This paper develops and tests a theory of the historical contingency of the risk of acquisition using data from the higher education publishing market from 1958-1990. Interviews and historical analyses are combined to identify two forms of capitalism--personal and market, and in particular to publishing, to identify the institutional logics identified with each form of capitalism (an editorial and a market logic). Hazard-rate models are used to test for differences in the effects of these two logics on the organization and market determinants of acquisition. Publishers with relational network forms of organization in production and distribution were at a higher risk of acquisition in the market period but not in the editorial period. Competition in the product market increased the risk of acquisition in the market period, but not the editorial period. The covariates explaining the risk of acquisition change as a consequence of the evolution of capitalism and as a result of a firm's strategic and structural conformity with the institutional logic of the prevailing form of capitalism.

Personal Versus Market Logics of Control: A Historically Contingent Theory of the Risk of Acquisition

Publishing studies: Critically mapping research in search of a discipline

In the most general terms, this article focuses on the tension between competing justifications of intellectual property. Section I examines the nature and definition of economic pragmatism and argues that, while economic pragmatism comes in many flavors, each is either unstable or self-defeating. Section II advances the view that Anglo-American systems of intellectual property have both theoretical and pragmatic features. In Section III a sketch of a theory is offered - a theory that may limit applications of economic pragmatism and provide the foundation for copyright, patent, and trade secret institutions. To be justified - to warrant coercion on a worldwide scale - systems of intellectual property should be grounded in theory. Intellectual property rights are, in essence, no different than our rights to life, liberty, and tangible property. Intellectual property rights are neither pure social constructions nor bargains without foundations.

Intellectual Property: Theory, Privilege, and Pragmatism

In the most general terms, this article focuses on the tension between competing justifications of intellectual property. Section I examines the nature and definition of economic pragmatism and argues that, while economic pragmatism comes in many flavors, each is either unstable or self-defeating. Section II advances the view that Anglo-American systems of intellectual property have both theoretical and pragmatic features. In Section III a sketch of a theory is offered--a theory that may limit applications of economic pragmatism and provide the foundation for copyright, patent, and trade secret institutions. To be justified--to warrant coercion on a worldwide scale--systems of intellectual property should be grounded in theory. Intellectual property rights are, in essence, no different than our rights to life, liberty, and tangible property. Intellectual property rights are neither pure social constructions nor bargains without foundations.

The Freelance Editorial Association, founded in the 1980s, was an organization of editorial professionals working on contract. Through its 15 years of operation, the organization developed a model of collective representation and sought to improve employment practices and work relations for these contingent workers. Expanding through occupational networks, the association established a program of services and a set of principles for advocacy, which it applied on behalf of members seeking resolution of disputes with clients. The organization, however, proved unsustainable. Resource constraints, labor market structures, and the underlying dynamics of occupational networks, which operated in the interests of clients as well as freelancers, undermined its model. Although the association addressed many individual needs, it generated little leverage toward promoting collective interests. Its efforts, however, offer caveats for the development of new models of collective representation.

Sheila McVey

Papers

Perspectives on publishing

Academic super markets