We survey the empirical literature analyzing the process of enterprise restructuring in transition economies. The survey provides new insights into the relative effectiveness of different reform policies, and into how this effectiveness varies across regions. We study the effects of privatization, the importance of different types of owners, the effects of foreign and domestic competition, the consequences of soft budgets, and the role of managerial incentives and managerial human capital, on enterprise restructuring.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm?abstractid=238716

Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative Survey

http://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/85633/1/content.pdf

Corporate governance and market valuation in China

Purpose – The aim of this study is to investigate whether performance management practices affect performance in public sector organizations.Design/methodology/approach – Theoretically, the research project is based on economic as well as behavioral theories. The study distinguishes amongst quantitative performance (efficiency, quantities produced) and qualitative performance (accuracy, quality, innovation and employee morale) and uses survey data from 93 public sector organizations in the Netherlands.Findings – The research shows that the definition of clear and measurable goals is positively associated with quantity performance as well as quality performance. In addition, the use of incentives is positively associated with quantity performance yet not related to quality performance. Finally, the effects of performance management practices in public sector organizations are affected by institutional factors. The results suggest that the behavioral effects of performance management practices are as import...

Performance management practices in public sector organizations : Impact on performance

China has enjoyed considerable economic growth in recent years in spite of an immature, albeit rapidly developing, legal system, a system whose nature, evolution and path of development have been poorly understood by scholars Drawing on his legal and business experience in China as well as his academic background in the field, Peerenboom provides a detailed analysis of China's legal reforms He argues that China is in transition from rule by law to a version of rule of law, though most likely not a liberal democratic version as found in economically advanced countries in the West Maintaining that law plays a key role in China's economic growth, Peerenboom assesses reform proposals and makes his own recommendations In addition to students and scholars of Chinese law, political science, sociology and economics, this will interest business professionals, policy advisors, and governmental and non-governmental agencies as well as comparative legal scholars and philosophers

https://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/16496/sample/9780521816496ws.pdf

China's Long March toward Rule of Law

Using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002, augmented by unique data on CEO turnover, ownership structure and board characteristics, we estimate Logit models of CEO turnover. We find consistently for all performance measures including both stock return and various accounting measures that: (i) overall, CEO turnover is significantly and inversely related to firm performance though the magnitude of the relationship is modest; (ii) CEO turnover-performance link is stronger when the percentage of company shares owned by the largest shareholder is larger. Furthermore, insofar as stock performance is concerned, (iii) turnover-performance link is found to be weaker for listed firms still controlled by the state; (iv) the appointment of independent directors enhances turnover-performance link; (v) the listing suspension mechanism, i.e., the ST designation, adopted by China's securities regulatory agency appears to be effective in improving turnover-performance tie; and (vi) listed firms with CEOs holding additional positions in the controlling shareholders have weaker turnover-performance link. Consistent with the "law and finance" approach to corporate governance and the literature on economic transition, our findings suggest that any fundamental improvement in China's corporate governance will require a broad program that encompasses not only privatization but also laws and their effective implementation to provide better protection for investors.

CEO Turnover, Firm Performance and Enterprise Reform in China: Evidence from New Micro Data

Performance contracts (PCs)--contracts signed between the government and state enterprise managers--have been used widely in developing countries. China's experience with such contracts was one of the largest experiments with contracting in the public sector, affecting hundreds of thousands of state firms, and offered a rare opportunity to explore how PCs work. On average, PCs did not improve performance and may have made it worse. But China's PCs were not uniformly bad; in fact, PCs improved productivity in slightly more than half of the participants. PC effects were on average negative because of the large losses associated with poorly designed PCs. Successful PCs were those that featured sensible targets, stronger incentives, longer terms, managerial bonds, and were in more competitive industries. Selecting managers through bidding was not associated with performance improvement. Good PC features were more often observed in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) under the oversight of local governments, that faced more competition, that were smaller in size, and that had better previous performance. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.

/pdf/the-empirical-effects-of-performance-contracts-evidence-from-4kcdyypugk.pdf

Shirley, Mary Xu,L. Colin

Papers

The empirical effects of performance contracts: evidence from China