Closing Civic Space Mean for Development? A Literature Review and Proposed Conceptual Framework

How do citizens vote in rural Pakistan, and how much agency do they have in
relation to local landlords, patrons and kinship networks in making electoral
decisions? I explore this question in this dissertation through an empirical
investigation of the voting behaviour of Pakistan’s rural majority in its most
populous and politically important province, Punjab, using a mix of qualitative and
quantitative methods and original data on the voting behaviour of about 2300
households in 38 villages.

The results of this dissertation counter the notions that rural Punjabi voters are
dependent and that national elections can be won on the basis of extended kinship
networks. My data reveals that the dependence of rural voters that so captivates
popular discourse about Pakistani politics describes only about 7 percent of voters,
and that kinship networks function more as forums for local collective action than
as extended political organisations. I found that a vast majority of rural Punjabi
citizens vote as members of village-level vote blocs that are organised by the landed
village elite. Nevertheless, most rural Punjabi voters do not participate in vote blocs
because of socio-economic dependence. Instead, I found that they are benefitseeking
political actors who organise within their kinship networks to strengthen
their bargaining position and then give their collective votes to vote bloc leaders
who act as broker-patrons and provide access to state officials and services. I also
found that voting behaviour varies significantly across villages and across
households within the same village. Most of the variation between villages is
explained by differences in social structure and varying levels of historical and
current land inequality, while the fact that households that lie within the same
village behave differently from one another is explained mainly by their wealth and
caste status.

Patrons, brothers and landlords: competing for the vote in rural Pakistan

Easterly (2003) has succinctly described Pakistan’s 50-year development experience as the paradox of growth without development. This paradox is in recognition of the fact that Pakistan’s successful performance has not been able to translate into meaningful social development for a majority of its citizens. Pakistan has been the fastest growing country in the region during the past 50 years and its growth rates have been more in line with East Asian than with South Asian economies (Figure 1).

/pdf/accountability-failures-and-the-decentralisation-of-service-2jprhxz41t.pdf

Accountability Failures and the Decentralisation of Service Delivery in Pakistan

http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/Malnutrition/DFID_ANG_India_Report_Final.pdf

Policies Without Politics: Analysing Nutrition Governance in India

How do political parties in Pakistan aggregate votes and connect to voters, especially in rural areas? Most explanations for party-voter linkages in rural Pakistan can be grouped into four broad categories: (a) political parties are made up of powerful landlords who use economic power to collect votes from dependent voters; (b) parties are conglomerations of clientelist networks; (c) parties are large aggregations of kinship networks; and (d) parties function by building links with specific types of constituencies across large parts of the country, and voters forge links with political parties based on ideology and party identification. These are, at best, only partial explanations. How is it that they can all co-exist? The answer lies in the level of analysis employed. I argue that when viewed in aggregated form at a macro-level of analysis, such as that of national politics, these varied explanations of party-voter linkages appear to be distinct and sometimes mutually exclusive. However, when disaggrega...

Shandana Khan Mohmand

Papers

What Does Closing Civic Space Mean for Development? A Literature Review and Proposed Conceptual Framework

Patrons, brothers and landlords: competing for the vote in rural Pakistan

Accountability Failures and the Decentralisation of Service Delivery in Pakistan

Policies Without Politics: Analysing Nutrition Governance in India

Losing the connection: party-voter linkages in Pakistan