Colonial institutions are thought to be an important determinate of post-independence levels of political stability, economic growth, and public goods provision. In particular, many scholars have suggested that British institutional and cultural legacies are more conducive to growth than those of France or other colonizers. Systematic tests of this hypothesis are complicated by unobserved heterogeneity among nations due to variable pre- and post-colonial histories. We focus on the West African nation of Cameroon, which includes regions colonized by both Britain and France, and use the artificial former colonial boundary as a discontinuity within a national demographic survey. We show that rural areas on the British side of discontinuity have higher levels of household wealth and local public provision of piped water. Results for urban areas and centrally-provided public goods show no such effect, suggesting that post-independence policies also play a role in shaping outcomes.

Comparing British and French Colonial Legacies: A Discontinuity Analysis of Cameroon

India's Political Economy

Spatial inequality is an important feature of many developing countries that seems to increase with economic growth and development. At the same time, there seems to be little consensus on the causes of spatial inequality and on a list of effective policy instruments that may foster or reduce spatial inequality. This paper examines the theoretical and empirical literature on spatial inequality to learn what we know and do not know about the causes of spatial inequality, to investigate what policies may or may not ameliorate spatial inequality, and to determine whether policy makers can identify and implement policies that promote or reduce spatial inequality.

/pdf/spatial-inequality-and-economic-development-theories-facts-f4wnu8llph.pdf

Spatial Inequality and Economic Development: Theories, Facts, and Policies

Over the past 20 years, China and India have emerged as the fastest growing economies in the world. In this context, the authors review, examine, and list the factors that have contributed to the emergence of China and India (referred to as Chindia). The authors compare the antecedents, characteristics, and consequences of their emergence in the global market. This article provides insights for the researchers and multinational enterprises from rest of the world to carry out studies on country analysis as well as foreign market entry modes. Besides, we posit theoretical and testable propositions for future research.

The Emergence of China and India in the Global Market

This article explores the relationship between kinship institutions and sex ratios in India at the turn of the twentieth century. Because kinship rules vary by caste, language, religion, and region, we construct sex ratios by these categories at the district level by using data from the 1901 Census of India for Punjab (North), Bengal (East), and Madras (South). We find that the male-to-female sex ratio varied positively with caste rank, fell as one moved from the North to the East and then to the South, was higher for Hindus than for Muslims, and was higher for northern Indo-Aryan speakers than for the southern Dravidian-speaking people. We argue that these systematic patterns in the data are consistent with variations in the institution of family, kinship, and inheritance.

/pdf/kinship-institutions-and-sex-ratios-in-india-3z3gys3y5e.pdf

Kinship institutions and sex ratios in India

We explore the impact of British colonial institutions on the economic development of India. In some regions, the British colonial government assigned property rights in land and taxes to landlords whereas in others it assigned them directly to cultivators or non-landlords. Although Banerjee and Iyer (2005) find that agricultural productivity of non-landlord areas diverged and out-performed relative to landlord areas after 1965 with the advent of the Green Revolution, we find evidence of superior economic performance of non-landlord regions in both the pre- and the post-independence periods. We believe that landlord and non-landlord regions diverged because their differing property rights institutions led to differences in incentives for development.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=938406

British Colonial Institutions and Economic Development in India

/pdf/british-colonial-institutions-and-economic-development-in-4rk4w60jwk.pdf

Shilpi Kapur

Papers

British Colonial Institutions and Economic Development in India

British Colonial Institutions and Economic Development in India