世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

Preface Introduction: The Decline of Confidence in Government Joseph S. Nye, Jr. PART ONE: The Scope and Performance of Government The Evolving Scope of Government Ernest R. May Measuring the Performance of Government Derek Bok Fall from Grace: The Public's Loss of Faith in Government Gary Orren PART TWO: The Menu of Explanations Is It Really the Economy Stupid? Robert Z. Lawrence Social and Cultural Causes of Dissatisfaction with U.S. Government Jane Manbridge The Polarization of American Parties and Mistrust of Government David C. King The Politics of Mistrust Richard E. Neustadt PART THREE: Data on Public Attitudes toward Governance Changing Attitudes in America Robert J. Blendon, John M. Benson, Richard Morin, Drew E. Altman, Mollyann Brodie, Mario Brossard, And Matt James Postmaterialist Values and the Erosion of Institutional Authority Ronald Inglehart Public Trust and Democracy in Japan Susan J. Pharr Conclusion: Reflections, Conjectures, and Puzzles Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Philip D. Zelikow Notes Contributors Index

Why people don't trust government

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2Fbm.2000.20.pdf

‘Trust — the social virtues and the creation of prosperity’

Designed for the general reader and students of law, this is a concise history and analysis of the civil law tradition, which is dominant in most of Europe, all of Latin America, and many parts of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. This new edition deals with recent significant events& such as the fall of the Soviet empire and the resulting precipitous decline of the socialist legal tradition& and their significance for the civil law tradition. The book also incorporates the findings of recent important literature on the legal cultures of civil law countries.

The Civil Law Tradition. An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America.

the architecture of government rethinking political decentralization are a good way to achieve details about operating certainproducts. Many products that you buy can be obtained using instruction manuals. These user guides are clearlybuilt to give step-by-step information about how you ought to go ahead in operating certain equipments. Ahandbook is really a user's guide to operating the equipments. Should you loose your best guide or even the productwould not provide an instructions, you can easily obtain one on the net. You can search for the manual of yourchoice online. Here, it is possible to work with google to browse through the available user guide and find the mainone you'll need. On the net, you'll be able to discover the manual that you might want with great ease andsimplicity

The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization

Electoral Politics in Post-1997 Hong Kong

Business interests are overrepresented in Hong Kong's nominally democratic political institutions. Many in Hong Kong perceive this as evidence of the existence of “collusion between government and business,” a phenomenon that has stirred public concerns in the city since its sovereignty transfer. Although anecdotal accounts abound, no systematic analysis has been conducted to evaluate the validity of this perception. In this article I use a rich firm-level dataset to offer the first systematic assessment of the effects of political connections on firm performance in Hong Kong. I define politically connected firms as firms that have stakeholders concurrently holding a seat on the Election Committee, a constitutional body that elects the city's chief executive. I found evidence, though not overwhelming, consistent with the “collusion” hypothesis: political connections do improve firm performance measured by return on equity and market-to-book ratio. The improvement is unlikely due to unobserved confounding factors such as firms' inherent ability. As for the origin of the political connections, the data show that a firm's economic power has little predictive value of its connections to the Election Committee. Rather, number of employees matters; firms that hire fewer workers were more likely to gain a seat on the 1997 Election Committee. This result may suggest that Beijing plays a more dominant role in the formation of political connections—that serve Beijing's co-optation needs rather than the interests of powerful firms that may have a desire to “capture” the state.

/pdf/political-connections-and-firm-performance-the-case-of-hong-33k9kvuvil.pdf

Political Connections and Firm Performance: The Case of Hong Kong

The existing literature on authoritarian survival, implicitly or explicitly, assumes that political challenges faced by authoritarian regimes are all domestic. I argue that globalisation exposes authoritarian regimes to new sources of threat. In particular, capital mobility forces authoritarian regimes to deal with not only those who dare to voice out dissatisfaction, but also those who exit. While repression may be the best strategy to silence the vocal, co-optation would be a more effective tool to retain the runaway. It is, however, often impossible to co-opt all the capital owners. As such, authoritarian regimes have to be selective when choosing co-optation targets. I argue that authoritarian regimes would co-opt renowned firms because these firms yield the greatest demonstration effect. Hong Kong provides an interesting case to illustrate my arguments. Beijing strategically co-opted the stakeholders of renowned firms in Hong Kong in order to solve the city's pervasive confidence crisis prio...

Authoritarian Co-optation in the Age of Globalisation: Evidence from Hong Kong

Resource disparity and multi-level elections in competitive authoritarian regimes: Regression discontinuity evidence from Hong Kong ☆

Localist parties have become an emerging force in Hong Kong’s political landscape. What has caused the rise of localism in the city? Extant studies focus on cultural and social factors. In this article, we propose a political economy explanation: global and regional economic factors have caused a housing boom in Hong Kong since the mid-2000s and produced impactful redistributive consequences. While homeowners benefit tremendously from the hike in asset prices, non-homeowners stand to lose. Their divergent economic interests then translate into political preferences; homeowners support political parties that favour the status quo, while non-homeowners tend to support those that challenge it. Using a newly available public opinion survey, we find preliminary evidence in support of our argument. In particular, homeowners are less likely to identify with localist parties and tend to vote for pro-establishment ones. High-income earners, however, are more likely to vote for localist parties.

/pdf/the-housing-boom-and-the-rise-of-localism-in-hong-kong-18fhanl5jw.pdf

Stan Hok-Wui Wong

Papers

Electoral Politics in Post-1997 Hong Kong

Political Connections and Firm Performance: The Case of Hong Kong

Authoritarian Co-optation in the Age of Globalisation: Evidence from Hong Kong

Resource disparity and multi-level elections in competitive authoritarian regimes: Regression discontinuity evidence from Hong Kong ☆

The Housing Boom and the Rise of Localism in Hong Kong: Evidence from the Legislative Council Election in 2016