Although the literature in peace psychology has been growing rapidly, many American psychologists are unaware of how conflict is resolved and peace is conceptualized and achieved. This article reviews the long history and broadening scope of peace psychology and introduces a model of peace that is useful for organizing the literature. The model suggests that peace can be facilitated at four different points of intervention. The authors discuss relationships between positive and negative peace, structural and direct violence, and peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. They advance some challenges for peace psychologists and conclude that peace psychology is a crucial field for grappling with humanity's most pressing problems in the coming decades.

Peace psychology for a peaceful world.

Peace psychology emerged as a distinct area of research and practice during the Cold War, when the preeminent concern was the prevention of nuclear war. Now global in scope, the focal concerns of peace psychologists are nuanced by geohistorical contexts and the distinction between episodic violence and structural violence, the latter of which also kills people, albeit slowly through the deprivation of basic need satisfaction. Accordingly, the focal concerns of contributors to this issue vary depending on geohistorical context: some being primarily concerned with patterns of behavior and cognition involved in the prevention of violent episodes and others with the amelioration of structural violence. A systems perspective is used as a framework for integrating episodes and structures of violence and peace. Articles emphasizing “systemic violence” demonstrate the interplay between structures and episodes of violence. Articles on “systemic peacebuilding” examine intergroup contact, the nonviolent management of conflict, and movement toward socially just structures, thereby yielding an increase in cooperative and equitable relationships across levels, from interpersonal to intergroup.

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What is Peace Psychology the Psychology of

This volume is divided into five parts. The first provides an overview of the physical and environmental effects of nuclear war, setting the stage for later sections that address the medical impact of various types of nuclear attack. Part III reviews the demand for medical resources after a nuclear attack and estimates the actual supply likely to be available. If a single one-megaton bomb were exploded over the city of Detroit, for example, it is calculated that survivors would need about forty times the number of burn beds currently available throughout the entire United States. Contributors to Part IV address the nuclear arms race from a psychosocial point of view: How does the threat of nuclear war affect the attitudes and behavior of adults and children. Studies provide evidence that many young children are worried about the possibility of nuclear war; most learn about nuclear war from television or the media and rarely discuss it with their parents. Finally in this section is a call for improving the screening system used to select nuclear weapons handlers.

The Medical Implications of Nuclear War

People's reactions to nuclear war. Implications for psychologists.

The patter of events between June 10 and November 22,1963, provided a partial test of a theory of international relations. The essence of the theory is that psychological gestures initiated by one nation will be reciprocated by others with the effect of reducing international tensions. This tension reduction, in turn, will lessen the probability of international conflicts and wars. Examining this theory in light of the 1963 experiment, I ask: (a) What are the main propositions of the theory? (b) What initiatives were actually taken by the United States in the experiment period, and how did the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics react? (c) What were the effects of these initiatives and responses on inter-bloc relations, and to what degree did these effects conform to the expectations of the theory? (d) What other factors, not accounted for by the theory, could have produced all or part of these effects? (e) What factors limited both the scope and the extent of the experiment, and under what conditions could it be replicated or extended?

The Kennedy Experiment

\" Psychologists\" current participation in nuclear armament issues constitutes the latest moment in a telling chronicle of engagement. Psychologists\" work on nuclear-war-related problems since 1945 has been sporadic, and their research corresponds with modulations in government policy. The history of these activities presents a sobering case that we can use to evaluate both the underlying forces on our research and the feasibility of our professional model of social responsibility. The recent activities of psychologists suggest some alternatives for our involvement in an imperative global issue, specifically for rethinking just what is psychological about the problems, and for determining what problems might or should concern psychologists. The present exploration of psychologists'past engagements suggests that we must go beyond simply evaluating our science as a corpus of either intellectual innovations or ideologies. We must begin more critical scrutiny of how we attain appropriate questions and share our answers. North American psychologists' concern with nuclear armament has escalated over the last several years. Throughout the country, groups of psychologists have begun to assist in the grassroots antinuclear movement, and at the 1982 annual meeting of the American Psychological Association (APA), the Council of Representatives passed a nuclear freeze resolution. Although in keeping with the new antinuclear cause, psychologists' involvement is not novel but actually represents a rather measured step in a historical progression. Knowledge of this history casts the recent events as somewhat expected occurrences and, in turn, gives reason for sober reflection on psychologists' participation. For although psychologists' nuclear-related activities exemplify an enduring commitment to the preservation of human welfare, they also feature several problems associated with those revered commitments. The discipline's heritage of contributing expert knowledge to social policy has long employed a model that equates responsible involvement with the provision of objective knowledge derived independently of political interests. However, neither political impartiality nor steadfast commitment to what is a compelling problem proves to be the case in this particular history. Perhaps, then, it is not so startling that the history also undercuts another implicit assumption of our professional model: the belief that psychology's expert advice is heeded in government decision making. Psychologists' concern with questions about nuclear war commenced almost simultaneously with public knowledge of the atomic bomb, and their research practices appear to have vacillated in accordance with the general political climate in the United States, specifically with changes in foreign policy. To some critics these parallels would suggest that socially relevant social scientific research is influenced either by concrete linkages between government, business, and the academic world or by a hegemony of corporate ideology (see Domhoff, 1970, 1978; Shroup & Minter, 1977; Wise & Ross, 1964). Although these hypotheses are deserving of investigation it is not necessary to demonstrate any orchestrated collaboration. Textual analyses of the pertinent documents reveal that psychologists' conventional practices are sufficient in themselves to have cemented such bonds. What follows is not a comprehensive history, for we still need to learn more about the direct connections between theory, research, and application. This history, comprised from a review of nuclear-related research (19451984), raises questions about our venerated and largely self-designated model of social responsibility. The history of psychologists' involvement in nuclear war issues forces us to reconsider our scientific obligations, personal options, and professional selfappraisals. Psychology and Social Practice Psychologists' acclaimed dedication to bettering human life predates the establishment of professional associations, laboratories, and the institution of psychology as a scientific discipline (Leary, 1980; Morawski, 1982; Sarason, 1981). Even the first generation of American psychologists contemplated the social benefits and the special obligations of the discipline. The mandates for socially responsible practices eventually became, and remain, visible in the con276 March 1985 • American Psychologist Copyright 1985 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/85/$00,75 Vol. 40, No. 3. 276-284 stitutional declaration of the APA, and as perusal of any recent copy of the American Psychologist will confirm, the discipline's contributions to social welfare are still construed as a significant function of contemporary psychology. The acclaimed dedication to human welfare has long rested on several fundamental postulates about the nature of research and the proper modes of utilizing knowledge in the management of society. A fundamental premise is that psychological knowledge is privileged only by virtue of being derived through objective procedures. This premise in turn demarcates the ideal role of psychologists in managing society according to a \"natural\" bifurcation of facts and values, in which psychologists are obliged to provide only the former. Here also lie the ostensible grounds for the distinction between acting as a psychologist and as a citizen. Given an associated assumption that policy decision making is and should be rational, the provision of psychological facts ultimately ensures competent policy judgments and, hence, an advancement in human welfare (for critical analyses of this model see Feyerabend, 1978; Garfinkel, 1978; Morawski, 1983). Throughout the development of the discipline psychologists have promoted this formula with a certain complacency. Although some have become wary of the model, they typically have concentrated on the problems of disseminating knowledge once it is acquired (Bevan, 1976; Miller, 1969). With few exceptions (e.g., Argyris, 1975; Sampson, 1977; Sarason, 1984), the knowledgegenerating aspects of the model have gone unchallenged. This essentially unexamined model, however, contains at least one dilemma that will become evident in the case of nuclear-war-related research. The dilemma and its objectionable consequences are exemplified in the thinking of one consumer of our knowledge, the Republican Senator Orrin Hatch. In an address to psychologists on the use of psychology \"to build a better and stronger society,\" Hatch (1982) claimed that \"among the first considerations is the relationship of psychology as a science to politics in general. Science is a nonpartisan pursuit of knowledge. We in America have a long-standing commitment to the pursuit of new knowledge and to disseminating that knowledge as widely as possible throughout our society\" (pp. 1036-1037). Senator Hatch then appended a material caveat by demanding that in cases where the values of society do not match those of the individual psychologist or the groups of psychologists, it seems to me wisdom would dictate that psychologists Requests for reprints should be sent to J. G. Morawski, Department of Psychology, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut 06457. should be very cautious and sensitive to the image they are projecting: If psychology is to be accepted as a scientifically valid monitor of society and, even more, if psychology wants to be accepted as a reliable agent for positive social change, psychologists cannot be seen as a group on the fringe of social normality who are promoting social deviance. (p. 1035) That his proscription on socially unacceptable yet valid knowledge is seldom appraised by psychologists may well be owing to the fact that, in practice, it rarely occurs. The history to be recounted here indicates all too clearly how the research procedures used by psychologists ensure against the \"deviance\" Senator Hatch noted. The degree to which psychologists complicitly avoid such \"deviance\" remains to be ascertained. What is of interest at this point, however, is how the dilemma appears to be resolved through a paradox. Through our selection of research orientations, our selective way of viewing a phenomenon, we may diminish or eliminate the actual potential of that research to positively transform social life. Psychologists' concern with atomic war commenced with the 1945 bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the last 39 years their efforts have ebbed and flowed largely with the tides of political climate. Although the methods and benevolent intentions of these psychologists dedicated to the nuclear issue did not change much-an emphasis on survey techniques and a hope to promote world peace--the particular foci of their investigations have varied. Research undertaken in the 15 years following World War II largely supported government policy in an attempt to socialize Americans to the benefits of atomic weaponry and energy. During a brief period in the early 1960s, however, psychological research on nuclear war constituted something of a critique of the psychological misperceptions inherent in government policy and foreign affairs. From the mid-1960s until the 1980s, a period of general public quietude, research on psychological issues of the nuclear age nearly ceased. In the last several years, clinically oriented psychologists have begun investigating the psychological consequences of living with the constant threat of nuclear holocaust. Despite changes in the focus of research, certain themes have persisted to structure, and perhaps to inhibit, psychologists' work. Most notable of these themes is the isomorphism between research interests and the prevailing political climate, a correspondence of such magnitude that it belies the value-neutrality mandated in the prototypic model of research practice. Furthermore, despite intense proclamations of responsibility to extend expert knowledge~ many psychologists demonstrated reluctance or inability

Sharon E. Goldstein

Papers

Psychology and nuclear war: A chapter in our legacy of social responsibility.