Confirmation bias, as the term is typically used in the psychological literature, connotes the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a h...

/pdf/confirmation-bias-a-ubiquitous-phenomenon-in-many-guises-18m0fi8wck.pdf

Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises:

The literature on interference in the Stroop Color-Word Task, covering over 50 years and some 400 studies, is organized and reviewed. In so doing, a set of 18 reliable empirical finding is isolated that must be captured by any successful theory of the Stroop effect. Existing theoretical positions are summarized and evaluated in view of this critical evidence and the 2 major candidate theories ―relative speed of processing and automaticity of reading― are found to be wanting. It is concluded that recent theories placing the explanatory weight on parallel processing of the irrelevant and the relevant dimensions are likely to be more sucessful than are earlier theories attempting to locate a single bottleneck in attention

/pdf/half-a-century-of-research-on-the-stroop-effect-an-31uxjoznng.pdf

Half a century of research on the Stroop effect: an integrative review.

This article reviews a diverse set of proposals for dual processing in higher cognition within largely disconnected literatures in cognitive and social psychology. All these theories have in common the distinction between cognitive processes that are fast, automatic, and unconscious and those that are slow, deliberative, and conscious. A number of authors have recently suggested that there may be two architecturally (and evolutionarily) distinct cognitive systems underlying these dual-process accounts. However, it emerges that (a) there are multiple kinds of implicit processes described by different theorists and (b) not all of the proposed attributes of the two kinds of processing can be sensibly mapped on to two systems as currently conceived. It is suggested that while some dual-process theories are concerned with parallel competing processes involving explicit and implicit knowledge systems, others are concerned with the influence of preconscious processes that contextualize and shape deliberative reasoning and decision-making.

/pdf/dual-processing-accounts-of-reasoning-judgment-and-social-118hw7hde7.pdf

Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition

A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Distinctions have been proposed between systems of reasoning for centuries. This article distills properties shared by many of these distinctions and characterizes the resulting systems in light of recent findings and theoretical developments. One system is associative because its computations reflect similarity structure and relations of temporal contiguity. The other is "rule based" because it operates on symbolic structures that have logical content and variables and because its computations have the properties that are normally assigned to rules. The systems serve complementary functions and can simultaneously generate different solutions to a reasoning problem. The rule-based system can suppress the associative system but not completely inhibit it. The article reviews evidence in favor of the distinction and its characterization. One of the oldest conundrums in psychology is whether people are best conceived as parallel processors of information who operate along diffuse associative links or as analysts who operate by deliberate and sequential manipulation of internal representations. Are inferences drawn through a network of learned associative pathways or through application of a kind of"psychologic" that manipulates symbolic tokens in a rule-governed way? The debate has raged (again) in cognitive psychology for almost a decade now. It has pitted those who prefer models of mental phenomena to be built out of networks of associative devices that pass activation around in parallel and distributed form (the way brains probably function) against those who prefer models built out of formal languages in which symbols are composed into sentences that are processed sequentially (the way computers function). An obvious solution to the conundrum is to conceive of the

/pdf/the-empirical-case-for-two-systems-of-reasoning-3qiztlk5di.pdf

The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.

The Impact of Prior Task Experience on Bias in Predictions of Duration Kevin E. Thomas (k.e.thomas@plymouth.ac.uk) School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth. Devon. PL4 8AA. UK. Stephen E. Newstead (s.newstead@plymouth.ac.uk) School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth. Devon. PL4 8AA. UK. Simon J. Handley (s.handley@plymouth.ac.uk) School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth. Devon. PL4 8AA. UK. Abstract The effect of prior experience on bias in time predictions on two different types of laboratory task was examined in two studies. Experiment 1 revealed that prior experience of performing a substantial part of the same task led to greater time prediction accuracy. However, contrary to the weight of previous research, there was little evidence of the temporal underestimation indicative of the planning fallacy. In fact, temporal underestimation only occurred on a longer duration task when it was preceded by a much shorter task, which was either related (Experiments 1 and 2) or unrelated to it (Experiment 2). In contrast, temporal overestimation prevailed on tasks ranging from about 30 seconds’ to four minutes’ duration. Contrary to the theory of the planning fallacy, these studies indicate that people do take account of their performance on previous tasks and use such distributional information when predicting task duration. The potential role of the anchoring and adjustment cognitive heuristics in determining temporal misestimation is discussed. Introduction The process of predicting task duration has been the subject of considerable research (e.g., Buehler, Griffin & MacDonald, 1997; Koole & Van’t Spijker, 2000). In general, such research has produced evidence of temporal underestimation on various laboratory (e.g., Josephs & Hahn, 1995) and real world tasks (e.g., Buehler, Griffin & Ross, 1994). Such research supports the cognitive judgment phenomenon known as the planning fallacy, which is the tendency to underestimate task duration despite being aware that previous similar activities took longer than anticipated (Buehler, Griffin & Ross, 2002). The planning fallacy was identified by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who suggest that distinct two types of data are available to people when predicting task duration. Namely, singular information, which is data about the task at hand; and distributional information, which concerns data about previous tasks. An aspect of singular information is the amount of work involved in completing a current task, whereas personal performance on previous similar tasks is an aspect of distributional information. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose that the planning fallacy is a consequence of heuristic information processing whereby singular information becomes the focus of attention at the expense of distributional information, which is overlooked. Hence, temporal underestimation occurs because the current task is treated as a unique event, which is dissociated from previous similar activities. Given that the neglect of distributional information has been suggested as a possible cause of the planning fallacy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), it is notable that the issue of prior task experience has received little empirical treatment in relation to time estimation. One exception is the work of Thomas, Newstead and Handley (2003; see also Thomas, Handley & Newstead, 2004), which revealed that prior experience of performing (or mentally planning how to complete) certain laboratory tasks led to a reduction in temporal misestimation. However, Thomas et al. (2003) found little evidence of the temporal underestimation indicative of the planning fallacy on short duration (i.e., up to four minutes’ duration) laboratory tasks such as the Tower of Hanoi. In fact, there was evidence of general temporal overestimation on such tasks, with underestimation only occurring on longer tasks when they were preceded by a shorter version of the same task. For example, temporal underestimation prevailed on the five-disk Tower of Hanoi task only when the three-disk version of this task was performed beforehand. The findings of Thomas et al. (2003) indicate that there are certain tasks on which the temporal underestimation indicative of the planning fallacy does not occur and is reversed. Thomas et al. (2003) suggest that the temporal underestimation they observed may have been a consequence of participants using the anchoring and adjustment cognitive judgmental heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). That is, information such as the perceived duration of the first task served as an anchor for time predictions on the second task, which were insufficiently adjusted according to the greater demands of the upcoming task. Such a judgment strategy would be expected to result in temporal underestimation if the perceived duration of a just-completed shorter task served as a basis for time predictions on a current task. A principal aim of the present research was to further address the issue of prior experience by employing laboratory tasks that are not only less artificial than those employed by Thomas et al. (2003), but are more akin to the ones used in previous research supporting the planning fallacy (e.g., Byram, 1997). That is, tasks that have well-

/pdf/the-impact-of-prior-task-experience-on-bias-in-predictions-3uwwfwefec.pdf

The Impact of prior task experience on bias in predictions of duration

This study investigates semantic constraints in reversible sentences and their relationship to sentence perception. In Expt. I, subjects were given anagrams of reversible sentences to solve, and any preferences for one version of the sentence over the other were taken to indicate the presence of semantic constraints in that sentence. In the second part of the experiment, subjects were presented with these sentences masked with white noise, and there was found to be a relationship between the semantic constraints and the ease of perceiving the sentences. Expts. II and III provide evidence that these constraints derive from a knowledge of the overall relationship expressed in the sentence rather than from the meanings of individual words. Previous experiments have failed to find any effect of semantic constraints in sentence perception; this discrepancy is explained in terms of the strategies subjects might have adopted in the various tasks.

Semantic constraints and sentence perception

Dual Processes and Training in Statistical Principles Helen L. Neilens (hneilens@plymouth.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Drake Circus Plymouth, PL4 8AA UK Simon J. Handley (shandley@plymouth.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Drake Circus Plymouth, PL4 8AA UK Stephen E. Newstead (snewstead@plymouth.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Drake Circus Plymouth, PL4 8AA UK Abstract A statistical training study is reported which demonstrates that analytic responding on everyday reasoning problems can be increased after instruction in statistical principles. Participants were given training on the Law of Large Numbers (Fong, Krantz and Nisbett, 1986). Bias was eliminated, but only on written justifications of their responses. Belief-based responding was still utilized when participants were asked for a quick indication of argument strength on a rating scale, thus demonstrating a dissociation between analytic and belief-based responding. Findings are discussed in terms of dual process theories of reasoning. Keywords: Dual processes, critical thinking, belief-motivated reasoning, Law of Large Numbers, training. Introduction In recent years, many researchers have adopted a two-process model of reasoning to explain the heuristic and belief-based influences on reasoning and decision making (Evans & Over, 1996; Stanovich, 1999; Epstein, 1994). The hypothesis is that there are two distinct systems underlying reasoning and decision making. System 1 consists of both innate and domain-specific knowledge acquired through learning and System 2 is related to intelligence and analytic reasoning. It is believed that belief-based and pragmatically cued responses can be interpreted under System 1 processing and logical or analytic responses can be interpreted under System 2. The two systems compete with each other for control dependent on the context of the problem or argument. It is argued that it is System 2 that is sensitive to instruction and permits abstract hypothetical thinking that cannot be achieved by System 1 (Evans, 2003). The aim of the experiment reported here was to investigate whether training in an intuitive rule system, the Law of Large Numbers, could impact on System 1 belief-based responses. The Law of Large Numbers is proposed to be an intuitive version of a statistical rule which people use to solve inferential problems in everyday life. The LLN rule states, ‘the certainty with which an inference about a population can be drawn increases as the size of a sample drawn from that population increases’ (Klaczynski, Gordon & Fauth, 1997). In order for an individual to apply this intuitive knowledge of the LLN principle it is important that these rules are cued by elements of a problem, such as the sampling process is made clear in order for the information to appear relevant, i.e. it is clear that there is a single trial or many repeated trials as with throwing a dice. Secondly, the role of chance in producing events is clear (Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson & Kunda, 1983). More recently a series of studies have been reported which demonstrate that LLN reasoning can be evoked on everyday reasoning problems when the conclusion is incongruent with a person’s beliefs (Klaczynski & Fauth, 1997; Klaczynski, Gordon & Fauth, 1997). Klaczynski et al. ascertained participants’ occupational goals and then presented them with nine reasoning problems which consisted of conclusions that were either enhancing, threatening or neutral to their desired goal. They found that more sophisticated reasoning strategies, such as law of large numbers reasoning, were utilized when the conclusion was threatening to their occupational goal. These analytic strategies were employed to discredit the evidence presented. Klaczynski et al. concluded that strategies are changed to suit the goal of the individual at an intrinsic level and the biases participants are displaying are self-serving. There is a great deal of evidence in previous research to suggest that belief-based influences impact on everyday reasoning (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Nisbett and Ross describe research findings as far back as the 17 th century illustrating people’s tendency to cling to preconceived beliefs and theories in the face of new evidence that should discredit them. Lord et al. provided evidence to show that supportive evidence serves to strengthen a person’s initial belief whereas opposing evidence using the same methods does not much affect belief. One explanation proposed to account for such findings is the selective scrutiny theory of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983). Individuals focus on the conclusion and if it is consistent with their beliefs they will then accept it but if it is inconsistent with their beliefs then they will examine the logic of the problem to see whether it is valid or not. On critical reasoning

/pdf/dual-processes-and-training-in-statistical-principles-57lvucvmlb.pdf

Dual Processes and Training in Statistical Principles

A major aim of psychology education is to train students in psychological literacy – the ability to apply psychological knowledge to everyday activities. In this paper we explore how well this has been achieved in recent years. As a result of Covid-19 the focus of teaching in recent months has inevitably been on developing online methods of teaching and attempts to develop psychological literacy have of necessity received less attention. However, we argue that the developments enforced by Covid-19 actually open up a range of new possibilities and that psychological literacy can benefit from these changes. In particular, we suggest that much of the transmission of psychological knowledge can continue to take place online and that universities should become places where the focus is on the application of that knowledge.

Stephen E. Newstead

Papers

The Impact of prior task experience on bias in predictions of duration

Semantic constraints and sentence perception

Dual Processes and Training in Statistical Principles

Psychology education in the post-Covid world