1. Introduction: constructing Eurocentrism and international theory as Eurocentric construct Part I. 1760-1914: Manifest Eurocentrism and Scientific Racism in International Theory: 2. Eurocentric imperialism: liberalism and Marxism, c.1830-1914 3. Eurocentric anti-imperialism: liberalism, c.1760-1800 4. Racist anti-imperialism: liberalism and cultural-realism, c.1850-1914 5. Racist imperialism: 'racist-realism', liberalism, and socialism, c.1860-1914 Part II. 1914-1945: Manifest/Subliminal Eurocentrism and the High Tide of Scientific Racism in International Theory: 6. Anti-imperialism and the myths of 1919: Eurocentric Marxism and racist cultural-realism, 1914-1945 7. Racist and Eurocentric imperialism: racist-realism, racist-liberalism, and 'progressive' Eurocentric liberalism/Fabianism, 1914-1945 Part III. 1945-1989: Subliminal Eurocentrism in International Theory: 8. Orthodox subliminal Eurocentrism: from classical realism to neorealism, 1945-1989 9. Orthodox subliminal Eurocentrism: neo-liberal institutionalism and the English school, c.1966-1989 10. Critical subliminal Eurocentrism: Gramscianism and world-systems theory, c.1967-1989 Part IV. 1989-2010: Back to the Future of Manifest Eurocentrism in Mainstream International Theory: 11. Imperialist and anti-imperialist Eurocentrism: post-1989 'Western-realism' and the spiritual return to post-1889 racist-realism 12. Imperialist Eurocentrism: post-1989 'Western-liberalism' and the return to post-1830 liberal paternalist Eurocentrism Part V. Conclusion: Mapping the Promiscuous Architecture of Eurocentrism in International Theory, 1760-2010: 13. Constructing civilization: global hierarchy, 'gradated sovereignty' and globalization in international theory, 1760-2010 Bibliography Index.

The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010

Life has been problematized anew by recent social change and scientific innovation. There are important and little studied geographical dimensions to any such understanding of “the politics of life itself,” however. A geographical perspective involves, first, highlighting the spatial aspects of both states and capital, two rather neglected dimensions of vital politics. Elaborating the geographical constitution of vital politics entails further describing the related powers of knowledges and practices. Reflecting on the geographical dimensions of longevity and health leads directly to a recognition of the ethical implications of the geographical luck of birth and residence. Taking up this ethical challenge requires specifying at least six components of geographical justice: culpability, fairness, care, state failure, human rights, and solidarity with environmental and social justice.

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Vital Geographies: Life, Luck, and the Human Condition

...............................................................................................ii Acknowledgments......................................................... .........................iv Chapter One: Introduction...........................................................................1 Chapter Two: Theories of American Empire...................................................45 Chapter Three: The US: Empire or Imperialist..................................................73 Chapter Four: The Years of Illusion, 1989-1998.............................................108 Chapter Five: Prestige and the Bombing of Yugoslavia......................................147 Chapter Six: Indispensable Nation: Prestige and US Unilateralism........................187 Chapter Seven: America Supreme: Prestige and the Invasion of Iraq......................230 Chapter Eight: Conclusion: ......................................................................278 Selective Bibliography............................................................................296

Soaring Eagle: Prestige and American Empire, 1998-2003

The American aggression in Iraq and the campaign in Afghanistan resulted from the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US. 9/11 has had a massive, catalysing effect on the American public, press, main political parties and official foreign policy makers. This article assesses the impact of 9/11 in changing US foreign policy and especially in creating a new foreign policy establishment by comparing it to the consequences of an historical military attack on the United States – Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941. It concludes that there is adequate evidence to suggest that a new bipartisan foreign policy consensus/establishment has emerged.

Catalysing Events, Think Tanks and American Foreign Policy Shifts: A Comparative Analysis of the Impacts of Pearl Harbor 1941 and 11 September 2001

Democratic political processes regulate competition among groups with conflicting preferences. Although much of the competition occurs peacefully within existing political institutions, democratic practices can also facilitate the resolution of intense conflict when the political system is challenged from within by groups fighting against the established government, and when it is challenged from without and on the brink of interstate war. This chapter provides an overview of the scholarly literature linking democracy to peace and conflict resolution, including pertinent theoretical propositions and the balance of evidence generated by empirical researchers. The promise of peace associated with civil liberty, political openness, and the foreign policies of democratic states has long figured into the writings of moral and political philosophers, perhaps most notably in Immanuel Kant’s essay Perpetual Peace, published in 1795. But the burgeoning academic literature in recent decades is largely the product of social scientific research, much (but not all) of which is built upon the analysis of large quantitative data sets. Our primary focus, then, is what social science, and in particular political science, tells us about the relationship between democracy, conflict resolution, and peace between and within states.

Democracy and Conflict Resolution

ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES is the preeminent power in the world, we are not yet an empire. Notwithstanding periodic foreign interventions and our considerable international influence, we have not used our military to secure direct and continuous control over the domestic affairs of foreign lands. If anything, the United States has avoided empire. We have abolished the draft, reduced taxes, cut defense spending, and eschewed nation-building. Only recently, we were accused of "abandoning" Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet departure from that country. Today, Afghanistan may be the germ of a new American imperium. Iraq forces the imperial question. In the aftermath of an Iraqi war, it may suffice to install a friendly autocracy, withdraw the bulk of our forces, and exert our influence from afar. Yet some have called for more. From voices within the administration like Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, to policy intellectuals like Richard Perle, to esteemed scholars like Bernard Lewis, many have argued that only a democratic transformation of Iraq, and eventually of the larger Arab world, can provide long-term security against terrorism and nuclear attack. In an important address in February, George W. Bush lent his voice to this chorus. In no uncertain terms, the president affirmed that "the world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values," not least because "free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder." The president invoked the examples of American-led democratization in post-World War II Germany and Japan, and he pointedly rejected the claim that Arab nations are incapable of sustaining democracy. What the president did not say, yet gently and ambiguously implied, was that so deep a cultural change would require America to occupy Iraq in force and manage its affairs for years to come. Could such a venture in democratic imperialism be harmonized with our liberal principles? Even if so, would it work? Is it possible to bring liberalism to a society so long at odds with the values of the West? All of these questions were posed and answered, both in theory and in practice, during Britain's imperial rule of India. Three great British thinkers, Edmund Burke, James Mill, and John Stuart Mill, not only philosophized about liberal imperialism; they lived it. Burke helped force a major reform of Britain's early imperial system, while John Stuart Mill succeeded his father James as the "chief examiner" in the London headquarters of the British East India Company. Burke on one hand and the Mills on the other founded the two competing moral and administrative schools of thought on the British Empire. Burke's colonialism was conservative, respectful of indigenous practices and elites, and insistent on the highest standards of stewardship. The Mills were skeptical, even contemptuous, of traditional practices and elites; they were determined to force a democratic social transformation. Neither approach, it turns out, was able to operate independently of the other. If we find ourselves shouldering an imperial burden in Iraq or beyond, we shall want to study the wisdom -- and the folly of Burke, the Mills, and their respective disciples. Far more than America's post-World War II occupation of Japan, the British experience in India may be the key precedent for bringing democracy to an undemocratic and non-Western land like Iraq. From India to Iraq BRITISH IMPERIAL India might seem an unlikely model for an American occupation of Iraq. American rule in Iraq would ideally be a successful and time-limited experiment in democratization. Yet the British governed sections of the Indian subcontinent for nearly 200 years. The earliest period of British colonial rule was marked by extreme exploitation and neglect. Once colonial government was placed on a sounder footing, even the best-intentioned policies of dedicated and sympa thetic administrators frequently went awry, leading to serious social disruption. …

Democratic Imperialism: A Blueprint

This is Samuel P. Huntington's moment. The world of cultural and religious strife anticipated by Huntington in his much-discussed (and widely excoriated) book, The Clash of Civilizations, has unquestionably arrived. Yet whether we might also someday see an alternative world -- the global triumph of democracy envisioned in Francis Fukuyama's brilliant work, The End of History and the Last Man -- is also a question that seems very much before us as we contemplate what it would mean to "win" the war in which we are engaged. The question of our time may now be whether Huntington's culture clash or Fukuyama's pax democratica is the world's most plausible future. This is a question with policy implications, of course, and both The Clash of Civilizations and The End of History are, in part, books about policy -- what the United States government should do. Ultimately, however, to choose between Fukuyama and Huntington is to articulate a vision of human social life. What are the mainsprings of human action? How salient is religion as a cultural force? Is democracy the most civilized and natural way of life? Questions like these are at the heart of the contest between Huntington and Fukuyama, and we can take the measure of the concomitant policy disputes only by moving through these larger problems, not around them. Philosophically and spiritually, The End of History and The Clash of Civilizations could hardly be more different (although each book can fairly be called "conservative"). Read closely, unexpected areas of convergence emerge. Nonetheless, ultimately, neither Huntington nor Fukuyama tells us what we need to know in order to synthesize their perspectives -- or to finally decide between them. The books are at once complementary and irreconcilable. Taken together, they frame our current perplexity. So let us explore the dilemma that is the state of the world at the moment by considering each book in turn. (1) Templates of conflict Anyone who has followed the war and the debates surrounding it will find something familiar and thought-provoking on nearly every page of The Clash of Civilizations. The book often reads as though it had been written this year. It's easy to forget how controversial it was when it appeared. For all the respectful (if often skeptical) attention Huntington's views have garnered from the policy community, his reception within the academy, among liberal opinion makers, and in many overseas capitals has been, and remains, overwhelmingly hostile. The reason why is that The Clash of Civilizations sticks a thumb in the eye of liberalism and multiculturalism alike. For Fukuyama, the mainspring of history is the liberal yearning for equal recognition. Huntington gruffly retorts, "It is human to hate." Humans require identity, and they acquire it, says Huntington, through the enemies they choose. With the collapse of Cold War enmities, new forms of identity will inevitably be constructed upon new patterns of hostility. Differences of religion and culture, says Huntington, will provide the needed template for the clashes to come. This vision of a civilizational state of nature in which hatred is rife and trust and friendship rare was bound to get a rocky reception in a nation where every other ad or song is about harmony. But Huntington pushes his argument further. Not content to affirm the inevitability of human hatred, or to predict the rise of cultural antagonisms in general, Huntington singles out "the Muslim propensity toward violent conflict" as the most important coming challenge to world peace and American power. "Muslim bellicosity and violence," says Huntington, "are late-twentieth-century facts which neither Muslims nor non-Muslims can deny." Yet until last September, deny they did. For the post-September 11 reader, watching Huntington demolish President Clinton's contention (SO like the current president's) that the West has no problem with Islam, but only with violent Islamic extremists, is a fascinating bit of reverse deja vu: The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. …

Stanley Kurtz

Papers

Democratic Imperialism: A Blueprint

The Future of "History": Francis Fukuyama vs. Samuel P. Huntington