A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X00003435

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

The program of research now known as the heuristics and biases approach began with a survey of 84 participants at the 1969 meetings of the Mathematical Psychology Society and the American Psychological Association (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). The respondents, including several authors of statistics texts, were asked realistic questions about the robustness of statistical estimates and the replicability of research results. The article commented tongue-in-heek on the prevalence of a belief that the law of large numbers applies to small numbers as well: Respondents placed too much confidence in the results of small samples, and their statistical judgments showed little sensitivity to sample size. The mathematical psychologists who participated in the survey not only should have known better – they did know better. Although their intuitive guesses were off the mark, most of them could have computed the correct answers on the back of an envelope. These sophisticated individuals apparently had access to two distinct approaches for answering statistical questions: one that is spontaneous, intuitive, effortless, and fast; and another that is deliberate, rule-governed, effortful, and slow. The persistence of large biases in the guesses of experts raised doubts about the educability of statistical intuitions. Moreover, it was known that the same biases affect choices in the real world, where researchers commonly select sample sizes that are too small to provide a fair test of their hypotheses (Cohen, 1969, 1992).

Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.

The affect heuristic

This article presents a new theory of subjective probability according to which different descriptions of the same event can give rise to different judgments. The experimental evidence confirms the major predictions of the theory. First, judged probability increases by unpacking the focal hypothesis and decreases by unpacking the alternative hypothesis. Second, judged probabilities are complementary in the binary case and subadditive in the general case, contrary to both classical and revisionist models of belief. Third, subadditivity is more pronounced for probability judgments than for frequency judgments and is enhanced by compatible evidence. The theory provides a unified treatment of a wide range of empirical findings. It is extended to ordinal judgments and to the assessment of upper and lower probabilities. Both laypeople and experts are often called upon to evaluate the probability of uncertain events such as the outcome of a trial, the result of a medical operation, the success of a business venture, or the winner of a football game. Such assessments play an important role in deciding, respectively, whether to go to court, undergo surgery, invest in the venture, or bet on the home team. Uncertainty is usually expressed in verbal terms (e.g., unlikely or probable), but numerical estimates are also common. Weather forecasters, for example, often report the probability of rain (Murphy, 1985), and economists are sometimes required to estimate the chances of recession (Zarnowitz, 1985). The theoretical and practical significance of subjective probability has inspired psychologists, philosophers, and statisticians to investigate this notion from both descriptive and prescriptive standpoints.

Support theory: A nonextensional representation of subjective probability.

Social conflict : escalation, stalemate, and settlement

Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and settlement, 2nd ed.

Expectations are a natural and necessary element in all negotiation. As one of the most important approaches to the settlement of conflict, negotiation necessarily entails the exchange of ambiguous information—about both one's adversary and the problem at hand. It is precisely because of this ambiguity that expectations, both intrapersonal and interpersonal, come to play an important role. While such expectations can be helpful in bringing about conflict settlement through negotiation, they can also contribute to the escalation of conflict and can move conflict in destructive directions. This article outlines both the beneficial and harmful effects of expectations in negotiation and speculates about some possible approaches to overcoming the negative effects of expectations.

Expectancy Effects and Negotiation

본 연구의 목적은 국내 소년 살인 범죄와 소년 살인범들의 실태와 특성을 탐색하여 소년 살인 예방과 관련 정책 입안을 위한 기초자료를 제공하고자 한다. 이를 위해 대법 원 판결문 검색시스템을 통하여 2013년부터 2021년까지 공개된 국내 만14세～18세 사 이의소년들이 피고인인 소년살인사건(기수, 미수, 예비, 음모, 방조 포함) 형사 1심 판 결문 33건을 수집하여 소년 살인 범죄와 살인범의 특성을 분석하였다. 그 결과 소년 살 인 범죄의 가해자 75.8%가 평균 16.95세의 남자 소년들로 친족, 연인, 지인과 같은 아는 관계(8.18%)의 피해자를 살해하여 평균 장기 89.2월, 단기 37.7월의 유기징역을 선고받 은 것을 확인하였다. 이러한 소년 살인범들은 표현적 동기(치정·애정 문제, 말다툼, 불 화·가족 문제 등)로 인해 우발적 살인을 저지르는 경향이 나타났다. 아울러, 대부분 비 음주상태에서 단독으로 범행을 실행했고, 다수의 공범이 존재하는사춘기집단살인 범 죄도12.1%나존재하였다. 또한가해자의 33%는ADHD, 조울증등 정신질환을 가지고 있었다. 이러한 분석 결과를 근거로 소년 살인 예방을 위한 형사사법적 개선과 제도권 내 교육에 대한 정책적 제언과 후속 연구의 필요성을 제안하였다. 

Sung Hee Kim

Papers

Social conflict : escalation, stalemate, and settlement

Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and settlement, 2nd ed.

Expectancy Effects and Negotiation

Characteristics of Juvenile Homicide Crime: Judgment Analysis