Drawing upon philosophy and social theory, Social Theory of International Politics develops a theory of the international system as a social construction. Alexander Wendt clarifies the central claims of the constructivist approach, presenting a structural and idealist worldview which contrasts with the individualism and materialism which underpins much mainstream international relations theory. He builds a cultural theory of international politics, which takes whether states view each other as enemies, rivals or friends as a fundamental determinant. Wendt characterises these roles as 'cultures of anarchy', described as Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian respectively. These cultures are shared ideas which help shape state interests and capabilities, and generate tendencies in the international system. The book describes four factors which can drive structural change from one culture to another - interdependence, common fate, homogenization, and self-restraint - and examines the effects of capitalism and democracy in the emergence of a Kantian culture in the West.

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Social Theory of International Politics

The debate between realists and liberals has reemerged as an axis of contention in international relations theory.’ Revolving in the past around competing theories of human nature, the debate is more concerned today with the extent to which state action is influenced by ‘structure’ (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus ‘process’ (interaction and learning) and institutions. Does the absence of centralized political authority force states to play competitive power politics? Can international regimes overcome this logic, and under what conditions? What in anarchy is given and immutable, and what is amenable to change?

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Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics

While neorealism and world-system theory both claim to be “structural” theories of international relations, they embody very different understandings of system structure and structural explanation. Neorealists conceptualize system structures in individualist terms as constraining the choices of preexisting state agents, whereas world-system theorists conceptualize system structures in structuralist terms as generating state agents themselves. These differences stem from what are, in some respects, fundamentally opposed solutions to the “agent-structure” or “micromacro” problem. This opposition, however, itself reflects a deeper failure of each theory to recognize the mutually constitutive nature of human agents and system structures—a failure which leads to deep-seated inadequacies in their respective explanations of state action. An alternative solution to the agent-structure problem, adapted from “structuration theory” in sociology, can overcome these inadequacies by avoiding both the reduction of system structures to state actors in neorealism and their reification in world-system theory. Structuration theory requires a philosophical basis in scientific realism, arguably the “new orthodoxy” in the philosophy of natural science, but as yet largely unrecognized by political scientists. The scientific realist/structuration approach generates an agenda for “structural-historical” research into the properties and dispositions of both state actors and the system structures in which they are embedded.

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The agent-structure problem in international relations theory

Trust and reciprocity : interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research

In this article I develop a proposal for the theoretical vantage point of the sociology of markets, focusing on the problem of the social order of markets. The initial premise is that markets are highly demanding arenas of social interaction, which can only operate if three inevitable coordination problems are resolved. I define these coordination problems as the value problem, the problem of competition and the cooperation problem. I show that these problems can only be resolved based on stable reciprocal expectations on the part of market actors, which have their basis in the socio-structural, institutional and cultural embedding of markets. The sociology of markets aims to investigate how market action is structured by these macrostructures and to examine the change of institutions, networks and cultural frames of market action.

The Social Order of Markets

Introduction. 1 Perfect and Monopolistic Competition: Two Variations on the Neoclassical Programme of Situational Determinism. (a) Perfect Competition and Monopoly. (b) Monopolistic Competition. (c) Duopoly and Oligopoly: Two Apparent Exceptions. 2 Stagnation of the Neoclassical Programme of Situational Determinism and Emergence of Rivals. (a) The Appraisal of Perfect and Monopolistic Competition. (b) Popper's Rationality Principle. (c) The Emergence of Economic Behaviouralism. 3 An Appendix on Methodological Controversies: Falsificationism, Conventionalism and Research Programmes in Economics. (a) Neoclassical Apologetics versus Falsificationism. (b) A Falsificationist Plea for Metaphysical Statements in Economics. (c) The 'F-tzvist' versus Chamberlinian 'Realism'.

Situational Determinism in Economics

How can we explain and predict human behaviour and, in particular, behavioural regularities in a social setting? Adequate answers to questions of this type have been of interest to influential traditions in the social sciences and in particular to sociology, economics, anthropology, and psychology.2 The main concern of the present paper is a particular type of answer — let us call it a ‘rationalistic answer’ — to the above question. Rationalistic answers have been especially influential in economics, where an elaborate theoretical structure was built on a particular conception of human behaviour. The coherence, elegance and apparent problem-solving ability of the theoretical framework of neoclassical economics is probably responsible for the longevity and relative immunity of the rationalistic approach from incisive criticisms which have been levelled against it in the last few decades.3

Spiro J. Latsis

Papers

Situational Determinism in Economics

The Role and Status of the Rationality Principle in the Social Sciences

Method and Appraisal in Economics.