This article reviews the key role that case study methods have played in the study of international relations (IR) in the United States. Case studies in the IR subfield are not the unconnected, ath...

Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield

There is broad scholarly consensus that the relative power of the United States is declining and that this decline will have negative consequences for international politics. This pessimism is justified by the belief that great powers have few options to deal with acute relative decline. Retrenchment is seen as a hazardous policy that demoralizes allies and encourages external predation. Faced with shrinking means, great powers are thought to have few options to stave off decline short of preventive war. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, retrenchment is not a relatively rare and ineffective policy instrument. A comparison of eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 demonstrates that great powers frequently engage in retrenchment and that retrenchment is often effective. In addition, we find that prevailing explanations overstate the importance of democracies, bureaucracies, and interest groups in inhibiting retrenchment. In fact, the rate of decline can account for both the extent a...

Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment

Despite the intense focus on China's rise, the United States has yet to confront the most challenging question posed by this power shift: Should it pursue a strategy of limited geopolitical accommo...

A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation

Using a theory of foreign policy based on the concept of national identity, Vucetic shows how English-speaking states have affected global security and prosperity for more than a century. Beginning with an analysis of the "great rapprochement" between the United States and Britain in the early 20th century, Vucetic examines the politics of international security cooperation among Anglosphere nations in Korea, Suez, Vietnam and Iraq.

The "Anglosphere": A Genealogy of an Identity in International Relations

ion address on January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush announced that as part of its post–September 11 security agenda, the United States would seek to prevent terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda from establishing links with three regimes—North Korea, Iraq, and Iran—that together form an “axis of evil.” These regimes, declared Bush, are intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with which to threaten the United States and its allies. Bush’s speech raises two dilemmas for the United States and its Asian allies regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). The arst involves understanding the signiacance of eighteen months of diplomatic initiatives by Pyongyang that began with the normalization of relations with the European Union, followed by a summit with the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) in June 2000, DPRK special envoy Gen. Myongnok Jo’s visit to Washington in August 2000, and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s trip to Pyongyang in October 2000. The juxtaposition of Bush’s declaration with these initiatives raises more questions than it answers about U.S. perceptions of North Korea’s intentions. Is the DPRK truly on the path to reform following the long period of uncertainty dating back to President Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994? Is North Korea’s current dictator, Kim Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula Victor D. Cha

Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula

A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 2002 Since the 1930s, appeasement has been labeled as a futile and possibly dangerous policy. In this landmark study, Stephen Rock seeks to restore appeasement to its proper place as a legitimate--and potentially successful--diplomatic strategy. Appeasement was discredited by Neville Chamberlain's disastrous attempt to satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial ambitions and avoid war in 1938. Rock argues, however, that there is very little evidence to support the belief that dissatisfied states and their leaders cannot be appeased or that appeasement undermines a state's credibility in later attempts at deterrence. Rock looks at five case studies from the past 100 years, revealing under what conditions appeasement can achieve its goals. From British appeasement of the United States near the beginning of the twentieth century to American conciliation of North Korea in the early 1990s, Rock concludes that appeasement succeeds or fails depending on the nature of the adversary, the nature of the inducements used on the antagonist, and the existence of other incentives for the adversary to acquiesce. Appeasement in International Politics suggests the type of appeasement strategy most appropriate for various situations. The options range from pure inducements, reciprocity, to a mixture of inducements and threats. In addition to this theoretical framework, Rock's explicit comparison of appeasement and deterrence offers important guidelines for policymakers on when and how to implement a strategy of appeasement. At a time when the strategy of engagement plays an increasingly central--and controversial--role in U.S. foreign policy, Appeasement in International Politics reestablishes the long-discredited use of inducements as an effective means of preventing conflict.

Stephen R. Rock

Papers

Appeasement in International Politics