Between 1989 and 1999, U.S. electric utilities spent $14.7 billion on demand-side management (DSM) programs aimed at encouraging their customers to make investments in energy efficiency. This study relies on panel data on 324 utilities spanning 11 years to estimate the effect of DSM expenditures on retail electricity sales. Our estimates imply that DSM had a much smaller effect on retail electricity sales than do estimates reported by utilities themselves over the same study period.

Demand-Side Management and Energy Efficiency in the United States

Methodology for assessing electric vehicle charging infrastructure business models

Paying people to protect the environment: A meta-analysis of financial incentive interventions to promote proenvironmental behaviors

Energy efficiency policies are a primary avenue for reducing carbon emissions, with potential additional benefits from improved air quality and energy security. We review literature on a broad range of existing non-transportation energy efficiency policies covering appliance standards, financial incentives, information and voluntary programs, and government energy use (building and professional codes are not included). Estimates indicate these programs are likely to have collectively saved up to 4 quads of energy annually, with appliance standards and utility demand-side management likely making up at least half these savings. Energy Star, Climate Challenge, and 1605b voluntary emissions reductions may also contribute significantly to aggregate energy savings, but how much of these savings would have occurred absent these programs is less clear. Although even more uncertain, reductions in CO2, NOX, SO2, and PM-10 associated with energy savings may contribute about 10% more to the value of energy savings.

Retrospective Examination of Demand- Side Energy Efficiency Policies

This paper considers the design, incentives and effectiveness of U.S. demand side management (DSM) programs and tries to explain why this ambitious, almost unanimously embraced initiative failed. Problems on the demand side result from consumers' private information that implies that substantial principal-agent slippage must accompany any conservation incentive the utility offers to the consumer. Moreover, the regulatory incentives induce the American utility to select inefficient programs. Therefore, the utility has little to gain from deterring such strategic reactions and cheating by consumers. As a consequence, the reported conservation exists largely on paper but not in reality. This ex-post assessment is important for two reasons. First, European countries (Scandinavia, Germany, Austria and others) have been eager to repeat this American regulatory 'success'. Second, the problems addressed in this paper would apply to another round of conservation programs induced by the concern about global warming.

Lessons from Utility Conservation Programs

** Member, University of California Energy Institute Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley BS, Cornell University, 1966; PhD, Economics, Stanford University, 1976 The authors express their appreciation to the Universitywide Energy Institute for the group's support of this work Additionally, the authors are grateful to Arzou Ahsan, Haru Connolly, David Howe, Matthew Nagler, Chudozie Okongwu and Clara Wang for excellent research assistance, and to Tracy Lewis, Michael Riordan and Carl Blumstein for helpful comments A Review and Analysis of Electric Utility Conservation Incentives

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Steven Stoft

Papers

A Review and Analysis of Electric Utility Conservation Incentives